

HUMANNESS AND DEHUMANIZATION

Edited by

PAUL G. BAIN, JEROEN VAES, AND JACQUES-PHILIPPE LEYENS

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Humanness and Dehumanization

What does it mean to be human? Why do people dehumanize others (and sometimes themselves)? These questions have only recently begun to be investigated in earnest within psychology. This volume presents the latest thinking about these and related questions from research leaders in the field of humanness and dehumanization in social psychology and related disciplines. Contributions provide new insights into the history of dehumanization and its different types, and new theories are proposed for when and why dehumanization occurs. While people's views about what humanness is, and who has it, have long been known as important in understanding ethnic conflict, contributors demonstrate its relevance in other domains, including medical practice, policing, gender relations, and our relationship with the natural environment. Cultural differences and similarities in beliefs about humanness are explored, along with strategies to overcome dehumanization.

In highlighting emerging ideas and theoretical perspectives, describing current theoretical issues and controversies and ways to resolve them, and extending research to new areas, this volume will influence research on humanness and dehumanization for many years.

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1 Advances in Understanding Humanness and Dehumanization

Paul G. Bain, Jeroen Vaes, and Jacques-Philippe Leyens

Editing a book can be an exciting and daunting process, but it is the excitement that keeps things going. We are very excited to have the opportunity to coordinate a volume showcasing new ideas and thinking in the linked fields of humanness and dehumanization. This derives from both the fascinating ideas of our contributors, and because it shows that this critical field of research is gaining broader recognition. Ideas about humanness are important in many sciences, ranging from biology to sociology, and are consequential in other fields, from religion to politics. However, the importance of beliefs about humanness is a relatively recent interest in psychology, even though it pervades many aspects of human functioning and interaction.

One of the aims of this introductory chapter is to introduce this field of research to those who might be less familiar with it, and to address a number of basic issues that might help readers understand the nature and importance of this area of research. This includes a brief exposition of its historical and theoretical background (expanded on in some chapters in this volume). We follow with a brief description of the contributions to this book, which span novel theories and approaches to understanding dehumanization, the application of dehumanization to new areas (such as crime and

policing, medicine, gender, and interpersonal relationships), and novel perspectives on what it means to be human and its consequences.

A (Very) Brief Background to Humanness and Dehumanization Research

Ideas about humanness imbue our everyday lives and the theories developed to describe our behavior. Philosophers invoke images of human nature to inform their ethical and political philosophies, such as Hobbes (1996/1651) who argued that humans feared evil but were not concerned about the common good. Within psychology, Wrightsman (1992) was one of the first to empirically examine people's general beliefs about humanness, and others have focused on specific aspects of human nature such as free will (Fahrenberg & Cheetham, 2007) or specific constructs such as values (Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006). Some researchers have highlighted how conceptions of humanness are the site of ideological debate, as interested groups and individuals define humanness in ways that support their own ends. A good example is the claim that humans are rational and self-interested, which does not just reflect a simplification in economic theory but is used to justify support and opposition toward government policies and intervention (Schwartz, 1986).

A unified definition of humanness between sciences seems therefore a utopia, partly because it is an abstract, often metaphysically tinged concept and partly because we are all involved parties. Several researchers agree, however, that we can learn a lot about humanity when looking at its violations (Kaufmann, Kuch, Neuhäuser, & Webster, 2011). Focusing on processes of dehumanization often makes that which is denied concrete and almost tangible. Although dehumanization is relevant to many fields, it is perhaps most contentious (and has received most attention) when applied in intergroup contexts. Symbolically powerful and enduring examples of dehumanization are the different genocides committed in the past century. However, dehumanization has a much

longer history. For example, from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment, European intellectuals were preoccupied with stories of savages, barbarians, and exotic tales of humanoid creatures and monsters (see Jahoda, 1999). It is thus fitting that our volume begins with Jahoda's further exploration of this history, covering the period from the late-18th century to the mid-20th century (Chapter 2). Jahoda focuses on how learned philosophers and scientists of the period tried to objectively establish that some races were superior to others. By tracking racialism and the scientific and philosophical endeavors used to justify it right up to the mid-20th century, he shows how these ideas laid the groundwork and justification for Nazi racial ideology providing a context for modern ideas about humanness and psychological theories of dehumanization.

Of course, with the abundance of armed conflicts, dehumanization remained an important topic of research in the latter half of the 20th century. There was a continued focus on overt forms of dehumanization—the literal description or treatment of others as nonhuman. Of particular concern was how viewing others as nonhuman allowed us to morally "disengage" from them—justifying treating them as animals as undermining the legitimacy of their views and needs (Bandura, 1999; Bar-Tal, 1989; Opotow, 2001).

Yet despite this long history, our understanding of dehumanization has recently come a long way in a short period, kick-started at the turn of the century by the discovery that dehumanization is not just restricted to extreme or overt prejudice but can occur subtly and even without conscious awareness (Leyens et al., 2000). The impetus that arose from this "infrahumanization" (a term chosen to distinguish this subtle denial of humanness from overt dehumanization) was shown to be a pervasive feature of intergroup perception (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Leyens et al., 2001) and to have meaningful behavioral consequences (e.g., Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Infrahumanization is observed through the attribution or association of characteristics that are uniquely human ("human uniqueness," or HU), such as complex emotions like embarrassment or optimism, more to an ingroup than to an outgroup. In contrast, basic emotions (e.g., fear, pleasure) are shared with animals, and

thus their attribution across groups is less relevant to dehumanization (Leyens et al., 2000). The HU sense of humanness corresponds to a distinction between humans and animals, so its denial to others is sometimes called “animalistic” dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). The burgeoning field of infrahumanization has been the subject of extensive reviews (Leyens et al., 2007; Vaes, Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012).

Haslam (2006) made an important further contribution by noting that humanness can be defined not only by what is uniquely human (as in infrahumanization), but also by what is typically human. These core human characteristics form what is called “human nature” (or HN). The denial of HN implies lacking characteristics such as emotionality, agency, warmth, and cognitive flexibility, making people resemble machines or robots, and thus has been called “mechanistic” dehumanization. People typically attribute greater HN characteristics, especially negative ones, to themselves than to other individuals (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Loughnan et al., 2010) and sometimes deny HN to other groups (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009).

To better understand the HU and HN conceptions of humanness and their role in dehumanization, it can also be helpful to explain what these effects are not. Some people perceived that the greater attribution of HN to the self than to others was another way to measure the “better-than-average” effect—where people attribute more favorable characteristics to themselves than to others (Alicke, 1985). However, it has been demonstrated that self-humanizing is distinct from the “better-than-average” effect (Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan et al., 2010), and that attributions of humanness are not reducible to merely attributing more positive characteristics to the self (Haslam & Bain, 2007) or the ingroup (Bain et al., 2009). Similarly, early studies in infrahumanization were sometimes understood in terms of ingroup favoritism (assigning more positive attributes to the ingroup), but statistical analyses have shown that the two phenomena were completely different (Demoulin et al., 2009). In particular, these findings cannot be explained by the valence of the characteristics, as both positive and negative emotions are attributed more to the ingroup (Leyens et al., 2001). As

a result, we can be confident that both HN and HU forms of dehumanization are not reducible to viewing the self or ingroup positively and outgroups negatively.

Another perspective has interpreted these findings in terms of models of stereotyping, particularly the stereotype content model that posits two dimensions of stereotypes—warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Research has shown that HU and HN senses of humanness are related but conceptually distinct from these stereotype content dimensions (Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008). Reflecting this relationship, groups lacking both warmth and competence are especially likely to be dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006), and Vaes and Paladino (2010) found that more competent outgroups were dehumanized less.

Overall, the novelty and usefulness of ideas about humanness and dehumanization, along with their distinctiveness from other theoretical understandings, has led to an impressive literature—more than 140 publications. Researchers have not only used the basic concepts, but also enriched the field with their own approaches and theoretical modifications. One issue with this surge in research has been some disclarity about whether researchers are investigating similar or distinct phenomena. This is where Haslam's contribution (Chapter 3) is especially valuable. Haslam describes a three-dimensional framework that imposes a coherent structure on the multitude of approaches to dehumanization. His framework distinguishes three dimensions: the type of nonhuman comparison (animal or object), the degree to which it is held or expressed consciously (implicit or explicit), and whether it involves an absolute judgment or a relative comparison (absolute or relative). Haslam then discusses how prominent dehumanization theories and findings can be understood within this framework and considers alternative conceptualizations as goals for further research.

Where to From Here?

In producing this volume, we were in the enviable position to ask leaders in the field their views about the most important issues for

this field, now and into the future. Of course, there were diverse responses! However, we attempt to bring these different strands of thought together in a concluding chapter (Chapter 17). Here, we outline the major areas that these scholars addressed.

Why Do We Dehumanize?

One class of contributions, which is discussed in Part 1, has moved beyond showing that we dehumanize others (in both obvious and subtle ways) to understanding why subtle, implicit forms of dehumanization are so widespread. The contribution of Waytz, Schroeder, and Epley (Chapter 4) argues that it arises from the difficulty of fully understanding minds other than our own—while we are aware of the internal complexities of our own mind, when we try to understand other minds, they will always seem a bit more simplistic. This suggests that dehumanization is a default state that can only be overcome by effort. This idea has several corollaries, and they explore the implications of each.

The contribution of Lee and Harris (Chapter 5) also focuses on the problem of knowing others' minds as a default judgment, focusing on its neuropsychological correlates. Importantly, they argue that even though our basic state is to not fully recognize others' mental states, this can be easily overcome by directing people to think about the distinct mental states of another—thinking about them as individuals—and this has the effect of humanizing them. This suggests that both motivation and contextual cues (to think of others as individuals vs. category members) can temper or even reverse processes of dehumanization.

The contribution of Hodson, MacInnis, and Costello (Chapter 6) expands this rationale even further, considering cognitive and motivational bases for dehumanization. They argue that dehumanization of other groups rests in part on the division we make between humans and animals (interspecies model of prejudice). In addition, they broaden consideration of attributions of both lesser *and* greater humanity to others, which they argue varies as a function of how valued a group is and whether it is seen as a threat. This is one of the few theoretical perspectives that allows for

superhumanization of others, in particular gods and demons, potentially extending to those with comparable powers on Earth, such as kings and dictators.

Heflick and Goldenberg (Chapter 7) focus on terror management (managing awareness of one's own death) as an important function of dehumanization. Reminders of our animal nature (i.e., that we are creatures like any other and thus will die) undermines one of our defenses against this mortal terror (i.e., that we can be at least symbolically immortal through our shared human culture). Hence, when we are reminded of our animal features, we react to view ourselves and our ingroups as more uniquely human. However, they also argue that our defense against this terror can be achieved by viewing ourselves as objects (deny HN, or see ourselves and groups in machinelike ways) because, unlike animals, objects and machines do not die. Thus, just as terror management can lead to (animalistic) dehumanization of others, it can also lead to the (mechanistic) dehumanization of ourselves.

Examining Dehumanization in New Domains

The archetypal groups for examining dehumanization have been national and ethnic groups, and these have occupied the main focus of recent work on dehumanization. Research is emerging that attempts to understand the humanness of other types of groups, particularly occupational groups (Iatridis, in press; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). In this volume, several scholars have pushed these ideas further to provide a detailed analysis of dehumanization in a wider range of contexts, and this forms the core theme of Part 2.

Two chapters focus on how dehumanization can offer important insights into crime and policing. Vasiljevic and Viki (Chapter 8) focus on dehumanization of offenders and how this results in some offenders (particularly from racial minorities) being excluded from moral consideration, thus justifying harsher punishment and reduced support for rehabilitation. Importantly, given that most offenders reenter the community, they explore how this dehumanization can be ameliorated through positive interpersonal contact and learning more about offenders as individuals. Hetey and Eberhardt (Chapter 9)

consider the interplay between dehumanization of criminals and police, particularly the portrayal of violent criminals as animals and police as machines. They describe how physical elements of the social context, such as police uniforms, contribute to how police themselves, as well as observers, may mechanistically dehumanize the police. They explore the functions each form of dehumanization serves in this context, such as when laypeople would actually prefer police to be more "machinelike," and the social contexts in which these perceptions are likely to be stronger, such as in times of rising crime rates.

In a similar vein, Leyens (Chapter 10) focuses on dehumanization in the medical profession, identifying not just when it is dysfunctional, but also where it can be functional and important. Importantly, he extends consideration of dehumanization beyond people's attitudes to the dehumanizing effects of physical contexts like the use of medical technology and machines. In addition to exploring how dysfunctional elements of medical dehumanization can be overcome, Leyens makes the critical point that allowing terminally ill patients to die may actually restore their humanity relative to prolonging their life using machines.

Another important extension of dehumanization research is into gender relations, particularly arising from sexual objectification. Vaes, Loughnan, and Puvia (Chapter 11) note that objectification, while related to dehumanization, has some distinctive characteristics, particularly an "approach" tendency that seems at odds from other forms of dehumanization that are mostly believed to be related to avoidance. They describe when and why objectification leads to dehumanization and explore its consequences.

The final extension covered in this section involves how dehumanization emerges in interpersonal contexts. Bastian, Jetten, and Haslam (Chapter 12) explore when immoral behavior in interpersonal contexts can lead to dehumanization of the perpetrators of harm as well as their victims. Importantly, they describe how this may lead not only to dehumanization of others, but also the dehumanization of the self, with important emotional and behavioral consequences.

Understanding Humanity

All forms of dehumanization rely on an understanding of humanity, but despite promising early psychological research in this area (Wrightsman, 1992) and some recent advances (Bain, Vaes, Kashima, Haslam, & Guan, 2012), overall there has been very little sustained investigation of what it actually means to be human and its consequences. Hence, the series of chapters in Part 3 focuses on what humanity means. Some chapters apply novel ideas about humanity to dehumanization, but others move beyond a focus on dehumanization to describe the broader consequences of what it means to be human.

The chapter by Bain (Chapter 13) begins by approaching humanity from a cognitive perspective, focusing on the structure and the content of the category "human." He proposes that the most useful conception is that human is a graded category based on prototypes (with different prototypes invoked by HU and HN dimensions of humanness). He applies this idea to infrahumanization, and in particular to help explain why some outgroups are "superhumanized" by ingroups. He also reports a cross-cultural study identifying similarities and differences in HU and HN prototypes across cultures.

The chapter by Kofta, Baran, and Tarnowska (Chapter 14), while focused on dehumanization, makes an important advance in our understanding of humanness. Noting that measures of modern forms of dehumanization are implicit, with participants largely unaware that they are dehumanizing, these authors focus on people's conscious representations of humans in terms of their potentialities or ideal capacities—what they call a "naïve theory of humanity." They validate a measure of this naïve theory and show that outgroups are typically seen to have lesser human potentialities than an ingroup. They suggest that this naïve theory may be more flexible and context dependent than are more implicit measures of humanness.

Another way of approaching humanness is to understand when we see someone as a "full" person in all their individual glory (and flaws), rather than relying on category memberships. This is the idea of individuation and is the focus of the contribution by Swencionis and Fiske (Chapter 15). These authors give an extensive overview of dominant theoretical approaches to individuation, the motivations for

individuating others, individual differences in who is more likely to individuate, and the contexts in which individuation is most likely to occur. They document the positive consequences of individuating both the self and others and conclude that individuation is a promising way to overcome dehumanization.

Finally, Kashima and Margetts (Chapter 16) highlight an area where humanness is an important concept beyond its links with dehumanization. They focus on conceptions of the relationship between humans and nature, specifically in the context of environmental sustainability. For instance, very different approaches to nature and sustainability can arise from viewing humans as the masters of nature, in contrast to seeing humans as at the mercy of natural forces. They review cognitive, cultural, and anthropological work, concluding that our understanding of nature has declined as humans have become more urbanized. They argue that this lack of understanding is linked to less sustainable practices and even to how we understand nature as researchers. They show that deep thinking about the human-nature relationship may be a key factor in cultures moving toward more sustainable lifestyles.

Conclusion

So on the question of where to from here, we can confidently predict that with the interest and innovation represented by the contributions in this volume, the field is in a great position to advance both our understanding of dehumanization and humanity itself, and to show critically how these concepts are important in a wide range of contexts. We hope that the ideas presented in this volume will be inspirational for years to come—at least until we all become cyborgs (Kurzweil, 2006).

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Part 1

Historical and Theoretical Insights Into Dehumanization

2 An Anthropological History of Dehumanization From Late-18th to Mid-20th Centuries

Gustav Jahoda

A stock-in-trade of many writers is a scenario where a city gent, a stranger, enters a country pub and is received by the locals with a mixture of suspicion and hostility. It is a scenario that is taken from real life since the intrusion of strangers into an established group is usually resented. It is a special case of a much broader phenomenon not merely in the human, but also the animal world. When ants encounter a conspecific whose smell reveals that it comes from another nest, they will attack. In many animal species, the introduction of a stranger into an established group is liable to evoke aggression. More generally, animals, like people, do not merely distinguish their own group from "others" but respond more negatively to the latter.

A pioneering study of rhesus monkeys, using field experiments, has demonstrated the presence of clear ingroup bias in several situations (Banaji et al., 2011). Similar issues are discussed by Campbell and de Waal (2011), who refer to cases where humans manifest physiological reactions that differ in relation to ingroup and outgroup members. The differential responses to "others" are almost certainly of evolutionary origin, since small groups of animals, or small human communities, had to compete for scarce resources with outsiders. Economic aspects have also been investigated experimentally (e.g., Gummerum, Takezawa, & Keller, 2009), and

evolutionary models have been proposed, such as that of Hammond and Axelrod (2006). As Brewer (1999) rightly argued, attachment to the ingroup does not necessarily entail hostility to the outgroup; however, the fact remains that ethnocentrism is extremely widespread, if not universal. Its effects range from merely favoring one's own group to eliminating "others" by genocide because they are perceived as less than human.

History abounds with instances of differences being regarded as signs of a lack of full humanity, or at least as deficiencies, and such differences were not necessarily physical. So during the Middle Ages, the dividing line between *us* and *them* was usually religion: Christians versus Pagans and, subsequently, Christians versus Muslims. A Black Christian (e.g., St. Gregorius) was accepted as fully human, while a White Pagan (e.g., a Scandinavian) was not. Pagan Eastern Europeans, notably Slavs, were regarded as lesser humans who could be enslaved (hence the term *slavery*). During the Renaissance, the Spanish conquerors treated the American Indians as subhuman, referring to them as "talking animals" or "soulless parrots in human guise."

Following the scientific revolution of the 17th century, and especially the impact of Newton on European thought, things began to change. The idea gained ground that if the motions of the heavenly bodies were lawful, then perhaps a similar lawfulness might be discovered in social life. This led toward the end of the 18th century to the beginnings of a scientific approach to human differences. However, that did not mean an end to prejudice—though there had always been some (like Montaigne in the 16th century) who had been able to take a balanced view. Yet most saw the scientific approach to "others" as a way of demonstrating that the old conventional wisdom was correct.

The Beginnings of Scientific Racism in the Late-18th and Early 19th-Centuries

In his *History of Mankind* (1785), the German scholar Christopher Meiners divided peoples according to their degree of beauty or

ugliness, which, he later suggested, indicates their “adaptability.” Of the American Indians, he wrote that they are “closely related to dumb animals.” Meiners was purely an armchair theorist, but Samuel Thomas Soemmering, in a work entitled *On the Bodily Difference of the Negro from the European* (1784), examined cranial capacity and the supposed “thickness of nerves”; this led him to the conclusion that the “Moor” is closer to the apes than to Europeans. The Manchester surgeon Charles White argued in *An Account of the Regular Gradations in Man* (1799) that if the Africans are nearer to apes, then their lower arms would be longer than those of Europeans. He convinced himself that he had confirmed this by measuring (rather questionable) samples of both races. In France, a *Natural History of the Human Species* (1801, 1824, 1834) was published by Jules Virey, a professor of pharmacy. The 1801 edition contained such absurd and prurient claims as that “Negresses” copulate with satyrs in the African jungle. While that was later dropped, Virey still kept harping on the immorality of Blacks, which he regarded as more characteristic of apes than of humans:

> Negresses abandon themselves to love with transports unknown anywhere else: they have large sexual organs, and those of the negroes are proportionally voluminous; for generally, as the organs of generation acquire greater activity among humans, so the intellectual faculties suffer a loss of energy. (Virey, 1824, Vol. II, pp. 15–16)

This energy theory has, in some form, long persisted. At any rate, Virey, although a scientist, lacked any empirical basis for his views about the animality of Blacks.

A more serious approach was that of the great French naturalist Georges Cuvier, who in his *Lessons in Comparative Anatomy* (1800–1805) put forward a theory about the extent of organization of the nervous system that manifests itself in anatomical and physiological features. Cuvier, who in his younger days had been liberal in his outlook, came to focus on “prognathism” (protruding chin) as a sign of animality characterizing the Negro. Given Cuvier’s status as an outstanding scientist, his views had a significant

influence on the predominant racial determinism of the 19th century. It should be noted that far-fetched prejudices were not just academic curiosities but had practical consequences. The attribution of animality to Blacks was welcomed by slave owners across the Atlantic, and a Nazi historian (Eickenstadt, 1936) sang the praises of both Meiners and Virey.

The Spotlight Starts to Focus on European "Races" as Well as Exotic Ones

In 1828, a very popular *History of the Gauls* (Thierry) appeared in France. It claimed that there were two distinct racial types in France —namely, the Gauls or Celts, who were highly intelligent, and the Kymris, who were not. This notion of "historical races" was taken up by the physician William Edwards, who published a book entitled *On the Physiological Characters of Human Race* (1829). In it, he contended that skull form rather than pigmentation is the essential criterion of race, and, of course, skull form varies also within European populations. Edwards postulated a basic distinction of people who are tall with long heads versus those who are shorter and have round heads, which foreshadowed the dichotomy of "Nordics" compared with lesser breeds. He also contended that the physical differences would correspond to mental ones.

Following Edwards, the Swedish scientist Anders Retzius who studied cranial shapes reported his findings in 1840 to the Swedish Academy. Two years later, he published a detailed account of races across the world and introduced the dichotomy of *dolicocephalic* (longheaded) versus *brachycephalic* (broadheaded); he also invented the so-called cephalic index used to measure and categorize skulls. He regarded broadheads as inferior to longheads, which is reflected in his division of European races, part of which is listed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Examples of nationalities categorized according to alleged types of skull shape

Longheaded	*Broadheaded*
Scandinavians	Laplanders
Germans	Finns
Dutch	Hungarians
English	Slavs

At about the same time as Retzius did his work, another, seemingly independent development along broadly similar (but rather odd) lines may be noted. In the second half of the 18th century, physiognomy was elaborated by Caspar Lavater. A follower of his, Carl Carus, expanded the scope to include not merely the face but also the whole skull. He regarded humans as being divided into races of unequal endowment determined by different cranial formations. He put forward a quaint typology rather like Meiners's ugly and beautiful races: Daylight (Whites), Nocturnal (Blacks), and Twilight (intermediate races). In his *Atlas of Cranioscopy* (1844), he compared a variety of skulls. An example will show that he also differentiated within his Daylight category, by saying that a modern Greek represented a lesser form of it. The psychological characterization included these unflattering comments: modest development of the mind; absence of analytical or philosophical disposition; without outstanding energy.

It may be mentioned that phrenologists, who inferred the relative strengths of "faculties" from the bumps on the skull, similarly differentiated European nations and races. They also began to collect skulls from different parts of the world, a practice that became increasingly widespread in the course of the 19th century. Pruner-Bey, mentioned in more detail subsequently, was a follower of Retzius and was one of the first to attempt a classification of the races of the world. He obtained skulls from every continent, totaling some 350. It was an odd mixture: Some skulls were modern, others were obtained from archaeological digs, and the gender was noted only for a minority. On each of these skulls, Pruner performed no fewer than 34 measurements, totaling nearly 12,000. No wonder he commented that "it required courage to accomplish a task which,

initially, seemed to surpass my strength" (Pruner-Bey, 1865, p. 417). Since he thought of races as completely homogeneous, this incredible exercise was undertaken without any notion of the need for sampling, races being represented by numbers ranging from a single one to 35. Like others, he took no account of the fact that the skull is not a geometrical object but has different planes and bumps, so that modes of measurement were idiosyncratic and not readily comparable.

Over almost two decades, anthropologists debated *how* skulls should be measured and especially *what kinds of* and *how many* measurements should be taken. The various proposals put forward led to an increasingly complex technology designed to permit more and more detailed measurements of various parts of the skull. The great anatomist and anthropologist Paul Broca constructed more than a dozen of these. The most elaborate was the *Universalkroniometer* designed by a scientist named Torok, who suggested that 5,300 measurements be taken of each skull!

Another crucial problem concerned the position of the skull when measuring—in other words, how the horizontal, which formed the basis of the measurements, should be determined. Most workers took as the horizontal a line from the bottom of the eye socket to the top of the ear hole. However, the distinguished German anthropologist Herman Schaafhausen, who had been the first to describe Neanderthal skulls, took a different view. He was a social Darwinist—that is, in the present context someone who wanted to use Darwinian theory to demonstrate on evolutionary grounds the existence of profound racial differences. So he proposed that in order to establish the horizontal, the skull should be oriented in a position corresponding to the skull, as it were, looking straight ahead. Such an orientation allowed a high degree of subjective judgment, so that anthropologists were able to vary the positions in accordance with their prejudices.

This applied particularly to prognathism, which, as already mentioned, was taken as a sign of animality. By shifting the emphasis to that feature, it was possible to escape the awkwardness of the fact that many Negroes are longheaded like Nordics. Eventually, a standardized approach within Germany arrived, which

made it possible to compare findings. However, the method was not universally accepted; for instance, Vacher de Lapouge (about whom more will be given subsequently) complained that the German measurements were unfair to France. In any case, from about mid-19th century onward, comparisons of skulls were often claimed to show the animality of savages.

"Savages" as Animals and Children

The resemblance between humans and apes is obvious and was recognized (and even exaggerated) by Aristotle and Galen. During the Middle Ages, alleged "wild men of the woods" were represented as apelike. Edward Tyson published a monograph (1699/1966) in which he systematically compared the anatomies of humans and what he called a "pigmie," later shown to have been a chimpanzee. Edward Long, a planter and judge in Jamaica, wrote a *History of Jamaica* (1774) in which he developed the thesis that Blacks do not just constitute a species intermediate between humans and apes but are closer to the latter.

A famous case was that of the so-called "Hottentot Venus," a Sanid (Bushman) woman who was exhibited in England and then, in 1814, in Paris where she later died.

Cuvier examined her and compared various parts of her anatomy respectively to those of monkeys, an orangutan, and female mandrills. Her remains were preserved, and later the prominent neurologist Gratiolet studied her brain and declared it to be very similar to that of an idiot (her remains were repatriated to South Africa in 2002). In Britain, a similar line was taken by the anatomist Sir William Lawrence, who wrote that "in all particulars just enumerated, the Negro structure approximates unequivocally to that of the monkey" (1819, p. 363).

In the following decades, a series of empirical investigations were conducted, which usually though not invariably were said to confirm the apelikeness of Blacks. Probably the most influential advocate of this view was Carl Vogt, a famous German-Swiss naturalist after whom a street is still named in Geneva. In his *Lectures on Man*

(1864), he put forward a theory about a missing link between the Negro and the ape, which he identified as microcephalous human idiots. He made a long and detailed series of comparisons between Germans, whom he saw as the highest type of humans, and the Negro. Much like Cuvier, but even more so, he went through practically every part of the Negro body, commenting on its "simiousness." Here are just a couple of examples: the neck is said to resemble that of the gorilla, and the teeth those of America monkeys. He also mentioned the larger penis of Negroes, without realizing that this would make Europeans more apelike! He summed up by saying, "I find a remarkable resemblance between the ape and the lower human type" (p. 183).

It should be noted that Vogt largely confined his comments to males, which he regarded as conservative since he reckoned that the female is always nearer the animal type. Far from being unusual at the time, such a view was in fact widespread and long remained so. For instance, Gustave LeBon, disciple of the great anatomist and anthropologist Broca and known for his classic work on crowd behavior, could write as follows: "All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women … recognise today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and are much closer to children and savages than to adult civilised man" (LeBon, 1881, Vol. 2, p. 157).

The bracketing of "children and savages" was common then, implying that "savages" are less than adult humans. This stereotypical image of the savage can be traced back to the Spanish conquest, when American Indians were described as being like 6- or 7-year-old children. However, the trope was rather infrequent prior to the 18th century, when it took on a rather different significance. Enlightenment thinkers believed in the progressive evolution of societies from savagery to civilization. Hence the savage state was seen as that of the childhood of humanity, and Lord Kames made the comparison explicit, suggesting that "as, with respect to individuals, there is a progress from infancy to maturity, so there is a similar progress in every nation from its savage state to its maturity in arts and sciences" (1779, Vol. 2, pp. 468–469). This did not necessarily entail the view that individual savages were childlike. In fact, many

writers of the period held that savages, rather than being devoid of reason, were just as able as Europeans but handicapped by their ignorance, and that they were capable of learning to apply their reason more effectively. All that changed with the rise of scientific racism in the 19th century.

The story of how this change came about is a complex one and can only be sketched very superficially. The beginning of the 19th century saw the rise of biology as a science (the term originated at that period), and some naturalists like the great Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) claimed to have discovered a relationship in animals between certain anatomical features and intelligence. The notion was then extended to human races, which led to the idea that there are degrees of humanity. This simple explanation of race differences had a wide appeal, first in the context of slavery and later in that of colonialism. Explorers and travelers commonly reported that indigenous peoples were like children, as for instance the famous Richard Burton: “The negro … mentally remains a child, and is never capable of a generalisation” (Burton, 1864, Vol. 2, p. 203). Subsequently, colonialists found it convenient to adopt this topos and saw themselves as paternally caring for colonial peoples who needed their guidance. Accordingly, the notion of the biologically determined inferiority of the “others” became the dominant scientific doctrine. There were some, like Theodor Waitz (1821–1864) or Adolf Bastian (1826–1905), who rejected biological racism and proclaimed “psychic unity,” but they were in a small minority.

Another group of important thinkers were the social evolutionists, inheritors of the Enlightenment tradition, who taught that the development of humanity paralleled that of individual development from childhood to maturity. Yet they were influenced by the prevailing ethos, and Herbert Spencer (1829–1903) wrote: “Children are ever dramatizing the lives of adults; and savages … similarly dramatize the actions of their civilized visitors” (Spencer, 1877, Vol. 1, p. 102). Even Edward Tylor (1832–1917), often said to have been the father of anthropology and most of his life a staunch social evolutionist, eventually came to share some of the prevailing prejudices.

Another factor that might be briefly mentioned is a linguistic one. It was widely thought that primitive languages do not merely lack

abstract terms but are incapable of expressing abstract concepts, and that again likens them to children.

All these converging influences resulted in the child-savage equation becoming firmly established. Before elaborating on this, a few general remarks are indicated. It might be supposed that the child image was based solely on the supposed lack of intelligence of savages. That would be mistaken, since the child image comprised a whole range of other attributes viewed as signs of immaturity. These included impulsiveness, emotionalism, lack of forethought, inability to concentrate, and so on. A fairly comprehensive picture of such images was provided by Letourneau (1881) in his section on the *Comparative Psychology of Human Races*. I shall quote from this at some length, partly to show that such attributions were by no means confined to Black Africans:

> The very inferior savage, like our own infant children, does not know what tomorrow means.
>
> The Tasmanians … express a wish for every kind of trifle, but drop them immediately afterwards; everything seems to distract them, nothing can occupy their minds.
>
> All travellers are agreed that in saying that the majority of the black races in Africa may be compared to our young European children. They have all the light-headedness, the capriciousness, the want of prudence, the volubility, and the same quick and confined intelligence, as a child.
>
> The Fuegians … Their saddened mind is not capable of astonishment or curiosity … a missionary, who complained of the heat, was answered by a young Fuegian that he was wrong to reproach the sun, for if the star hid itself they would soon have a cold south wind. [A reasonable enough comment, one would have thought]
>
> Like the Caribs, who will sell their hammocks in the morning for less money than they could have done the evening previous, the Red Skins [native Americans] will destroy a whole herd of

> bisons and take only their tongues, without thinking that in two days' time they may again be hungry.
>
> But of all the savage races none are more childish than the Polynesians. Their thoughtlessness and their light-headedness are extraordinary. It is impossible to fix their attention upon anything for two minutes. (Letourneau, 1881, pp. 553–557)

The attempted explanations for such apparent childishness, which made "savages" less than fully adult humans, will now be considered in more detail.

Midcentury social evolutionists relied heavily on philology (the historical and comparative study of languages) in their theories, arguing on the basis of linguistic changes. For this purpose, they commonly sought to show parallels between the language of European children and that of savages: "A word formed on the principle of imitation is said to be formed by onomatopoeia … How universal and instinctive this procedure is may be observed among infants and savages" (Farrar, 1860, p. 73). Much the same point was made by Sir John Lubbock, an outstanding 19th-century scientist: "Savages have a great tendency to form words by reduplication, which is also characteristic of childhood among civilized races" (Lubbock, 1863/1913, p. 564). Lubbock was extremely influential, having been one of the most widely quoted authorities whose books were repeatedly reprinted. In several works, he sought to present a portrait of "the primitive condition of man" and, as was the practice at the time, drew rather indiscriminately on the writings of numerous travelers and missionaries. Unlike his 18th-century predecessors, Lubbock believed that the mind of the savage is bound to be utterly alien to the European. This, he maintains, is because the mind of the savage is totally different from our own and, like that of a child, gets easily tired and just gives random answers without thinking.

This child-savage equation runs as a constant thread through Lubbock's writings, as will be illustrated by another passage:

> Savages may be likened to children, and the comparison is not only correct, but also highly instructive. Many naturalists

> consider that the early condition of the individual indicates that of the race, that the best test of affinity of a species are the stages through which it passes. So also is it in the case of man; the life of each individual is an epitome of the history of the race, and the gradual development of the child illustrates that of the species. Savages, like children, have no steadiness of purpose.
>
> In fact, we may fairly sum up this part of the question in a few words in saying, as the most general conclusion which can be arrived at, that savages have the character of children with the passions and strength of men. (1863/1913, pp. 562–565)

James Sully (1895/1903), in his classical work of child psychology, relied very heavily on Lubbock for the numerous parallels he drew between children and savages—for instance, both like toys such as dolls.

Curiously, at the time when Lubbock was writing, a broad consensus about developmental aspects had emerged, based on reports by travelers. When the Negroes are still children, it was believed, they are as bright or even brighter than White children; but at puberty, a rapid decline in intellectual powers sets in. This was graphically described by Vogt who, as was his habit, compared Blacks with apes:

> Young apes are intelligent and good learners, but afterwards they become obstinate savage beasts, incapable of improvement. And so it is with the Negro. The Negro child is not, as regards the intellectual capacities, behind the white child. All observers agree that they are as droll in their games, as docile and as intelligent as white children…. it is found that the Negro children in the schools, not only equal but surpass the white children in docility and apprehension. But no sooner do they reach the fatal period of puberty than, with the closure of the sutures and the projection of the jaws, the same process takes place as in the apes. The intellectual faculties remain stationary, and the individual—as well as the race—is incapable of further progress. (Vogt, 1864, pp. 191–192)

The explanation offered by Vogt—namely, premature “closure of the sutures”—needs an explanation. The “sutures” refers to the gaps between the bones of the skull that grow together as the child matures. Vogt attributed this theory to the German-born Pruner Bey, professor of anatomy at the Cairo University. After retiring to Paris, he published a monograph on Negroes (1861), in which, like others before and after him, he stated that their prognathism indicated animality and mentioned what became known as “arrested development,” a doctrine that persisted well into the 20th century.

The year 1863 saw the foundation of the Anthropological Society of London by James Hunt, who was one of the most vociferous propagandists for extreme racial views. Hunt was essentially a publicist who trawled through publications of others, seeking ammunition for his stance. His main theme was the “animality” of Blacks, most extensively treated in an essay *On the Negro’s Place in Nature* (1865). In that same essay, he also referred to arrested development: “With the Negro, as with other races of man, it has been found that children are precocious, but that no advance in education can be made after they arrive at the age of maturity; they still continue, mentally, children” (Hunt, 1865, p. 27).

The “suture” theory continued to hold sway until the end of the century. Ellis (1890), whose work is a classic on the Ewe of West Africa, wrote as follows:

> The Ewe-speaking people of the Slave Coast present the ordinary characteristics of the uncivilized negro. In early life they evince a degree of intelligence which, compared with that of the European child, appears precocious; and they acquire knowledge with facility till they arrive at the age of puberty when nature masters the intellect, and frequently completely deadens it. This peculiarity has been observed amongst others of what are termed the lower races, and has been attributed by some physiologists to the early closing of the sutures of the cranium, and it is worthy of note that throughout West Africa it is by no means rare to find skulls without any apparent transverse or longitudinal sutures. (pp. 9–10)

Probably the most detailed exposition of this notion is due to Augustus Keane, an ethnologist who was professor of Hindustani at University College London. Although he does not seem to have had any qualifications in anatomy or physiology, he pontificated at length, and a short extract will convey his ideas:

> The development of cellular tissue, with a corresponding increase in mental power, apparently goes on until arrested by the closure of the cranial sutures. All the serratures are stated to be more complex in the higher than the lower races, and their definite closing appears to be delayed till a later period in life amongst the former than amongst the latter. (Keane, 1896, p. 44)

He further cited a finding by the famous surgeon and anthropologist Paul Broca to the effect that early closing also happens with idiots, in line with Vogt's notion about the status of idiots as intermediate between Negroes and apes. Keane asserted that the delay in the closing of the sutures is a function of mental activity. He speculated that the "throbbing" of the brain during mentation physically acts to keep the sutures open; needless to say, greater mental activity of Whites was taken for granted.

While this kind of speculation was absurd, a more rational argument was based on biological evolution and specifically the so-called biogenetic law, also known as "recapitulation." It was formulated most precisely by Ernst Haeckel (1876/1905) in his book *The Evolution of Man*:

> This general law … may be briefly expressed in the phrase "The history of the foetus is a recapitulation of the history of the race" [in the sense of humanity at large] … The series of forms through which the individual organism passes during its development from the ovum to the complete bodily structure is a brief, condensed repetition of the long series of forms which the animal ancestors of the said organism, or the ancestral forms of the species, have passed through from the earliest period of organic life down to the present day. (Vol. 1, p. 5)

While Haeckel's concept had been confined to embryology, the general idea came to be extended to include *postnatal* human development in order to account for race differences.

The most prominent expositor of the view that differences between animal species and human races can be explained in terms of the biogenetic law was George Romanes. In a series of lectures published in 1880, he made claims so absurd that they went well beyond those of the most extreme racists. For instance, he compared the intellectual level of savages to that of European children aged between 3 and 5 years. He also proposed that the developmental age differences between what he called "very brutal man" and "very human ape" at just 6 months! However, this must be put in the context of what he said of White infants, whose intelligence he likened to that of jellyfish. Romanes complained about the reactions of mothers in the audience who regarded that statement as laughable.

It will be shown later that another biological theory in the 20th century also provided support for a racist stance, but first the issue of the rise of intra-European racism will be taken up again.

The Mythology of Superior and Inferior European Races

At the outset, three writers will be considered who did not conduct any empirical research but proclaimed the gospel of race. The Scottish anatomist Robert Knox, dismissed from his post owing to a body-snatching scandal, began to earn his living lecturing on race. In 1850, he published *The Races of Man*, in which he suggested that people of different races have an innate dislike of each other. He regarded himself as a Saxon, a race possessing the best qualities as compared with Celts or, even worse, peoples of the then-Russian empire. Among Germans, he credited those who were darker with most achievements, in direct contrast with most of the writers who followed. He had scant regard for the Prussians: "No native Pruss [*sic*] has ever been found fit for anything" (Knox, 1850, p. 26).

More famous was Arthur de Gobineau, an aristocrat whose essay *The Inequality of Races* (1855/1967) was probably prompted by his fear of the movement toward mass democracy, which threatened to destroy his class. Gobineau, who was not a simple-minded racist, was primarily concerned with the relationship between race and civilization. According to him, humanity is divided into three main races: White, Yellow, and Black; and among the Whites, the best are Aryan Nordics. Yet he had no illusion that there were "pure" races, and the mixture of blood was his main explanatory principle for historical trends. Here is an example:

> A series of feminine or feminized races occupy the larger part of the globe; this observation applies particularly to Europe. With exception of the Teutonic family and a part of the Slavs, one finds in our part of the world only groups feebly equipped with practical sense…. In places where the Germanic element has never penetrated, there is no civilization of our kind. (1855/1967, p. 112)

He predicted that race mixing would greatly increase, resulting in degeneration of humanity as a whole.

The last of the writers considered here, and perhaps the most influential one, was Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the son of a British admiral who married into Richard Wagner's family. Humans, he said, are divided into distinct races not by God, as Gobineau had believed, but by biology. He was a passionate advocate of a pure Nordic race and regarded most others as "degenerate." Erudite and with a persuasive style, his book *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899) made an enormous impact. Kaiser Wilhelm II encouraged officers in the German army to read it, and it was also well received by liberals like Bernard Shaw.

A section entitled "The Importance of Race" reveals the mystical aura attributed by Chamberlain to this notion: "Race lifts a man above himself: it endows him with extraordinary—I might almost say supernatural—powers" (1899, p. 269). He meant of course the *noble* races, for him the Aryans and Teutons, and especially the latter: "That the Teuton is … perhaps the greatest power in the history of

mankind, no one will wish to deny" (1899, p. 542). But then he raised the question as to who could be considered a Teuton, and with that he ran into trouble, as does anyone who wants to pin down a "race." This did not prevent him from proposing that unless there had been much crossing with "races from the south or with degenerate Celto-Germanic or Slavo-Germanic races," the Germanic peoples "are long-skulled and fair (or dark)" (1899, p. 528). Implicitly admitting that there was no way of defining Teutons physically, he fell back on a supposed psychological feature: "Loyalty is the finest touchstone for distinguishing between genuine and false Germanicism" (1899, p. 548).

Chamberlain was dismayed by the fact that in many parts of Germany short, dark-haired, and roundheaded people predominated, which meant that they were only partially Germanic, or altogether anti-Germanic. For instance, he referred to "those physically strong but mentally inferior Anti-Germanic traces, which were never quite destroyed, and are now increasing" (1899, p. 525). Prominent among the anti-Germanic races were the Jews, and he believed that antagonism toward them was instinctive. He claimed that if a (Germanic) child that knew nothing about Jews came to be faced with one, the child would start to cry!

While Chamberlain made some use of craniological categories, he was critical of scientists who sought to identify races by measuring their skulls. Instead, he suggested, morally and intellectually distinguishable races should first be established, and only then should one look at anatomical characteristics, to see if they are related. Generally, as one moves from Knox via Gobineau to Chamberlain, the increasing role of underlying political determinants of their views becomes apparent. As will be shown next, that was even true of supposedly tough-minded anthropological scientists.

During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/1871, shells fell on the Museum of Paris with which the prominent French anthropologist Armand de Quatrefages was associated. It was a traumatic episode for him and led him to publish a provocative piece in which he argued that Prussians are not Aryans but are descended from Finno-Slavs (Quatrefages, 1871). Moreover, he attributed very negative qualities to the Finn-Prussians, as in the following passage referring

to the destruction of a library in Strasburg by the Prussian army: “Nowhere is the vindictiveness of the Finns more evident than in the dark rancour of the jealous hate of the semi-barbarian towards a superior civilization” (Quatrefages, 1871, p. 668).

Needless to say, this tirade was not well received by German scholars, several of whom sought to refute him. In particular, the distinguished scientist Rudolf Virchow reproached Quatrefages for not having based his arguments on any empirical investigations. As he said: “One has to measure skulls and the numbers found have to be compared with the numbers furnished by other skulls. Hence I have collected Finnish and Esthonian skulls, measured and compared them” (Virchow, 1872, p. 306).

From then onward, craniology became increasingly important, and during the late 1880s, a new movement began that combined its tenets with Darwinism. Georges Vacher de Lapouge was a French anthropologist who enthusiastically embraced a version of evolutionary theory. Directly inspired by Gobineau’s notion that race determines historical phenomena, he interpreted Darwinism as confirming Gobineau’s thesis of the fundamental inequality of races. This was certainly not the view held by Darwin himself, who had written: “It may be doubted whether any characteristic can be named which is distinctive of a race and is constant” (Darwin, 1871/1901, p. 269).

Lapouge, known as an anthroposociologist, proposed that there are two major races in Europe, and a minor one that has features of both. The major ones are *Homo Europaeus* and *Homo Alpinus*, who are longheaded and broadheaded, respectively. The former, typical Nordics, were said to be enterprising, ambitious, energetic, and courageous. The mental disposition of the broadheaded ones was described as more or less the opposite of that of the Nordics, and their type was allegedly “the perfect slave” (Lapouge, 1896, p. 227). He also postulated a drift toward broadheadedness due to social selection, said to become progressively more important than natural selection.

In Germany, Otto Ammon put forward a rather more elaborate theory in *Social Order and Its Natural Foundations* (1896), and by “natural foundations,” he meant race. His racial typology

distinguished in the usual way between tall, longheaded people with blond hair and white skin, and short, broadheaded ones with brown eyes, black hair, and brown skin. He called the former Aryans or Germanics, but labeled the latter “turanic” or “mongoloid” following some speculations by Pruner Bey about Asian origins. The psychological characteristics attributed to these races were much like Lapouge’s cited previously.

Ammon’s theory is based on two fundamental postulates, the first being that there is a powerful association between race and social status. He sought to account for this in the following manner:

> If in one social class long heads and in another short ones prevail, the reason must be sought in a process of selection. Individuals with particular mental dispositions unconsciously sort themselves through inclinations and skills into certain kinds of occupations; and these mental dispositions, which are racial properties, are linked with the external features of the races concerned; they are jointly selected and transmitted through inheritance. (Ammon, 1896, p. 94)

His second main postulate was that country people tend to be broadheaded and city ones longheaded. Any of the longheaded ones in the country will tend to move into cities. In order to verify his theory, he carried out a vast series of cephalic measurements of army recruits and pupils in schools for the elite and for the lower orders. Unfortunately for the theory, pupils in the elite schools tended toward the “turanic” type, for which he dreamed up an ad hoc explanation.

There are many other problems with Ammon’s work, and some of his assertions are simply bizarre. Before illustrating this, it must be explained that Ammon, like other writers on race, was aware that race mixture occurred, much as they deplored it. Here is what he said on this topic:

> Individuals of the lower class, produced by *Panmixie* [general random mix] often have mental dispositions lacking in harmony; most of this is already displayed in their external appearance,

> characterised by the fact that the parts of their bodies do not fit together. (Ammon, 1896, p. 93)

In hindsight, it is astonishing that the writings of Lapouge and Ammon, while not without contemporary critics, were widely accepted as authoritative in many countries. In Britain, the well-known and greatly respected anthropologist John Beddoe (1912, p. 185) could report that "at Cambridge the first-class men have proportionally longer as well as more capacious heads" and that "men of distinction are in large proportion natives of the more blond areas." We have now reached the 20th century, which, as will be seen, brought very few changes.

Racism in the 20th Century

Apishness and Childishness

These often went together, but I shall begin with an emphasis on the former. The latter part of the 19th century saw the start of large-scale European colonization, and in spite of the abolition of slavery, debates about the status of the "Negro" in the United States. Colonialism led to an interest in "primitive psychology," motivated mainly by the need to understand the peoples being ruled. An example is Fritz Schultze, a German professor of philosophy and pedagogy, who published a book with the subtitle *Colonial Psychology* (1900). The introduction offers a classification of humanity as a whole on supposedly evolutionary principles, each category being subdivided into lower, middle, and higher levels. It ranged from savages via barbarians and civilized peoples to the highest grade, namely, [some European] *Kulturvölker*.

Primitives are said to have a less well-developed brain and therefore a lesser capacity for thought. Their thinking remains at the associative level that can also be found in animals. Their lack of logic means that they are childish, imitative, and not reflective beings. In order to provide evidence of this, he cites a report by an explorer:

> I wanted to learn a few of their words, pointed to the sun and said “Tupan” (what is this?). Then I held out my hand to them in the tone of a questioner. In this way I wanted to invite the thinking people [among them] to tell me what they call “hand” in their language. Instead, I encountered a good-natured ape. [One of them] pointed to the sun, exactly as I had done myself, held out his hand to me with the same expression of questioning I had used myself, and then looked at me with great satisfaction. And whatever I tried I succeeded only in making them play orang-outang. (Schultze, 1900, p. 39)

A moment’s reflection will show that the stupidity was that of the explorer!

On the other hand, the sensory acuity of savages is said to be very high, and some extravagant comments are made about their sense of smell, indicative of animality. For example, inhabitants of deserts can smell water from a great distance, and American Indians are as sensitive as bloodhounds—their likes or dislikes of people depend on smell.

Generally, the book is filled with stereotypes about the “stink laziness” of savages and their utter lack of cleanliness. Finally, a section entitled *savages resemble children and animals* will be summarized. Savages, with their wild swings of mood, their irresponsibility and irritability, and their weakness of thought, are just like children; but perhaps they are childish rather than childlike. Their seemingly childlike naivety is apt to change suddenly to the blind fury of a wild animal. Of course such views were widely shared and not confined to Germany. A French colonial governor wrote about “the Negro”: “Like the animal, he deals with the needs of his life when the necessity for it makes itself felt, or when circumstances allow it” (Cureau, 1912, p. 201).

Some of the crassest equations with apes, purportedly on scientific grounds, can be found in the American anti-Black literature of that period. Although the statements were often said to be based on personal investigation, their resemblance to 19th-century material is so close as to make it unlikely that it was mere coincidence:

> The hand of the typical negro, although human, often has much about it to remind us of the manus in the gorilla … I met with very black negroes in the South, both men, in whom the ears were conspicuously pointed at their upper margins as in *Quadrumana* [i.e., primates other than humans] … Many years ago I dissected an old negro man … As a subject he was particularly simian in his organization, and one thing I noticed about him more than anything else, in addition to his immense copulatory organ, was the structure of his toe nails. These were … marvellously thickened and curved, reminding one at once of the claws of certain animals. (Shufeldt, 1907, p. 34)

The resemblance of this tirade to 19th-century writings is striking. The stereotype of the "immense copulatory organs" still survives in White folklore; paradoxically, it brings Whites nearer to primates, since these have smaller "copulatory organs"!

The image of apelikeness continued to feature during the first half of the 20th century, even in some prestigious texts. The French Nobel Prize–winning physiologist Charles Richet likened Blacks in his *La sélection humaine* (1919) physically to apes, and intellectually to children and imbeciles. Similarly, Bauer, Fischer, and Lenz, three distinguished German scientists, published a volume on human heredity in 1927 that went to three editions and in 1931 appeared in English translation. It has a chapter on "racial psychology" in which Australian Aborigines and other "primitives" are likened to apes and the feeble minded, and it is only slightly less disparaging about the "childish" Negroes. As late as 1938, a rather maverick American anthropologist, Ernest Hooton, published a book in which he wrote that "Negroids" have "a somewhat generalized foot structure with certain ape-like characters" (Hooton, 1938, p. 281).

Turning now to childlikeness, it has already been mentioned that one common explanation for it was the "biogenetic law," expressed rather oddly by a German scholar who believed that after developing normally Black children start to regress: "When the Negro boys … are mentally as developed as the children of the White races, they recapitulate the nature of their human ancestors" and then degenerate until "they become like their close forbears brutal, stupid

but crafty, bestial beings" (von den Velden, 1906/1907, p. 112). The biogenetic law also lay behind Freud's account of group psychology as indicated by the term *regression* (though he was probably also influenced by LeBon's book on crowd mentality):

> The weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotional restraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay … these and similar features … show an unmistakeable picture of *regression* [emphasis added] of mental activity to an earlier stage such as we are not surprised to find among savages and children. (Freud, 1921/1955, p. 117)

The implication is that savages are *arrested* at an earlier stage. But as even those who held the most negative attitudes, like Hunt or Vogt, suggested, Black children are just the same as White ones or even more precocious until they reach puberty. The same notion was put forward by Edward Tylor, often regarded the father of modern anthropology:

> The account generally given by European teachers who have had the children of lower races in their schools is that, though these often learn as well as the white child up to about twelve years old, they then fall off, and are left behind by the children of the ruling race. (1881/1930, Vol. 1, p. 58)

Tylor attributed that to the supposedly lesser development of the brain, but during the 20th century, a new explanation became widespread. Its first formulation, as far as I have been able to ascertain, was by a man who first provided a systematic study of the development of African children.

> The savage is at his best, intellectually, emotionally, and morally, at the dawn of puberty. When puberty is drawing to a close, a degenerative process seems to set in, and the previous efflorescence of the faculties leads to no adequate fruitage in later life. If we consent … to treat the savage child as the zero of the scale … we must remember that the adult Kafir, on this scale, is often a *minus* [emphasis in original] quantity…. Not a

> few observers have pointed out that the imagination in the Kafirs runs to seed after puberty: it would be truer to say that it runs to sex. (Kidd, 1906/1969, pp. vii–ix)

From then onward, this supposed cause runs through many writings for half a century. Some two decades after Kidd, Miller described the precocity of "the primitive child" and said there is a "unanimity of opinion" that it comes to a halt with the onset of puberty. This is because the primitive then "falls into a slough of sensuality" (Miller, 1928, p. 164).

That view continued even after the end of the Second World War. Here are extracts from the writings of two psychiatrists:

> Up to puberty there is in my opinion very little difference in intelligence and learning ability between Bemba and European children. After that a marked difference occurs, the European far outstripping the African child. This, I think, is due to the early release of the genital sexual impulse in the average African child. (Davidson, 1949, p. 77)

The other one draws parallels between brain-damaged Europeans and normal Africans (shades of Vogt!) and refers to the "whole-hearted concentration on sex which characterizes the African adolescent" (Carothers, 1953, pp. 106–107). Remarkably, the monograph by Carothers was commissioned and published by the World Health Organization.

Before concluding this section, the remarkable case of the biologist Julian Huxley will be related. He was the grandson of Thomas Huxley, known as "Darwin's bulldog" since he had defended him vigorously against numerous attacks. During the early 1920s, Julian Huxley visited the southern states of the United States and seems to have become thoroughly infected by the local prejudices. He described numerous examples of behavior indicating the childlikeness of Blacks and with surprising naivety accepted "evidence" of the following kind:

> They are often childlike in their intellect. I used occasionally stay with a Southern friend who used his cook as an exhibition and

> object-lesson to doctrinaires from New England. “Bring me my saucer, Julia,” he would say, after a discussion on racial equality; and Julia always appeared with a saucer, a small plate, and an apology for disremembering which was which. (Huxley, 1924, p. 821)

His general conclusion was that “the Negro mind is as different from the white mind as the Negro from the white body. The old characterization ‘the minds of children’ is perfectly true” (Huxley, 1924, p. 822). Some 15 years later, Huxley had changed his own mind, when he was one of the signatories of an antiracist manifesto by eminent biologists.

Intra-European Racism in the 20th Century

Craniology lingered on for a while, as may be shown by the work of a professor of anatomy at the University of London. He measured the cephalic indices of German prisoners of war and found that “the north of Germany is more long-headed than the south and east, and that Silesia and Bavaria are particularly brachycephalic [roundheaded]” (Parsons, 1919, p. 22). However, he drew no conclusions from these findings, and so the point of the exercise remains obscure.

That was not true of the writings of Hans Günther, who was to become the Nazi expert on race. Inspired by Lapouge, with whom he had close links, he published a number of books eulogizing the Nordic ideal; and during the 1920s, he was given scientific awards in Scandinavia. His best-known book was entitled *The Racial Elements of European History*, which was translated into English. In it, he commented that there was “remarkable agreement” among observers on the mental characteristics of the different European races (1927, p. 51); that, of course, harked back to 19th-century ideas. Under the Nazis, he became professor at the University of Berlin, and even after the Second World War, he published books on eugenics. Günther was highly influential and still features on American websites dedicated to White supremacy.

It hardly needs saying that racial ideologies were not just academic theories, but such theories both reflected and influenced discriminatory laws and practices. Examples in the United States are segregation of Blacks and immigration laws favoring North Europeans. The European racial hierarchy came to the fore again in Nazi ideology and policy, for instance, in relation to Slav populations, causing untold misery.

Conclusion

In the introduction, it has been argued that distrust of strangers, and antagonism toward them, are evolutionary products. However, as the historical record shows, this did not preclude radical changes. We have moved very far away from the ideas prevalent in 19th-century intellectual and scientific circles—such ideas now seem absurd. This does not mean that racism has completely disappeared. Some spectators at football matches still make “monkey” noises and throw bananas when a Black player is on the field, but such behavior is now generally condemned. So there has been enormous progress, and while this is no ground for complacency, neither does it justify pessimism.

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