views, and to ask you to scrutinize in your own observation the theory of the unconscious compulsion to confess, which I have been advancing. I have reminded you, furthermore, of the fact that knowledge based only upon what one has heard is worth little. I hope, therefore, that you will compare what you have here heard with your own impressions and experiences. I should be happy if your own experience were to bring you to the point where you "know it in yourself."

PART THREE

The Shock of Thought

Introductory Note

THE following essays, dating from the years 1924 through 1927, contain new contributions, additions and revisions concerning a psychoanalytical theory which I published in a work of larger size, *Compulsion to Confess and Need for Punishment*, in 1926.* These essays, too, center about the relations between the powers of human drives and that inner agency which psychoanalysis calls the superego. I am aware of the fact that the individual essays contained in this volume are not all of the same psychological depth. I have no intention of denying their fragmentary and one-sided character.

* Part Two of this volume.

Berlin, October 1928

I

Fright

1

After Abraham, Ferenczi, Jones and Simmel had made important contributions concerning the problem of traumatic neuroses in the discussion during the Fifth International Psychoanalytical Congress,* Freud took up this topic again in 1920 in a larger context.** He sees in the traumatic neurosis a consequence of an extensive instinctual eruption through the protective barrier against stimuli, which is the primary function of our mental apparatus. He points out that it is not merely the intensity of the stimulus arriving at the protective barrier which brings about the traumatic neuroses. The condition of the ego-strength must be considered another important factor. If this threshold is low, the psychic apparatus will be less capable of receiving an influx of energy. In that case, the consequences of an eruption through the protective barrier must be more violent than in a case with a higher strength of its own, which possesses a greater binding force. Recognition of this second factor implies a warning to us not to overestimate the pathogenic power of an external injuring or traumatic factor. The particular pathological result will depend on the combined effects of both factors. There will again result a supplementary sequence analogous to the one Freud postulated for the cooperation of constitutional and accidental factors in the etiology of neuroses.

Confronted by the theories about traumatic neurosis which

* *About the Psychology of War Neuroses*, International Psychoanalytical Library, Volume I, Vienna, 1919.

** *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*, 1920, Collected Writings, Volume VI.

attribute the greatest etiological significance to fright and to the endangering of life. Freud's conception appears first to be a return to the old doctrine of the effect of shock. But contrary to it, the essence of shock is seen in that eruption through the barrier that protects the layer of the cortex which receives stimuli. The fright retains its significance also in the frame of Freud's theory because its determinant is the absence of anxiety-preparedness. This determinant implies a lower resistance of the systems first receiving the stimulus. Because of that low cathexis which cannot bind the oncoming quantities of energy, the consequences of the eruption through the protective barrier take place much more easily.

Freud's concept seems to me to require an analytical supplement and extension. The course it should take was indicated in other explorations of Freud's, but not pursued by him, nor by other analytical authors. The following attempt at a modification is necessarily of a hypothetical character, the more so, as there is only scant experience available in this field to support it.

This attempt is restricted essentially to the diligent observation of traumatic neuroses during the war. I had ample opportunity to study many cases at and behind the front, but none to analyze them. The following hypothesis originated, therefore, in the comparison of impressions and clinical observations of traumatic neuroses, on the one hand, with experiences from analysis of nontraumatic neuroses on the other. My thesis should not, however, be denied justification in advance because of the fact that adverse circumstances prevented analytical investigation of accident-neuroses from being carried through. It is, after all, in the nature of a hypothesis that it can be verified and proved only when arrived at by more routes than one.

It should, furthermore, be noted that other, nonanalytical observers have not profited so much as might have been expected from the possibility of utilizing clinically this material on hand for examination, and that they have not come nearer to a psychological understanding of traumatic neuroses. We therefore see, between breadth of experience and its intellectual use, a supplemental relation similar to that between intensity of stimuli and de-

gree of ego-strength in the traumatic neuroses themselves. The emphasis placed on the hypothetical character of the following discussions is meant merely to indicate that they treat of anticipatory ideas which should be verified in special investigations. While entirely convinced of the provisional nature of all scientific concepts, one may still consider that a certain piece of research has come closer to the hidden connection than another.

Furthermore, the publication of this paper appears to me to be justified, in spite of its hypothetical character, because it is the attempt at an explanation whose analytical verification is equally desirable on theoretical as well as on practical grounds.* The nature of the special stimuli that have traumatic effect in the neurosis from shock has been investigated and clarified in so many ways that our analytical investigation can scarcely hope at this point to be able to penetrate more deeply into the understanding of the disturbance. Freud characterized the intensity of stimuli as the factor etiologically most significant. Emphasis on the second factor, the individual degree of ego-strength, makes it, however, also according to this theory, understandable that relatively small intensities of stimuli in many cases produce traumatic effects, hence, that they are able to erupt through the psychic protective barrier. The stimuli objectively known are, in the genesis of traumatic neurosis, the sources most exactly determined and explored. Not only laymen refer to them exclusively in explaining the disease. Scientific investigators, too, have recognized their significance time and again. Undoubtedly, the special stimulus is in definite causal relation to traumatic neurosis, but this relation is by no means unequivocal and exclusive of other factors, as can be seen from Freud's theory. Research will need to ask why one stimulus produced such different effects, and why the particular effect was produced in the individual case.

* I have gone carefully through the medical literature concerning traumatic neuroses, but neither there nor in general textbooks of nervous diseases, could I find an approach to my hypothesis. This essay was written in 1924, before the publication of Freud's *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*. Freud's paper has shown the many points in which the ideas here advanced are in need of modification and the many in which they coincide with his ideas.

2

In looking over the situations from which traumatic neuroses develop, and considering critically the effectiveness of objective stimuli in producing the individual neurosis, we are reminded of another problem, even though at the same time soberly evaluating all differences in the two, a problem in which psychoanalysis had to be interested at an early time. That is the relation between the objective stimuli of a dream and the subsequent dream. The significance of the objective stimuli of the senses in the psychology of dreams has been found by careful observations and has even been confirmed by experiments. The correctness of the theories which state that excitations of the sense organs are inciters of dreams has never been doubted by psychoanalysis. The problem was, however, how to prove the connection between the external, accidental stimuli of dreams and their contents.

Freud proved the inadequacy of the theory of dream stimuli from the fact that it leaves two points unexplained, "first, why the external stimulus is not recognized in its true nature in the dream (compare with the arousal dreams, page 18) and second, why the result of the reaction of the perceiving mind to this misunderstood stimulus can be so unpredictably variable."*

I use here the dream of Maury, the French psychologist, which has become famous as an example of a dream the content of which is definitely causally connected with an external stimulus. The dreamer sees himself transported into the time of the Revolution's Reign of Terror, experiences gruesome scenes of murder, is taken into custody and put before the Tribunal. There he sees Robespierre, Marat, Fouquier-Tinville and other prominent men of that time, whose questions he answers. He is sentenced after many incidents and then taken to the place of execution, accompanied by a vast multitude. He mounts the scaffold, the executioner ties

* *Interpretation of Dreams, Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II, p. 222.

him to the board, it topples, the blade of the guillotine drops. He feels his head being severed from his body, wakes in the most frightful anxiety and finds that part of the head of the bedstead had fallen and struck the vertebrae of his neck, much as does the blade of a guillotine.

There are two factors that interest us here which seem to be helpful in building a bridge to the psychological comprehension of the traumatic neurosis. The first one is the connection between the somatic external stimulus appearing in the dream-formation and the actually produced dream. The second concerns the particulars of the relation in time. The second factor gave rise to a spirited discussion in the *Revue Philosophique*.* Maury is struck on the back of the neck by a small board and dreams in the extraordinarily short time between the fall of the board and his waking caused by it, a whole novel of the time of the Revolution, a dream that releases a lively affect of anxiety. A special acceleration of the succession of ideas seems to be a property of dream-work, as is shown in other examples referred to in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*. We remember, however, that this is a specialty not only of the dream. People in danger of drowning or of falling from great heights see run off before them in a few seconds many scenes from their lives, like films following each other swiftly.

Freud gave an explanation of Maury's dream, which seems to give us a possibility of understanding the other factor concerning the modification of the external stimulus. He believes the French psychologist's dream represents a fantasy that had been stored intact in his memory for years and that was stirred (one might say touched off) the instant the sleeper received the arousal stimulus. This view would also help to eliminate the first difficulty, namely, that of the shortened time. It was, as Freud says, "tapped lightly," as if one were to play only a few measures of a familiar piece of music on the piano and the whole piece then emerged from memory. Something in its entirety is thus at once set in excitation from a point of eruption. "Through the arousal stimulus the

* *Revue Philosophique*, 20. *Année*, 1895: Egger, *La durée apparente des rêves;* Le Lorain, *Le rêve D. . . . L'appréciation du temps dans le rêve.*

psychic station is excited, which opens the access to the whole fantasy of the guillotine. This, however, is not lived through in sleep, but only in the memory of the wakened. Awake, one remembers in all its details, the fantasy, which only as a generalized whole, had been touched on in the dream."

What do the psychic processes in these arousal dreams have to do with the situations which we make responsible for the origin of the traumatic neuroses? The connection seems on first sight to be a very loose one. As in the arousal dream, an external stimulus acts which then evokes physical sensations and mental processes. The short interval of time between the unconscious perception of the sensation and the waking can be compared easily to the interval between the perception of a stimulus, as in a railroad accident, and the first reaction of the person involved in it.

If we think of the temporary clouding of consciousness in the case of the accident, a condition which is like a blackout of a few second's duration, after the eruption of the stimulus, we are reminded of sleep. Another factor for comparison is surprise. The dreamer experiences a stimulus for the occurrence of which he was not prepared. Likewise, the patient in accident neurosis. The significance of the surprise factor in the psychogenesis of the accident has been recognized in Freud's theory.

If we take dreams of the type of Maury's dream of the guillotine, which are by no means rare, another point of comparison appears, namely, the release of strong affects of anxiety. What interests us psychologically in this comparison is: "What happens in our emotional life in dreams of this kind and in cases of accidents in the short time between reception and pre-conscious comprehension of the stimulus? In other words, what psychological process takes place in the time between the arrival of the stimulus at the cortical substance receiving it and the first reaction to its reception?"

Freud has explained that the oncoming stimulus in Maury's dream of the guillotine, as in other dreams of that character, excited a whole fantasy which had already been complete and available. Is the somatic stimulus, as such, reponsible for the vehement anxiety with which the dreamer wakes up? The answer is, of

course, "No." The intensity of the affect is justified by what the stimulus means in its emotional modification. If a similar stimulus were to impinge on us while we were awake, we certainly would not feel any anxiety. But is this so certain? Changing the picture only slightly, we can easily come close to one of those situations that could adduce a traumatic neurosis. Supposing Maury wakes, then takes a walk one day and is suddenly hit by a small piece of board that may have fallen from some scaffolding. Only a few elements are changed in this situation, but in place of a healthy person starting up frightened from stifling dreams, who soon calms himself, we have the picture of a victim of accident-neurosis with all the classical symptoms.

One could easily argue here that the accident-neurosis occurs only as a consequence of too strong a rush of stimuli, that a collision, a vehement blow, a violent electric storm is the cause. But the clinicians also report time and again about stimuli of small intensity that are responsible for the occurrence of traumatic neuroses. On the other hand, they often show us numerous instances of strong stimuli endured without any damage. Readily conceding the fact that, beginning from a certain intensity of stimulus, everyone is bound to fall victim to a traumatic neurosis, I shall concern myself here exclusively with those cases which, though not showing a special intensity of the stimulus, still lead up to this form of disturbance, and I emphasize this limitation. It is easy to point to a certain psychic and physical constitution (we indeed acknowledge its significance) but emphasis on the constitutional factors does not relieve research from the task of investigating the special psychic processes in the case of the accident.

Other objections appear and require consideration. The dreamer is able to tell us something about the psychic happenings in that short interval of time, namely, his dream. But the traumatic patient can report only a very little about his physical sensations during the seconds when the accident struck. To invalidate this seeming contradiction is not so difficult as it may seem at first. In the first place, it is not correct that the dreamer always knows about his dream. Frequently, objective sensory stimuli release an

affect of anxiety in the sleeper, which can be noticed from his meaningful signs, while the dream that gives notice of the emotional modification of the stimulus is not remembered. On the other hand, analysis of the traumatic experience could show us unconscious material that we did not expect.

We have said it was not the somatic stimulus as such that justified Maury's anxiety, but the fantasy released by the stimulus. The importance of the stimulus, as the releasing factor, is undoubted, but it is comparable to that of the spark that falls into a powder keg. We say that Maury's old fantasy, "wakened" by the sensory stimulus, is a typical one, the core of which anyone familiar with psychoanalysis will recognize as a castration fantasy. It is this latent meaning of the fantasy that justifies the extent of anxiety. The perception of the stimulus has caused the conjuring up of an old fantasy which, while it originated in infantile complexes, made contact with the reading of the adult.

Only the fantasy of the guillotine, however, is admissible into consciousness, while the castration fantasy, which lies behind it, explains the intense fright. One might say that the idea of being guillotined had once, while he was awake, made momentary contact in Maury with the unconscious castration idea of the child and the anxiety connected with it. It is this anxiety that reappears in the dream.

The physical sensation as the small board struck was only the "stimulus" that mobilized this old unconscious anxiety. The stimulus then caused a psychic modification that brought up thought-material which shows this infantile anxiety in analytically transparent covering, indestructible and effective in the emotional life of the adult. The fright is only in part explained by the sudden influx of stimulus. It is really a "fright in thought" as Freud called it in *Interpretation of Dreams*.* This intensity of anxiety can be understood by the fact that the dreamer has gone back to old, repressed material. It is as if the small board, in striking the body, reminded him of that unconscious fantasy, as if it were its realization.

* Collected Works (*Gesammelte Schriften*), Vol. II, p. 385.

There is no doubt as to the significance of this unconscious fantasy for the degree of affective intensity. I can use the report of an English physician, Dr. Brunton, of one of his cases, rather than numerous examples explaining this role. In this report, the shock and the fright effect of a weak somatic stimulus stands out boldly because of an anticipatory thought.* The students at an English college had come to hate one of the assistant instructors. They decided to frighten him and prepared an execution block and hatchet in a dark room. Then they seized the instructor and led him before a group of black-robed students who posed as judges. When the assistant instructor saw this arrangement he thought it was a joke. But the students assured him that they were quite serious about it. They told him they were going to decapitate him on the spot. They blindfolded him, pressed him to his knees and forced his head onto the block. One of them simulated the sound of a swinging hatchet; another dropped a wet towel on the instructor's neck. When the blindfold was removed, he was dead.

3

Returning to our earlier example and a description of its consequences, we find that Mr. A. Maury was a twenty-three-year-old student of jurisprudence and medicine, who took a walk in the year 1840 on the Rue Rivoli, not expecting any surprise attack or accident, but feeling in good spirits. Suddenly a small board fell from a scaffold, striking the back of his neck and he dropped to the ground. He did not suffer any major injury, but there soon appeared the symptoms of a traumatic neurosis. Accelerated pulse, abnormal excitability of the system of the cardiac nerves, increased blood pressure, hypnalgesia, abnormalities of secretion, differences between pupils, disturbances of locomotion and vision, etc., were

* From Dr. R. Liertz, *Harmonien und Disharmonien des menschlichen Trie hund Geisteslebens.* (Harmonies and Disharmonies of Human Instinctual and Mental Life) Leipzig, 1925, p. 196.

found beyond doubt by the *Médecine des Hôpitaux*. There is no reason why we should not assume that myotonoclonica tropidans and Oppenheim's akinesia amnestica were present in classical completeness.*

It is easy to prove in this example the significance of the fright factor of the surprise. It seems to me that merely pointing to it is not enough to make more understandable the eruption through the protective barrier in this case of traumatic neurosis. There must be something specific in this fright to help explain the pathological reaction. Let us again compare psychologically the situation of Maury as he was struck by an arousal stimulus in the dream and by an accident. The stimulus had the effect of reminding the sleeping man of something—the complete imaginary picture. This turned out to be—it can hardly be said any other way—a novel with the strong effect of castration as the dominant theme.

In the arousal dream of Napoleon as quoted by Freud, and in similar dreams known to every analyst, there is found the peculiar effect which Egger, in his discussion of Maury's dream, characterized as "l'effet rétrospectif et rétroactif de la sensation." We found that an old anxiety, in becoming a present one, was the especially frightening factor in the arousal stimulus. That old anxiety was, in this case, the castration anxiety which was aroused by a sudden external stimulus.*

* The special literature about traumatic neuroses offers numerous examples of similar situations in which the disease originated. We take from Oppenheim's *Textbook of Nervous Diseases*, Sixth Edition, Second Volume, Page 1938, just this statement: "but any other injury, even those concerning only a peripheral part of the body—neck, feet, etc.—engender the disease. . . . For instance, several times I saw serious neuroses after a violent plunge, or blow against the tip of a finger or, also, after a finger had been squeezed for some time." The biographical data concerning A. Maury, I found in the article "*La durée apparente des rêves*" by Victor Egger in *Revue Philosophique*, 1895. This author reports on page 45, "*le rêve de la c'était l'epoque ou il étudiait simultanément le droit, la médecine et en général, toutes les sciences.*" Unfortunately, I have not been able to find more exact biographical data of significance about Maury, in spite of a diligent search in the libraries of Paris.

* The significance of castration anxiety for the development of the traumatic neuroses has already been described by Sadger. Simmel's experiences, too, testify to this connection, not easily recognizable to the non-analyst.

We believe that something of that kind occurs in the situation of the group of traumatic neuroses we are discussing. The specific character of the fright consists in the impression of an old unconscious anxiety suddenly becoming a present one, even though this specific character may afterwards turn out to be part of a more general psychic attitude. It is not a dreaded situation that becomes entirely clear materially, but a sudden real impression which has the capacity of reawakening through memory all of the unconscious anxiety. An insignificant material stimulus (as in a dream of the type of Maury's) has sufficed to revive certain old thought-content and to make affects tied to it reawaken in their full force.

That no material realization of an old unconscious fantasy takes place, but only one in thoughts should be emphasized because it implies a psychically reinforcing effect. This may be compared with the fact that an illusion frequently releases stronger emotional effects than a direct and exact representation. This character of illusion is peculiar to the situation. A traumatic situation of this kind presents itself, therefore, in the following manner: it is as if (I emphasize, as if), suddenly, in an unexpected manner, something we once dreaded and then disclaimed and banned from our thoughts became real. The dark disaster, which we unconsciously expected, is suddenly at hand.

Take the case of an unforeseen railroad collision. The content of the unprepared traveler's fright would be an old unconscious expectation of disaster in his own life becoming actual. The strong impression of the shake-up in the collision has been left to unconscious modification for a matter of seconds. There it has reactivated those old apprehensions which had been rampant in the dark. Something unknown, suddenly impinging as a threat in one's life, had been known unconsciously for a long time, but was estranged. Something that had been unconsciously expected seems to become reality at the very moment when one was not thinking of it. We understand this to mean that a submerged psychic reality with the character of anxiety is suddenly transformed into a present reality, a process comparable to the sudden removal of a resistance due to repression. Cause and connection

of this psychic process are supplied by a material occurrence, namely, the traumatic event. This piece of undoubted reality gives the character of reality to the whole experience. A certain unconscious process has returned unexpectedly. This return is not tied to an instinctual process, but to an external event. The traumatic event appears like an unconscious confirmation of the justification of that old anxiety.

How did the expectation of disaster evolve, the confirmation of which we unconsciously comprehend as the traumatic event? It appeared in each of us as an emotional reaction caused by unconscious impulses. The expectation of disaster had been caused by the repression of these strong tendencies. It was later, along with its psychic motivation, drawn secondarily into the unconscious. The fact that the dark, apparently irrational, feeling of imminent disaster could not be reconciled with normal human intelligence, with common sense, which had consciously long ago discarded the belief in a mysteriously punishing power, may have contributed to that result.

It is now as if that punishment we unconsciously dreaded were suddenly at hand. It stalks us in an unprepared moment. A day like any other has transformed itself suddenly into a "*dies irae, dies illa.*" But from where did the dreaded disaster come? It is easy to answer this question, if we remember that our psychic life reverts in the traumatic moment to obsolete, animistic ways of thinking. We have been accustomed to consider ourselves the masters of our will. Our motions have obeyed our intentions. Suddenly we sense unexpectedly the working of an unknown force without recognizing where it originates. It is suddenly here as if a powerful hand lifted us, shocked us, pulled us or threw us down however it pleased.

A primitive psychic reaction, which we never overcome completely, causes us to trace back unconsciously to higher powers, originally to parents, everything overwhelming that happens to us, that we experience passively. A similar reaction forces us to consider unconsciously everything threatening and horrible we experience, as a punishment coming from those sources. As we know, we

later acknowledge natural forces or fate as our masters, but in the background of our unconscious there still stands the father or the mother whose will impinged upon our life in early days. We had felt that we were the masters of our ego and now suddenly we come to feel a power which causes us to recognize, with the speed of lightning, our entire impotency and helplessness.

The connection of fright and self-confidence and narcissistic libido now becomes clear. In the experiencing of the shock, the established ego has suddenly come to feel a threatening power of fate, as that of a father-substitute. It has been overpowered by the superego reprojected into the external world. Shock appears as the result of an expression of force or rather of will, of that mysterious power with paternal character. The adult who, otherwise, would certainly look back at his childhood beliefs half compassionately, half contemptuously, reacts to this sudden overthrow like a surprised, intimidated child who, conscious of guilt, waits for the sudden appearance of his strict father from whom he expects punishment.

4

We have found reason to supplement in a certain direction Freud's evaluation of fright as a factor in the etiology of the traumatic neuroses. We believe that in many cases a definite fright is released when an old repressed expectation of disaster seems to become actual. The factor of surprise remains fully valid also in our hypothesis. It undergoes, however, a displacement and now concerns something once dreaded by us which suddenly seems to become a reality in changed form or under changed circumstances. This may perhaps be the general psychological nature of fright.

A second, though small, revision of Freud's concept appears necessary. He points out that fright is the condition that takes hold of us when we face a danger without preparation. The absence of anxiety-preparedness is the characteristic of fright. This certainly seems correct. But it seems to follow from our description that pre-

paredness for anxiety cannot be completely absent. How can this description be reconciled with Freud's concept? We feel that there is truth in Freud's characterization of fright through the lack of preparedness for anxiety, but we have seen in fright all the traits of a resumption of an old unconscious anxiety. If our opinion does justice to the actual psychic processes, then in most cases an overpowering anxiety is suddenly aroused. This anxiety is by no means justified by the real incident, at the moment of the accident. The external impression is subjected to an unconscious modification.

The difference of opinion is certainly not unbridgeable. Freud's description concerns conscious preparedness for anxiety. This preparedness is certainly absent in a traumatic situation. But it is possible that an unconscious, a free-floating anxiety, so to speak, lives in almost all of us which has nothing to do with an expectation of immediately imminent actual dangers.

A differentiation that occurred to me elsewhere seems to be of possible use here. I thought I should generally keep apart fore-anxiety and end-anxiety, these expressions being used in analogy to Freud's fore-pleasure and end-pleasure.* Fore-anxiety is the psychic preparation for an approaching external or internal danger, not merely a warning sign, but a primitive attempt at a first conquest of the danger. Fore-anxiety might also be called a rehearsal of the dreaded situation for conquest. End-anxiety is the reaction in squarely facing the situation of danger.

Fright has, it seems to me, the character of end-anxiety, which through the absence of fore-anxiety, assumes special intensity and emotional power. Preparedness for anxiety is really absent in fright insofar as the present unexpected situation of danger is concerned. In its place, the old anxiety-preparedness has suddenly become present, having originated not merely as a psychic reaction to actual intense hostile impulses. This free-floating anxiety readily interprets the sudden shock as the beginning of approaching punishment. We see here fore-anxiety has a special function. It seems to alleviate the end-anxiety and aims at protecting the indi-

* *Compulsion to Confess and Need for Punishment*, 1926. (See Part Two of this volume.)

vidual from the full impact of the anxiety-preparedness of former times. It refers him only to the present situation of danger.

Its double function would, therefore, be this: to eliminate and overcome psychically as much as possible the old anxiety-preparedness and to limit or reduce it to a present one. The limitation of anxiety to the present situation is, thus, equivalent to a reduction of its intensity. It is as though we had deprived it of a sounding board. Regression to the old, free-floating anxiety has the same effect as an increase of intensity. It is, therefore, not a minus but a plus anxiety that breaks through in the traumatic neuroses. The force of the external factor does not alone cause this abundance of anxiety, but also the regression to early anxiety released by this factor, the anxiety that brings fear of castration or of death at the hands of the father.

In addition to the other factors, this one is of decisive importance for the quantity and quality of the individual's reaction to the traumatic situation. The lack of fore-anxiety engendered a psychic short circuit, as it were, connecting the oncoming stimulus immediately and directly with the deepest emotional strata. It seems really as if all of us were provided with a larger or smaller measure of free-floating anxiety connected with our unconscious feeling of guilt, as if the fear of danger could, in certain cases, take recourse in moral anxiety, the core of which we know to be castration anxiety. A certain part of this anxiety is released when danger is imminent, and it appears as fore-anxiety, situated before end-anxiety.

Fore-anxiety gives, in a way, a warranty or security against the end-anxiety's becoming too intense, or, if you will, against the impetuous, ego-overpowering emergence of that deep unconscious anxiety of our childhood. Besides the intensity of stimuli, it is the time factor that modifies the normal course of anxiety in the traumatic experience. The suddenness of the eruption of the stimulus prevents the development of fore-anxiety, and, therefore, of protection against an encroachment on the realm of unconscious anxiety. It also causes the swift interpretation, or rather comprehension, of the invading stimulus as if by instinct, in the sense of that old expectation of disaster. It has already been pointed out

by psychoanalysis that symptoms are formed in order to retrieve and master anxiety, to convert it into small change, as it were. From our discussion, we are forced to conclude that anxiety retrieved in the symptoms of traumatic neuroses has the character of fore-anxiety.

We can see that by this roundabout way we have arrived at a supplement to Freud's theory of traumatic neuroses, which leaves its core intact, but which modifies its husk at a certain point. The theory of the protective barrier against stimuli in traumatic neurosis is intact, but in many cases the protective barrier seems to us to be of a special kind, as it gives protection from the primal anxiety. The mechanisms of anxiety form the protective barrier here, which, in the traumatic neuroses, is broken into. In an indefinite number of cases of this illness, the ego suspects the other menace, as it were, behind the external danger, as if the danger implicit in the external situation gave cause for a reactivation of the ego's hidden fear of the superego. In the depth of these cases, it makes no difference in the development of a fear of death whether or not there is real danger to life in the traumatic situation. In many cases, fear of death develops even though there is no sufficient cause for it in reality. According to Freud, fear of death occurs between ego and superego.* For an instant, the ego sees itself abandoned by the superego. The security of being loved and protected, which has unconsciously accompanied us since childhood, has disappeared. Metaphorically and often literally, the ground has been pulled out from under our feet and that allows us, for moments, to plunge into emptiness.

5

It follows from the preceding discussion that in the traumatic situation, a sudden disturbance of the narcissistic libidinal situation takes place. The shock has suddenly broken through the relatively great independence from the superego which the ego had

* *The Ego and the Id. Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. VI.

attained. It is as if the ego were unexpectedly, and in a drastic way, reminded of the superego's power, projected outward as fate. This reminder, however, has a definite direction: that of punishment. This sudden disturbance of the narcissistic position of the ego has been especially emphasized by Abraham.

We see similarities and differences between these arousal dreams that end in anxious waking, and those situations in which traumatic neuroses originate. There takes place, in both, a resumption of old impressions that have become unconscious. This resumption marks an act of emotional return and is called "*régression enforcée*" by the French psychologists. In the arousal dreams, the somatic stimulus is used for modification in the dream, reactivating old, imagined anxiety situations. In the situations engendering traumatic neuroses, it is also the external stimulus that causes resumption of an unconscious anxiety.

The differences are determined mainly by the decisive circumstances of the external situation. The wish to sleep undoubtedly functions as a reinforced protective barrier if the stimulus is not too strong when a waking is then forced. In this case, the wish to sleep can cause, at least, a delay of the anxiety effect. This factor coincides with the injection of a fore-anxiety, although abbreviated. Furthermore, it seems likely that the sleeper's doubt as to the material reality of the stimulus may have an effect which would cause him to ask if he were conscious: "Am I asleep or awake? Am I dreaming or is it real? Do I have to wake up because of it or can I go on sleeping?*

* No ghost needs to rise from the tomb of the old psychology of the conscious to remind us that these forms of expression are foreign to the dream. We know that, strictly speaking, we are using the wrong language, taken from the realm of consciousness, in characterizing the function of the dream as that of wish-fulfillment. Actually, we should repeat this every time: if it were possible to describe, in the language of the conscious, the psychic processes of the dream, we should have to state that something goes on in the dreamer's emotional life that we can only comprehend as this or that wish. But the objection made by philosophers cannot touch at the essence of the analytic theories. The psychoanalyst can no more be made responsible for the inadequacy and scantiness of human language than for so many other inadequacies with which he is taxed.

We should turn here to an objection which seems seriously to endanger our hypothesis. Most authors who have published their observations about traumatic neuroses have noted that the reactions of the victims of accidents quickly set in and fulfill their purpose. We cannot ignore the significance of this argument by pointing to the fact that in some cases this quick and adequate reaction is missing, that a paralyzing horror seems to prevent the individual from all action. In the majority of cases, it has been shown convincingly that the reaction sets in quickly and purposefully. Of course, it is possible that flight or other appropriate measures are resorted to as a reflex, similar to the way animals behave when confronted by sudden danger. That reflex would set in without necessarily excluding the great anxiety affect.

We should see clearly that this does not concern the essence of the question. This we understand when we keep in mind the importance of the time factor. There may be only seconds between the perception of the stimulus and the individual's reaction, but this is enough time for a preconscious recognition of the true nature of the stimulus, enough time for the stimulus to be, as it were, tentatively put in its proper place, according to individual experience, and perhaps for appropriate measures to be taken reflexively. The continuing effect of anxiety in depth is thus by no means excluded. It takes place as though on another psychic plane. It may be that recognition and evaluation of the real situation or its comparison with analogous situations known by the individual occur in the pre-conscious system, while the unconscious clings to the infantile affective comprehension of the situation. The judgment adjusted to reality would, thus, leave untouched the affects due to deeper causes. In this way, the anxiety affect would be cut off only as far as the upper strata of the emotional life are concerned. This process would be comparable to one of defense in the face of vital necessities. Here a strong affect is really squeezed in, as it would be expressed in Breuer-Freud's old theory of hysteria. It cannot be discharged emotionally. Its effects will, however, come to the fore later.

6

Once more I shall discuss the fright factor in the etiology of traumatic neuroses, in order to make a few remarks on the side, as if to show some paths branching off at this point. Considering again our attempt to explain the specific fright in the situation in which this neurosis originates, we recognize this fright as related to another, a fright felt in the face of impressions we call sinister or uncanny. Or rather, there is a sinister element contained in experiencing traumatic impressions that lead to accident-neurosis.

The uncanny factor of an experience evolves, according to Freud, from the revival of repressed infantile complexes either through an impression, or from an apparent, renewed confirmation of obsolete primitive beliefs. Freud points out that these two species of the uncanny cannot always be precisely separated because primitive convictions are rooted in infantile complexes. It seems to me that here the outlines of a bridge can be recognized, unclear at first, a bridge which leads from the analytic explanation of the uncanny experience to the exploration of the fright, so significant a factor in the origin of traumatic neurosis. We have recognized the revival of repressed infantile complexes and the apparent confirmation of obsolete views in the regression to unconscious anxiety and its hidden meaning. These features, it seems, are common to both kinds of experience.

We know, however, that there are special differences between the experience of an uncanny impression and that of impressions that can lead to a traumatic neurosis. It is easy to see that even though there may be an uncanny element in the traumatic situation, it is not essential. Likewise, the experience of such impressions may often be followed by traumatic neuroses, but it need not necessarily have this result. Therefore, the thought-contents of the uncanny element and of those impressions that lead to traumatic neuroses are, as such, independent of each other. They coincide, however, at a certain point.

I have shown that the disparity between the impressions coming from outside determines the kind of emotional reaction. This answer, being too general, can scarcely satisfy us. We merely emphasize two factors in order to appreciate the psychological differences, factors essential for the formation of traumatic neuroses, but not for the appearance of the uncanny element. They are the impression of danger immediately threatening our life and the suddenness, the surprise of the traumatic experience that excludes anxiety-preparedness and fore-anxiety.

Only in a very few cases is an imminent danger or a threat to life connected with these impressions we call sinister or uncanny. When, at twilight, we think we see a picture come to life and step towards us out of its frame, it still does not mean, beyond doubt, that our life is in danger. Even if it seems to threaten us, we still do not feel a bodily thrust, slap or hit originating from the mysterious picture, and the testing for reality helps us to overcome the anxiety. In experiencing something sinister, the doubt as to the material reality of the content of the experience is a protection against the traumatic effect. But a person who feels in the traumatic accident a severe shock to his own body cannot doubt the reality of his experience, of his sensation.*

When the uncanny element appears suddenly, and has beyond any doubt the character of reality, seems to cause real danger to life, and is, possibly by accident, connected with a strong mechanical shock, then, indeed a traumatic neurosis can develop with all its clinical characteristics. In that case, the experience of something sinister has assumed a traumatic character. This is shown in many

* One of my patients reports that soon after his father's death, when he woke at night from deep sleep, he had the extraordinarily lively impression of his father in a vagabond's clothes, standing at his bed. At the same time his knowledge of his father's having died was present. In interpreting this report, I assume it was the echo of a dream. When the patient was still a wild and obstinate boy, his father often called angrily to his mother, "Throw out the little vagabond!" That hallucination was certainly an extraordinarily uncanny impression to which the patient reacted with strong anxiety, palpitations and trembling. Although the patient stressed time and again the liveliness of the vision, a doubt as to its reality must have remained, because the patient

instances in neurological literature. Mechanical shock seems to be an essential factor in an accident with traumatic effect. Freud pointed out that mechanical shock must be recognized as one of the sources of sexual excitation. The mechanical power probably frees that quantity of sexual excitation which becomes traumatically effective because of the absence of preparation for anxiety. As I said earlier, the directness and the character of reality in the experience are enhanced by the mechanical shock.

The other factor, which causes a difference between experiencing something sinister and experiencing the details of an accident, is that of suddenness, of surprise. A stranger, who spends the night in a castle that he is told is haunted, is psychically prepared for the emergence of uncanny sensations. If, in the night, he hears a peculiar knock on the wall, or thinks he does, he is, possibly through fore-anxiety, protected against a traumatic effect. In other cases, a general emotional atmosphere with a sinister effect is sufficient psychic preparation for experiencing a special sinister impression or feeling its effect. All this is, of course, true only where a special psychic disposition does not exist to conceive of something as sinister.

I do not intend to state all the differences between both qualities of experience. What has been said is enough for our purposes. We find that experiencing an uncanny impression under certain rare conditions such as suddenness, mechanical shock or imminent danger to life can bring about a traumatic neurosis. It is more important to keep in mind that the experiences which evoke a trau-

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pinched himself hard on the cheeks and pulled his hair to convince himself as to whether he was asleep or awake. A doubt of this kind, which still requires confirmation through one's own bodily sensations, is excluded in a traumatic accident because of the evidence of the bodily sensations. But the doubt can appear afterwards. The assumption is perhaps justified that the unpleasure of mechanical shock came about through the reversal of effect of the pleasure which the child feels when passively moved, as when lifted, put down, etc. In tracing this psychological development, one may perhaps be led back all the way to the intrauterine condition. *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI, p. 222.

matic effect in accident-neurosis would not have this power over us if we did not unconsciously perceive something uncanny in them. I believe that I characterized the essence of this sinister element in the discussion of the specific anxiety in traumatic neurosis.

It seems doubtful to me whether a traumatic neurosis could have come about if this element were missing. It may, on first sight, appear strange or even absurd to assume that in accidents of everyday life, on the level of a high civilization and of world-dominating technical achievements, there should exist such a thing as an uncanny experience. However, we say that they are perceived by the people concerned only in such a manner as to release in the unconscious the well-known *reaction* to something sinister or uncanny. Technical progress is of very little importance to the unconscious in man. The recognition of the force of hidden powers may manifest itself in an accident caused by a machine or in a railroad crash, as well as in an event caused by earth tremors or other natural catastrophes. What we maintain is that those traumatic experiences have a character peculiar to them which we would consciously call uncanny. This is experienced so, regardless of whether a soldier has been buried by a grenade, or a traveler thrown from his seat in a train collision, or lightning has, out of the blue, struck close to somebody taking a walk. As times are, it may not be superfluous to note here that the word "sinister" is meant to describe the emotional reaction of the person concerned in the traumatic situation, not at all to signify an acknowledgment of higher powers at work.*

* Psychoanalysis has described how these higher powers are psychologically conceived. Questions concerning a conception of the world (*Weltanschauung*) are not the business of scientific research. We have nothing to do here with metaphysical problems. It is only the statement of facts which we pointed out, that continuance of our psychic dependence deep into maturity, strictly speaking, until the end of our lives. A statement of this kind can hardly be used to consider those old beliefs eternal or unshakeable. If an opinion may be expressed here, it should rather give cause to wonder how little the crown of creation, as man likes to call himself, has outdistanced the rest of the mammals.

7

Everywhere in the discussion of the original causes of traumatic neurosis we come across the importance of the factor of suddenness and surprise. It would, no doubt, be bold, but by no means hopeless, at this point, to try to comprehend the nature of surprise in general. Fright is, of course, only a special case of suprise. But one could be justified in considering an expectation that has become unconscious to be a surprise, an expectation that we face in reality at an unexpected time, under changed conditions, or in a form not easily recognizable.* Then the surprise would be the expression of a difficulty in recognizing something long known that has become unconscious. It might even signify the degree of emotional expenditure required for the identification of something that has become unconscious. Strictly speaking, surprise should be defined as a defensive reaction directed against the suggestion to forget about what is habitual and to rediscover the oldest in the new.

It is clear that in this way the psychology of the reception of new impressions gains a changed aspect. Perhaps there is, according to the words of the sage, really nothing new under the sun—that is, psychologically speaking, and that we would not be able to grasp and understand anything absolutely new. Only in making a connection with something long known, but not necessarily conscious, can we absorb it at all, making it our own.

The long known does not have to be limited to ontogenesis. The strongest impression of early acquired or inherited fragments of knowledge can be gained in the analysis of certain traits of infantile experience. Freud, in the discussion of a case of childhood neurosis, arrives at the opinion that some kind of knowledge, difficult to determine, something "like a preparation for the understanding in the modification of early experiences in the small

* There exists also a "joyful" fright. That is the emotional reaction felt when something we once hoped for, but in which we can no longer believe, suddenly becomes reality.

child" must have some effect. (*Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VIII, page 566.)

In the sexual enlightenment of the child, for instance, one can scarcely escape the impression that, in a way, it always comes too late. This reminds one of something a Viennese lady, well-known for her malapropisms, said after she had attended the opening night of a drama: "The play is very beautiful, but it is not suitable for a première." The resistance psychoanalysis has found in the world is based mainly on the rejection of repressed knowledge, a reaction which comes from well-known affective sources.

The bewilderment with which we face new insights is an emotional reaction which consists in the difficulty of recognizing something known long ago that has become unconscious. This concerns new scientific truths as well as errors. All learning is, in a way, an anagnorisis of an unconscious kind. It only seems paradoxical, but really is not, when Goethe says, "Everybody learns only what he can." A psychologically oriented pedagogy would certainly come to practical conclusions from a well-considered conscious use of these analytic insights.

Along similar lines, I attempted to explain the emotional reactions to foreign deities, cults and rites in "*Der eigene und der fremde Gott*," published in 1923. Exploration of the psychological nature of surprise should become fruitful also for the science of esthetics, widening in a definite direction our understanding of artistic creation and enjoyment. A narrative keeps us in suspense if it arouses our unconscious anticipatory ideas and fulfills them in an unexpected manner or under unexpected circumstances. It has certainly been observed that in a play we feel that surprise is unnatural and uncalled for if we have not been unconsciously prepared for it in some way. Suppose that in a realistic play, at one point, one of the main characters is suddenly stricken by a heart attack during a bridge party, but the audience has not been prepared in any way, through preceding remarks, for the illness or the occurrence of such an event. If there is any dramatic effect here at all, it certainly will be only a superficial one, similar to one we feel when a picture falls from the wall. The effect would be deeper if

the audience, in an inconspicuous way, had been informed of a previous illness or earlier fainting spells of the person. This technique of allusion has an even deeper effect than if the audience has been prepared for the possibility of the dramatic moment in a clumsy and conspicuous way.

We generally say that the death of a relative or a friend has a less shocking effect upon us if we have been prepared for it, perhaps by a long illness. That is correct. But the shock is the greater and more lasting if we had once thought of that possibility, repressed the expectation (or wish) and then suddenly receive, "unprepared," the news of the death of the person who was close to us. From this angle, too, light is shed upon the psychological problem of shock and fright.

8

Returning to the heart of our topic, we should like to emphasize once again that it is a definite fright which frequently makes its psychic effectiveness felt in traumatic neurosis. It is the fright that we feel when a danger, which we once unconsciously expected and which we thought we had escaped, suddenly becomes reality. We believe that in many cases this effectiveness would be far from so great were it not for a deeper resonance it receives from our unconscious feeling of guilt.

In support of this opinion, I shall mention several factors pointed out by those authors who have studied traumatic and war neuroses. The fact is emphasized that an injury or wound suffered at the same time as the traumatic event occurred, tends, in most cases, to prevent the development of a neurosis. It is actually as though a wound, hence, a punishment, the equivalent of castration, had replaced the fright that was psychically modified only later, and had gratified the person's unconscious feeling of guilt or his masochism. This is comparable to cases in which people are spared neurosis if they fall ill organically, or if they enter an unhappy marriage, etc.

In this manner, the euphoric mood, which can be considered maniacal, exhibited by many war-injured persons after shock, may also be explained, without excluding the strength of other ideas like that of returning home, safety from renewed danger of death, etc. These people have paid their tribute. Now nothing more can happen to them. They have escaped, as it were, with a black eye. Our conception would also explain, in part, the conspicuous fact that, in contradiction to the analytic dream theory, the dream takes the victim of an accident-neurosis back, time and again, into the traumatic situation. Freud said that these dreams retrieve the mastery over stimuli and develop the anxiety, the omission of which was the cause of the traumatic neurosis.

These dreams help in this way to fulfill the primary task which must be fulfilled before the pleasure-principle can dominate. This view is not contradicted when we mention, as a more special addition, the fact that these dreams represent reactions to the reawakened feeling of guilt. They are actually the wish-fulfillment of unconscious feelings of guilt reacting to repudiated, sadistic instinctual impulses.* This would compel us to consider the dreams of victims of accident-neurosis close to the punishment-dreams that gratify the masochistic tendencies of the individual.

We intended to treat here of only one of the psychoanalytically comprehensible aspects of shock and fright. But we should remember that there exist, besides it, other emotional factors not discussed, the significance of which we should not underestimate. It should, I hope, be accepted without objection if the attempt is made here to trace one single thread in a multicolored fabric.

It will be kept in mind that there are, in addition to it, many others and that the total impression results only from their simultaneous effects.

* Freud himself had already considered this concept possible when he said, "if we have not become uncertain of the wish-fulfilling tendency of the dream through the dreams of the victims of accident-neurosis, we could still resort to the assumption that in this condition, the function of the dream has been shaken as so much else, and deflected from its intentions. Or we would have to remember the mysterious masochistic tendencies of the ego."

II

Sexual Desire and a Feeling of Guilt

RECENTLY two psychoanalytic authors had a scientific discussion in the columns of the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* concerning "Need for Punishment and the Neurotic Process." In a clear and unequivocal manner, Wilhelm Reich pointed out the significance of an accumulation of libido in the etiology of neuroses in contrast to the secondary demands of the need for punishment. His presentations were so lucid that in several points they appeared to be irrefutable statements of facts, almost to the degree of banality. Take, for instance, the sentence that "man's morality is never on so firm a foundation as his immorality, and that one thinks one is moral where basically one is merely afraid of the consequences of a deed." This statement is true beyond doubt and not only the analyst, but any somewhat introspective young teen-age girl is more than capable of saying something about the confusion between morality and "fear of consequences."

Franz Alexander, in his perceptive and justified defense against Reich's attacks, found himself goaded into making several statements that arouse our protest. He points out as one of his fundamental ideas, that the morality of the neurotic superego is a "corrupt and formal one" and that in condemning it he does not mean "genuine morality." It is rather difficult to discriminate between corrupt, formal morality and genuine, strong morality. I would refrain from daring to speak with certainty in these matters in a world in which no evaluation is in the least comparable to the certainty that, in a foreseeable time, green grass will grow over our graves.

My small contribution towards the solution of these problems

will start from this discussion, without joining it. I do not intend to do so because, among other reasons, I do not believe the contrasts to be irreconcilable. The primacy of the damming-up of libido is maintained even if the significance of the unconscious need for punishment is recognized. The small segment of the body of problems which I am trying to delimit here is highlighted by a statement of mine that concerns the problems discussed and that, since it was made, has evoked strong protests. This statement says that in a number of neurotic cases the influence of the feeling of guilt increases the libido and deepens the instinctual gratification.

Some psychologists argue that the facts do not bear out this process and that sufficient instinctual gratification exists without the feeling of guilt. I had meekly to agree, but I also reminded them of the possibility that what they protested had perhaps once in the course of the history of science been stated by somebody, but certainly not by me. If somebody says that there are also brown horses and that they, too, are used for riding and pulling, he does not, by saying this, dispute the existence and usefulness of white, black and dun-colored horses.

Some of my physician friends objected to my statement that libido is a border concept between the somatic and the psychic and that my assertion of an increase of libido defies all physiological laws. This, of course, was a realm where I could not follow them. I could not follow them, it is true, but, alas, neither could they lead the way. What is known about the physiology of libidinal processes is of little use for the explanation of the problem from this angle. Much of what I have gathered about the nature of libido from physiological points of view has certainly left a strong impression with me, but this impression was not always unequivocal. Some of the statements of this science which is so proud of its precision have exhibited a wealth of imagination that would have shamed our greatest poets.

Following Freud's lead, we have all found that the feeling of guilt inhibits instinctual gratification. Every day of our analytical practice shows us again that, as Alexander expressed it so well, "all that reduces moral anxiety enhances instinctual gratification." We

know that accumulation of libido, primarily deriving from the influences of the external world and of the ego, can be determined simultaneously also by the factor of a feeling of guilt. But it seems to me that in analytical literature we have not sufficiently emphasized that in many cases damming-up of libido has a reactive effect upon the feeling of guilt.

One would really expect the reverse to be true. A person who was able to ward off the onrush of his instinctual impulses to an unusually large extent should feel in full possession of his self-confidence or of satisfaction with himself and his energy, since he is free from guilt and fault. This happens sometimes when ability to sublimate is especially great and libidinal economy extraordinarily good. In the majority of neuroses, however, and in most character deformations which we see, we observe something peculiar: repression does not succeed, yet the feeling of guilt grows, and under certain circumstances, it assumes an emotional power which combines with that of the repressed drives. Even though the symptom has the character of a substitute gratification, it does not gratify to a sufficient degree.

The analytic explanation of this situation is simple. The feeling of guilt does not concern the action, but concerns the endopsychically recognized danger of temptation and it grows with that danger. The accumulation of libido enhances the unconscious temptation which is stronger than that in actual gratification of a drive. The temptation on one hand, the anxiety connected with it on the other, and the feeling of guilt become more urgent and more impetuous. Reich and Alexander each pointed out another aspect of this psychic process. Actually, both factors, the accumulation of libido and the feeling of guilt, work together. Their motto might be expressed, "March separately and unite to hit the ego."

In many cases of neurosis, we can see that both factors unite while still on the march, as it were, for the common aim. The ego fights the damming-up of libido and resorts to the superego for help. To the increased demands of the superego again correspond increased instinctual demands which are to be held down. These instinctual demands provoke punishment from the superego, until

finally, as in obsessional neuroses and in masochism, both demands are gratified simultaneously. There results, then, the seemingly paradoxical psychological connection in which, for instance, the feeling of guilt concerning sex, of the ascetic who lives in chastity in the desert, is by far stronger than that, say, of the habitué of the Moulin Rouge. It would be definitely wrong to derive this difference only from that between the different moral demands of the two types, and to consider only the divergencies between the philosophies of life responsible for this difference.

Another determinant is, indeed, the difference between the expenditure of repression and the extent of instinctual gratification. Sometimes, however, it seems that the person who yields lazily to his instincts develops a far lesser feeling of guilt than the one who resists them. Repression creates the semblance of a dangerous and sweeping power of instinctual impulses which had not been felt originally.

Absence of gratification shrouds the love-objects with magic and endows them in our imagination with a dangerousness that is by no means their attribute otherwise. For the priest, a woman's embrace may be compared to a hunter's trap—"*laqueis venaterum*" —and he warns us urgently that any wickedness is small compared with woman's—"*brevis omnis malitia super malitiam mulieris.*" To a ladies' man, the arms of a woman are simply parts of a human body slightly fragrant with "*Nuit de Noel,*" and woman's "wickedness," a matter of course which arouses in him neither resentment nor astonishment. Warnings of the power and dangerousness of women can be found less in night clubs, where they might be appropriate, than in monasteries where women are considered "*instrumenta diaboli.*" Nature has endowed sex with greater power over St. Hieronymus, who flees from his fantasies into the desert only to succumb to them there, half starved and parched, than ever she endows the admirer of the ballerinas. The great service of culture and religion to sexuality is still not enough acknowledged. They have enhanced sexual gratification by their having marked it as sin. Remove girdle and veil and the pleasant illusion is gone. Girdle and veil are, therefore, eminently erotogenic means.

Modesty, then, not only represses the sexual impulses. It also preserves them, indeed, deepens them.

"This sherbet is good. How good it would be if it were a sin to eat it," says the Neapolitan woman. This remark reminds us again of the statement which emphasizes strengthening of libido and deepening of sexual gratification by the influence of the unconscious feeling of guilt.

Our experiences so far show that reduction of the unconscious feeling of guilt opens the path to instinctual satisfaction, as pointed out recently by both Reich and Alexander. That certainly is correct and of decisive significance but it comprises only part of the psychic processes hitherto recognizable. In a considerable number of cases, I have observed that this overcoming of the unconscious feeling of guilt soothes and reduces the excessively driving force. It is as though the dynamics of the analytic process have set in on two opposite sides, as though they create changes and displacements on various levels. The liberation from a feeling of guilt weakens the libidinal instinctual force. This effect can be explained, particularly in those cases in which the feeling of guilt contributes to the intensification of sexual desire. Does that imply a contrast to our experience according to which everything that reduces moral anxiety enhances instinctual gratification? By no means, as this remains true in all cases, and is confirmed time and again by the recuperative process.

It is a contrast insofar as it can be shown that in certain cases an increase of moral anxiety can force sexual gratification. In the analysis of the cases discussed here, it was found that certain sexual experiences of early childhood and of puberty were kept in such pleasurable memory because, in addition to all other factors, they showed the influence of the feeling of guilt. This sexual play and experimentation, again and again reproduced in the imagination, often led to masturbatory activity and gratification. They were described as pleasurable in tone, especially when they concerned strictly forbidden activity or actions in situations where there was danger of being exposed to discovery.

I shall point out here only a few cases of this kind. A young girl

"tried out" men in her sexual fantasies, imagining now one man, now another, in certain love scenes, in order to find out which fantasy would afford her the greatest excitation. At that stage of her imagination, she also changed the sexual situations. She recalled having found the greatest pleasure in a sexual situation with a man while her mother was in the next room, so that she was forced to fear being disturbed by her mother at any moment. Never before had she felt so deep a sexual satisfaction. The second case concerns a man who, as an officer in enemy country, had a date with a nun in a convent at night. Time and again, his fantasies returned to that scene in which the nun's habit, the cell, the hard bed, the crucified Jesus on the wall played a great role. Sexual desire and the gratification felt had never been greater than in that situation.

I shall briefly point out other similar cases. For instance, an otherwise cold woman was capable of sexual orgasm only when she knew her husband was near by while she betrayed him with her lover. A man attained full potency only when his sexual partner pronounced obscene words during the act. To this category belongs a great number of frankly detailed cases with special conditions of love-making, for instance, those characterized by Freud as demanding the condition of the betrayed third person, also those female types pointed out by him, whose sexual anesthesia is removed only by a secret relation. In all these cases, the latent influence of the unconscious feeling of guilt can be demonstrated in the enhancement of desire and the deepening of satisfaction.

At this point, we should reply to various objections which attempt to shake our conception. The most important one will assert that the phenomenon we described as a strengthening of gratification by the breakthrough of a prohibition is of a secondary nature. This objection will especially stress the fact that it is the significance of fixation and regression that is decisive for the intensified urge and the deepening of gratification. I am of the same opinion and I go even farther than that in this direction. I believe that, in studying these cases, we could contribute something to our understanding of the nature of fixation and regression, namely, the possi-

bility of a complication which we have not yet sufficiently appreciated.

One can discriminate between a primary fixation on the infantile objects of incest or on their substitute persons and the secondary one. In the former, the biological necessities of the sexual drives have created their expression. In the formation of the secondary fixation, which strengthens the original one, the condition of the prohibition is one of the determining factors. It is the same in the regression. Thus, the natural incestuous tie is not dissolved by the feeling of guilt, but, often enough, deepened and strengthened. It can be shown in many analyses that this condition of prohibition, which originates in the incestuous choice, influences reactively the later choice of object and is one of the factors in its determination.

There are certain configurations in the love life of men and women whose common features are the violation of infantile prohibitions; for instance, the type of man who finds his fulfillment only in the humiliated love-object, the other kind who requires the condition of a betrayed third person, the type of woman who insists on secrecy in her sex relations and many other special conditions in the love relations of normal and perverted persons. We know the origin of this prohibition, these external and internal influences which opposed the infantile sexual gratification. These influences can, as we see in the psychology of neuroses, be so lasting that they still reverberate in the allowed and legal sexual gratification. The connection of sexuality and the feeling of guilt has, under present cultural conditions, become so intimate that even marital sexual intercourse often enough means, unconsciously, the violation of a prohibition. It could be said that through these influences the realm of sexuality has been so much saturated with a feeling of guilt that it cannot be imagined any longer without that feeling.

I should like to emphasize once more the decisive factor from which we started. The disappearance or reduction of the feeling of guilt is one of the most important initial conditions for sexual gratification. But its increase or its influence also brings about instinctual eruption which then appears as a mixed form of grati-

fication of both needs. I should even say that, in innumerable cases of emotional eruption, in the triumph over the superego, the forced and violent character of this conquest still gives evidence of the aftereffect of the unconscious feeling of guilt. If I may draw a conclusion from impressions gained in the observation of only a few cases of manic-depressive patients, I should dare to say that the manic phase corresponds by no means to a pure and simple triumph of the superego. The turbulent, violent, highly stimulated nature of the manic personality still shows that the unconscious feeling of guilt is present under the surface at the very moment of its subjugation. Children's boisterousness may perhaps be best compared to manic behavior, that demonstration of the violation of a prohibition still showing the continued effect of the prohibition even in its violation. It might be said that mania is the emotional state, the intensity of which is determined, among other factors, by the depression which is latent and which continues below the surface. Even in the mood of the drunkard who is "high," there are traces of the grief or sorrow which he tries to drown.

We gain, at this point, a number of insights that deepen our concepts in a certain direction. The orgy is an instinctual eruption, whose extent is characterized not only by the removal of the accumulation of sexual urges, but also by the secretly continuing effect of the feeling of guilt. Its violence, its excessiveness is determined also by the fact that the prohibition remains unrecognized in existence in the background.* This factor of a never completely mastered feeling of guilt, not mastered even during the act, explains certain features of the psychology of the criminal. There exists an emotional mood of despair, originating in the repeated and futile effort to master the instinctual urge. There exists another one resulting from the effort to resist the attacks of the powers of conscience.

Both factors may have an indeterminate share in the psychogenesis of the type of crime which we call affective. Tired of fighting on two fronts, the criminal is simultaneously overpowered by his instinct and by the powers of his conscience. Sometimes

* A Rumanian proverb says, "What you run away from, runs after you."

we see a similar process in the neurotic who, between instinctual urge and pressure of feeling of guilt, succumbs to the conditions which the Church, with fine psychological feeling, calls "sin of despair" ("*la tentation de désespoir*"). The Church, and rightly so, considers overstrictness, the rigid, fanatical clinging to asceticism and penitence sinful. The Church knows that an exaggerated feeling of sinfulness must lead to the very sin of despair. He who knows himself to be damned needs no more renunciation, he comes not only to sensual enjoyment, but to frenzy, to orgy. Religion, thus, really demands sin, since without it, there could be no remorse, no fear of God and no piety.* As one can see, the ways of the Lord are mysterious and not always direct.

As Freud characterized it, the feast is not only an allowed, indeed, it is a required violation of that which is otherwise forbidden. The celebration also presupposes that the prohibition continues in existence, having been overcome only for the moment. The intoxication is followed by the hangover which, however, had been there before, otherwise no intoxication would have been necessary. One might say that the intoxication shows what efforts it takes to overcome the depression.

It would be wrong and unjustified to expose only one side of the problem. In analytic observation, the fact can be demonstrated that sorrow and melancholia are not only reactions to a loss, but that they signify the relentless fight against the impulses that wished for this loss. Here a neglected factor appears. The feeling of guilt, which is of such great significance in the psychogenesis of neuroses, is by no means a psychologically simple phenomenon. It is not only the moral reaction to forbidden activity, but also to its repetition. Analytically speaking, the feeling of guilt also receives its intensity by the unconscious repeated enjoyment of a forbidden gratification.

Though it may certainly sound paradoxical, one is nevertheless psychologically justified in saying that as long as the unconscious feeling of guilt lasts, the temptation to repeat a proscribed

* Therefore, the faithful may sing fervently of the fall of man as of "*Felix culpa.*"

activity is near. One would expect the reverse to be true but the complex psychological constellation justifies this conclusion. The analytically comprehensible nature of remorse fits into this connection. He who repents too much is in danger of doing again that which he repents of. One speaks of the gnawing character of remorse, thus indiacting its self-tormenting, autocannibalistic character, but its essence is the continuing appetite. Incidentally, there exists also remorse over not having committed "sins," regret for lost, missed utilization of opportunities for gratification of our drives.

In the final phases of the obsessional neurotic process, often that which was earlier forbidden becomes an impulsive demand and request. Its omission releases moral anxiety. A young man whom I treated for psychic impotency showed great feeling of guilt in the last quarter of his analysis whenever he did not satisfy a woman sexually, while earlier it had been the sexual satisfaction that he considered forbidden. Furthermore, he was now driven, as if by a compulsion, to have too frequent sexual intercourse.

There are numerous analogous examples in the history of the religions. Out of their abundance, only one will be selected, from the time of the Katharers, the heretical sect which damned any carnal intercourse. The monk Gervasius tells of the time that William of the White Hands, Archbishop of Reims, once rode on horseback outside the town with his clerics. One of the monks of his retinue noticed a beautiful young girl in a vineyard. He approached her and, in a most gracious way, made an amorous proposal. But she replied that once her maidenhood was lost, she would irrevocably be given to eternal damnation. Now the monk suspected that the girl adhered to the godless teaching of the Katharers. The Archbishop, having heard that the girl treasured so highly that which belonged to her earthly body and deserved so little reverence, had her seized. When, in spite of all persuasion and promises, she insisted on her frightful aberration, she was given over to the hangman. In her delusion, she could not see that one had to despise earthly things and obey the Church, outside of which there is no salvation. "*Extra ecclesiam non est salus.*"

We cannot ignore, either, that this repression, too, has a double character. Freud determined the nature of repression as something between flight and condemnation, a preliminary step to condemnation. Not in contrast, but as a supplement to this description, one can add that repression also preserves the situation of temptation, that it not only fights off the forbidden pleasure, but also holds it fast. This aspect of the repressive condition is shown clearly through the processes of the return of the repressed from the middle of the repressive. In them, the repressed instinctual impulses, or the repressed thoughts, apparently abruptly break through the defense and receive some gratification.

It would perhaps be practical to discriminate between these processes and another one we have just characterized. In it, the feeling of guilt fights the repressed impulses until it becomes their ally. I call this the submersion of the repressing into the repressed. Certain measures of defense had been erected against the proscribed ideas, but they proved themselves too weak. The fought-off instinctual impulses have become too powerful and have pulled over into their realm also all those factors that had been destined to fight them. It is as in certain actions to save drowning people. The rescuer is pulled down by the endangered person. Similarly, the moral feeling of guilt often facilitates instinctual eruption and enhances the intensity of gratification.

This point of view should have significance for analytic therapy because it reveals the nature of certain difficulties in our therapeutic efforts. These difficulties are caused by the fact that the gratification that was intensified and deepened by the feeling of guilt is less easily accessible to reduction and sublimation than the normal, even though antisocial one. I have earlier pointed briefly to the significance of this point of view for the psychology of the criminal. Schiller, whom Nietzsche rightly called "the moral trumpeter of Saeckingen," announces emphatically that it is the curse of the evil deed that it must procreate evil. It would be by far truer to change the emphasis in that sentence and to say that it is that very curse directed at the "evil" deed that produces these effects.

The present cultural situation is responsible for the fact that man is unsatisfied in following his instincts, because moral demands object, and he is unsatisfied in resisting them, because of the deep down unchangeable animalistic nature of man. He is unsatisfied in accepting the pricks of flesh, and unsatisfied in kicking against them. In view of this situation, pervailing in this most magnificent of all worlds, the deeply refreshing optimism of certain philosophers is, indeed, to be admired.

I believe there is little hope for any essential change in the emotional life of people. They remain poor, miserably suffering creatures, suffering even where they cause suffering. It is perhaps already a consolation to state such comfortlessness rather than to prettify it, to give it an optimistic interpretation, to make it appear nice and to hush it up.

III

Some Unconscious Connections of Hatred and Anxiety

THE impulses of hatred, which should be considered representative of the destructive tendencies, are as mysterious as those of love, as far as their origin and their dynamics are concerned. The man who is filled with hate makes just as pathological an impression as the one who is in love. Until we ourselves experience hate, we are hardly better able to understand the psychic motives and aims of the hater, than those of that other monomaniac, the person who is love-struck. We cannot see that the love-object of one is an angel on earth and we do not understand why the other insists on considering a certain object a devil in human form.

But we do know that hatred, as related to the object, is older than love, and that part of the riddle resulting from the strong admixture of hatred with the love impulses is explained by the fact that hatred is love's precurser. Another part of the riddle becomes understandable through the defensive reaction of certain ego-drives which, in turn, can point to the almost unavoidable conflicts that result between ego-interests and love-interests.

But where does hatred come from? Freud teaches us that it originates in the primeval rejection by the self-loving narcissistic ego of the external world with its stimuli. The prototypes of the relation of hatred originate in the struggle of the ego for its assertion and maintenance. The ego hates, therefore, all objects that become sources of unpleasurable sensations. Taking this statement of Freud's biologically, one may say that the ego hates all objects exerting stimuli and capable of endangering its exist-

ence. The ego reacts with anxiety to the approach of an object of this kind, which means danger to its preservation, and it tries first to remove itself from the source of stimuli by the suitable action of escape.

Anxiety is preformed phylogenetically in the individual. Freud characterized its nature as a signal of danger. It can point to experiences of the forebears, which had traumatic effect. Where reflective flight is not possible, the individual will take other measures in order to cope with the dangerous stimulus. He will, for instance, endeavor to remove the source of stimuli, primarily by incorporating it, by devouring it.

Hatred may be described as that relation to the object which announces a preparation for one of these two reactions, or as that relation which is caused by their delay. In later development, hatred will, indeed, be moving between these two opposite actions, and will either remove itself from the hated object or destroy it. Even in the development of love relations at a later period, which exhibit a mingling of intense hatred, both tendencies thus performed through the relation of hatred, become clearly recognizable. They stand out more strongly when love impulses regress to the sadistic-anal level of organization.

Here I shall state the fact that hatred stands biologically and psychogenetically in intimate connection with anxiety or, in other words, that hatred is one of the impulses which derive from the affect of anxiety. It is not necessary to emphasize the fact that anxiety is capable of transposition into emotional impulses of other kinds and of causing other object reactions. What are the special conditions from which this special genesis of hatred results? I have indicated one of them—hatred can arise only if spontaneous suitable reaction to the approach of a dangerous object is impossible. Motor action would be the expression of a mastery of anxiety and would make it unnecessary for hatred to arise. This, of course, is true only for a primary situation of the kind that has been described, while later on, hatred becomes the instinctual pre-condition for the possibility of that reaction.

A comparison of these conditions with those of the opposite

emotional representative suggests itself. Originally, love evolves from an instinctual inhibition, that is, the postponement of the immediate gratification of the sexual instinct. All the idealistic attempts at extenuation, all the poetic transfiguration and all the metaphysical depth of the philosophers cannot bring about the disappearance of the psychological fact that originally love can develop only where immediate and direct sexual gratification is impossible.

Analysis cannot truthfully say much about the nature of the mysterious and extolled feeling, glorified by the religions and celebrated in poetry. The scant clarification which psychoanalysis is capable of supplying shrinks essentially to a single sober result of research, the origin of love in sexuality. The primary and most important condition for these overwhelming feelings certainly turns out to be, whatever may be said, the ungratified sexual need. Whether this feeling, which has given people so much happiness and so much more misery, comes from heaven or the other place, whether God in His kindness has given it to mortals, or whether the devil has afflicted them with it—"*virtus diaboli est in lumbis*"—its origin in the gross, socially disowned sexual need is beyond doubt.

Postponement of immediate and direct sexual gratification is the primary pre-condition for the psychogenesis of love. Postponement of object annihilation is the pre-condition for the beginning of hatred. This can be recognized also regressively by drawing conclusions from the intended effect to the motive of the action. If the obstacles causing these feelings to arise are removed, the gratification of the primary instinctual needs follows immediately. The lover aims at union with the object, the hater at its annihilation.*

The sagging of feelings of love after sexual intercourse corresponds to the subsiding impulses of hatred after the annihila-

* It is noteworthy that hatred seeks the proximity of the object, as does love. As traces of the tendency to approach the object can be found even in platonic love, so they can be found in the most sublimated impulse of hatred. And it seems that hatred "par distance" is entirely out of favor with people.

tion of the object. Both phenomena are the result of never completely achieved mastery of the stimuli. Both leave the impression of "unfinished business."

An object from which danger threatens, fear of the object, the impossibility of mastering this anxiety by escape or the annihilation of the dangerous object immediately, or in an adequate way —these are the features that comprise the essential conditions for the release of the reaction of hatred. These cannot, of course, be the only ones.

This will be made clear in the answer to the obvious question that follows. Why does hatred result from the described situation rather than a continuation of anxiety? This cannot be easily answered. The sincere answer can only be that we do not know. We are tempted to assume that this differentiation takes place under the influence of quantitative factors. We seem to have found with some certainty that hatred is a kind of defense against anxiety, a primitive attempt at mastery of anxiety. A deeper insight into the question of how the transmutation of anxiety into hatred can come about will probably result from the contrast of death-instincts and life-instincts shown in Freud's conception. But the nature of anxiety, originally perhaps a reaction to the primary pleasure in letting the ego perish, has not yet been sufficiently clarified.

From this derivation, the clarification of several factors of the impulses of hatred results. It is most important that the anxiety, for the mastery of which hatred is mobilized, clearly continues within the experience of hate. The impulse of hatred is aimed only at objects one fears, objects from whom the ego expects external or internal endangerment. Whenever this factor of fear drops out, feelings of contempt, aversion, indifference result, but in no case hatred. The factor of unconscious anxiety is immanent in the impulse of hatred and can not be detached from it. It is in accord with the law of the rebound of affects that fear of an object can transpose itself into aggression once that feeling has attained a certain strength. This mechanism is, incidentally, not at all limited to people. Dogs frequently attack people because

they are afraid of them, and they desist from aggression when they feel they have nothing to fear. The rat, when cornered, attacks people furiously.

From impressions gained in the psychoanalysis of neurotics, the insight may dawn on us that there is more to these dynamics of the transposition of anxiety into hatred and into resultant aggressive tendencies than we have recognized so far. Certain experiences of analytic practice suggest the conclusion that sudden actions of aggression or hatred frequently result from attempts to fight off anxiety which has become excessive. Impulsive acts of this kind exist not only in hysteria. Also, the symptomatology of obsessional neurosis and, in the shape of instinctual eruptions even more, that of manic-depressive disorders, furnish numerous examples of this special form of defense against anxiety.

I should think in this connection that a psychological explanation may be found of aggressions in psychotic cases. In cases of paranoia, the aim is to master the threat coming from the object, or seeming to do so, by threatening the object.

Of still greater significance is the exploration of these defense mechanisms and of this process of transposition in the psychology of the criminal. Criminal psychologists, judges, prosecutors and defense counsels would do well to study these difficult emotional processes with the help of the analytic method. A large number of otherwise unexplainable crimes are clarified in the psychic process in which an aggressive action is used to reduce the tension of anxiety. Certain cases of suicide have no other explanation than that, under the influence of too great anxiety, hatred had been turned against the ego, driving it into death. It may be said that the ego prefers its own annihilation to anxiety which has grown too intense and has become inescapable. It executes the aggression against the object introjected into the ego, the object which had threatened it with danger.

We are back again, then, to the problem of the transposition of hatred into anxiety. It is impossible to fathom its depth without considering the contrast of life—and death—instincts. Anxiety is a phenomenon of reaction to the instinctual desire of the in-

dividual to achieve death by the shortest route. The resistance of the ego against this instinctual challenge effects the reversal of affect, which transforms the primary pleasurable character into anxiety. As a logical supplement to Freud's conception, it should be said that anxiety is the expression of the struggle against the longing for death, in other words, of the struggle against the temptation to revert to the quietude of inorganic development. Hatred would, hence, be the expression of defense of the ego against the object which arouses in us this wish, a reaction of the life-instinct against the goal of the death-instinct.

This protesting reaction, which owes its strength to Eros, can achieve its effect only with the means used by the older death-instinct. Indeed, it retains the old instinctual aim and changes its course only in that it displaces the pleasure onto another object. Hatred is, therefore, a drive which, through displacement onto another object, aims at gratification of the death-instinct. Displacement is the process that saves the ego from ruin, while still permitting it the enjoyment of part of the old gratification via the foreign object. We pointed earlier to the case where an over increased anxiety can drive the ego into death. This can be expressed also in a positive way. The ego desists from struggling against annihilation and succumbs to the temptation of the death-instinct.

Clearly, hatred has assumed, as it were, only the executive power of the death-instinct, while the choice of object—a foreign object or the ego—has only secondary significance. Suicide because of unhappy love can be explained by the regression to which the life-instincts are subject. The ego annihilates itself rather than destroy the beloved person. There is no hate without an object. There is, however, a readiness to hate, which is originally as little discriminating in its choice of an object as is love. It is a free-floating hate, as it were, representing the attempt at mastery of a latent anxiety.

In the analysis of a number of neurotic patients, one can observe that hatred also has another significance of an emotionally dynamic and affectively economic kind. Hatred frequently helps in sparing a person intense affects of anxiety and prevents him from the development of over great feelings of unpleasure of this kind.

The significance of this economic factor in the genesis of hatred deserves deeper psychological appreciation.

At this point, a certain sequence of psychic processes, which I described earlier, may be seen in a more comprehensive aspect. In *Compulsion to Confess and Need for Punishment,* I expounded a theory to the effect that, in a considerable number of cases, neurotic patients as well as healthy persons had intense feelings of hatred against the very persons who showed them a well-meaning and friendly attitude. The psychological fact that many persons have this attitude of increased hatred toward the very objects to whom they have caused damage or offense seems here bewildering. In the former book, I attempted to explain that this seemingly paradoxical reaction derives from the effect of the unconscious feeling of guilt, and to show the way in which it does so.

This is where that special psychological case fits into a more general complex of facts. The castration-anxiety, whose representative we found in the unconscious moral anxiety to be, has continued as hatred. It seems, indeed, that the increase of that moral anxiety can bring about impulses of extreme hatred and frequent outbreaks of hatred.

In many cases of neurotic patients or neurotic characters, I was able to convince myself of the effectiveness of this mechanism. One of my patients would not be satisfied until she had most deeply offended every person close to her, relatives and friends. Once, when she had hurt her best friend in this manner, she gave this description of her psychic processes during analysis. "I was horrid to R. because I had been horrid to her before. But being horrid makes me hate her." The hatred appears here clearly as the attempt at freeing herself from the stifling pressure of the feeling of guilt which has become overwhelming and which urges repetition of the act. This is, therefore, a special case of anxiety, unconscious moral anxiety from which emerges the impulse of hatred. But we know that here, too, a realistic anxiety is primarily in the picture, an anxiety which Freud has shown to be the core of moral anxiety.*

* The analysis of relations of love sometimes gives the impression that hatred against an object originates in the anxiety which reacts to the antici-

The process of the psychogenesis of hatred deriving from a definite attempt at mastery over anxiety appears quite clearly in cases where the object of anxiety is also the primal image of the superego. In the case of a certain young girl, the impulses deriving from the Oedipus complex assumed a peculiar form. As their motivation, as far as it was conscious, it was stated that the patient hated her mother because the latter caused her to hate herself, meaning to say that she was forced to hate herself because of the education given her by her mother. It could easily be guessed that the qualities that caused her to develop this self-hatred were intimately connected with the impulses of her sexual instincts, and that the anxiety concerned situations in which there were temptations of this kind.

It can be frequently observed in the transference-situation in analysis that the patient becomes aggressive in thought and talk when anxiety similar to a feeling of guilt has reached a certain intensity. This psychological derivation necessarily leads to a conclusion that is confirmed by analytic observation of the individual: hatred becomes the more intense the stronger the unconscious anxiety is, in defense against which it was produced. It seems sometimes that the greatest intensity of hatred is reached under the impression of impulses of stifling anxiety. We cannot decide here whether and to what extent realistic anxiety is deepened through moral anxiety in cases of this kind. I consider it probable, however, that the pressure of the feeling of guilt contributes decisively, together with other factors, to this development of the impulses of hatred. Supported by unconscious feelings of guilt, hatred attains

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pated dependency of the ego upon the object. Hatred, in this case, seems to be a psychic phenomenon of reaction to strong masochistic tendencies. In some cases it can be seen that the hatred with which some women react to the approach of a certain man originates in the anxiety—among other sources—which accompanies their anticipation of much suffering in the relation with him. A motive of this apparently unfounded hatred is the anxiety concerning the preservation and maintenance of the ego, originally, fear of being overwhelmed. Compare the earlier, deeper explanation of anxiety originating in the struggle against impulses of the death-instincts, with this explanation.

sinister dimensions. In these cases, it is interesting to observe that annihilation of the hated object is the goal not only for realistic reasons of instinctual gratification, but also because the removal of the object is expected to give liberation from the stifling pressure of moral anxiety. The aggressive outbreak has, therefore, the purpose of flight from an intense anxiety.

I should not like to conclude the discussion of this analytical theory without emphasizing a problem that presents itself here. It concerns the impulses in the typical constellation which, in analysis, we call the Oedipus complex. This situation is of great significance for the development and maturation of the individual. In it, the small boy shows clear signs of sexual and jealous impulses towards his mother and betrays no less clearly his hostile impulses towards his paternal rival. This psychological connection between hatred and unconscious anxiety appears to be of far-reaching and lasting significance in the development of this situation.

The rather longlasting, frictionless coexistence of contrasting tender and hostile feelings towards the father as well as other features of the psychic process suggest a certain assumption that appears to be worthy of consideration. Does the impulse of hatred in this situation, too, develop only under the influence of anxiety? In other words: I believe the boy's primary rejecting and hostile attitude, which initially does not at all conflict with his tender feelings for his father, develops into hatred only later through the defense against his castration-anxiety. This hatred, I believe, is then increased under the influence of the closeness of temptation, and later reactively strengthened through moral anxiety. In this situation, too, it seems to me that hatred is an attempt at mastering the unconscious anxiety.

I must refrain from pointing to some aspects that result from the clarification of the connection between hatred and anxiety. I may, however, without being accused of rashness, say with assurance that from this point, more than one path leads into hitherto scarcely entered realms of ego-psychology.

IV

Forgiveness and Vengeance

1

If we may believe the psychologists of the conscious, there is nothing problematic or questionable in the fact that we forgive someone who has offended or hurt us. It is for us to decide whether we choose this or another reaction to an act that was directed against us. Of course, we can seldom refrain from commenting on our choice and pointing out how much more noble it is to forgive than to take revenge.

However, the very fact that the reaction of forgiveness seems to be something psychologically quite simple, elementary and self-explanatory, might arouse our distrust. The processes which appear to official science as self-explanatory usually are those least understood by it. Is it really a foregone conclusion that we forgive? On the contrary, it is a very unnatural reaction.

Nothing could be more plausible and natural for people than to take revenge. The moral reaction which, for several thousand years, has accompanied our strongest and most elementary instinctual impulses to an increasing extent, brought about the suppression of the deep, truly unqenchable need for vengeance that lives in us. It is a peculiar fact, though not surprising to the psychoanalyst, that society proscribes this need for the individual while satisfying it for itself in so many fields.

Punishment in education and in legal procedure and penitence imposed upon the sinner by religion, war and other social institutions are, in origin, manifestations of revenge. The individual's need for revenge, suppressed in our social order, has been pre-

served in the unconscious, strong and vigorous as on the first day and none of the intensification of moral prohibitions affect it at all.

For the unconscious there exists neither forgiveness nor negation.* In the analysis of neuroses, we observe the deep and decisive extent to which the individual's unconscious drives to take vengeance for wrong suffered, and the inexorability with which the unsatisfied need for revenge can turn against the ego. On certain occasions it can be observed that a particularly strong, vengeful impulse, a trend towards retaliation and revenge to a large extent destroys the individual's life. One finds (with the customary regret or without it) how little the Christian principles of clemency and forgiveness can do in the face of such strong emotional impulses.

Only fools, hypocrites or sick people deny the deep and voluptuous satisfaction adequate revenge can give, deny the extraordinary feeling of liberation, indeed, redemption from stifling psychic pressure, which follows successful revenge.** That femininely sentimental remark of Mme. de Staël's that to understand all is to forgive all reveals its profound untruthfulness also in analytical practice. The understanding of the motives and instinctual forces of our fellow men may sometimes—I say sometimes—cause us to judge them more kindly but it is remarkable how small is the influence of that understanding when we ourselves are offended or hurt by their actions. Scholars have good reason to wonder at our illogical and peculiar attitude when we

* Compare Freud, *Negation. Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. XI.

** In contrast to all humanitarian talk so eloquently proclaiming man to be good, and showing enthusiasm about his progress, Heinrich Heine's upright and morally courageous admission may be quoted here, "My frame of mind is most peaceful. My wishes are: a modest hut, a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, milk and butter—very fresh, flowers in front of my window, beautiful trees outside my door and, if the good Lord wishes to make me completely happy, he lets me have the joy of seeing hanged on those trees about six or seven of my enemies. Deeply moved, I shall forgive them before they die, all the wrong they inflicted upon me in their lifetime. Yes, one must forgive one's enemies, but not until they are hanged." From *Thoughts and Notions (Gedanken und Einfälle)*.

forgive more quickly and readily the wrong inflicted upon another.

It is clear from the start that psychologically we must discriminate between forgiveness extended to us and that we extend to others. Psychoanalytical investigation reveals, however, these two kinds of forgiveness to be by no means so sharply different, so independent from each other as we should expect.

If it is true that there is no forgiveness for the unconscious, then traces of the original tendencies should still be discernible in the reaction-formation. This is so, indeed. Forgiveness, to be conceived of as reaction-formation to intense tendencies towards revenge, has become the most sublimated and sublime form of vengeance. To forgive somebody has come to be an expression of tendencies towards the deepest humiliation of the person forgiven. That deep reaching, almost irrepressible human impulse to pay back in the same coin only seems to have yielded to the reactive tendencies. We are in reality ready to forgive only after we have taken revenge. Where revenge is impossible for external or internal reasons, even forgiveness becomes revenge. When we help our enemy we heap "fiery coals" upon a guilty head, thus taking revenge. Behind a transparent mask, what has been warded off has taken the place of the powers of defense, like a usurper with the royal insignia on the throne of the legitimate ruler. Even the Church, though condemning vengeance, makes a point of paying back in the same coin. "In these sacred halls vengeance is unknown," Sarastro proclaims in the *Magic Flute*, but it is taken anyway.

"Mine is vengeance," saith the Lord. One may wonder why God does not claim the privilege of forgiveness with the same decisiveness, and why he challenges us poor humans to accomplish that prodigious feat of forgiving one another. That feat, incidentally, joins the others which He demands of us and for which He has, in His inscrutable way, equipped us likewise inadequately.

Religion adds to the postulate of forgiveness a weighty reason. It demands that we forgive others so that we, too, may be for-

given. Doing so, it has touched on the motives of forgiving more deeply than did the psychology of the conscious. We are all sinners at all times. We, too, have inflicted evil upon others and must, therefore, fear punishment. Religious teachings, introducing this argument, intend to make us decide for this special kind of instinctual renunciation by appealing to the social anxiety, and to the moral anxiety, that live in all of us.

The conscious effect of this suggestion is undeniably strong. We are more inclined to forgive somebody if we are conscious of the same or a similar guilt. But we said this concerned only the conscious. If the decision of the conscious prevailed, we would not suddenly feel resentment and desire for revenge long after we had forgiven an offender or enemy. Nor would we suddenly have feelings of guilt or anxiety, were we certain that we have long been forgiven for a past wrong. The psychology of the conscious, of course, says that these feelings originate in the fact that forgiveness in either case has not been complete, that the anxiety and the thirst for vengeance, respectively, correspond to this very imperfection. We cannot contradict, as in this world everything is imperfect. We should, however, prefer to assume that these unexpected feelings, so strongly contradicting our conscious attitude, are outgrowths of repressed impulses that try to force their way back into consciousness. In any case, everyday experience teaches the analyst that the idea of forgiveness belongs entirely in the realm of consciousness and that the repressed impulses of vengeance and retaliation are everlasting, are really eternal.

2

I shall not discuss the numerous neuroses where those unconscious vengeful tendencies had an essential influence upon the determination of the severity and extent of the illness. It seems better to me to go back to a number of observations that show

us the problem under discussion from an unexpected angle. During the last few years, I have had a chance to study in analysis several people whose conscious vengeful tendencies were unusually intensive and lasting. This thirst for vengeance was, as a rule, directed against members of their family, former friends and people close to the patient. It expressed itself in variegated, often elaborate daydreams and fantasies that frequently exhibited the most refined cruelty.

It was not always mere fantasy. In a few of these cases, actions took place either of an impulsive kind or as the result, apparently, of long premeditated plans. In many cases, one could easily see that the people upon whom revenge was taken were merely substituted persons and that the revenge had been displaced onto them from the primary objects. In one of these cases, the patient's thirst for vengeance could best be compared to the mood of one who has run amuck. The looseness of object-choice in vengeance was amazing. The slightest cause, scarcely perceptible to others, was enough to arouse a whole sequence of vengeful fantasies. I was much impressed by the vengeful fantasies of a man to whom an elderly gentleman had once addressed a harmless jesting remark which caused him to feel deeply hurt. Eleven years later he struck the offender with exquisite cruelty where it hurt most. He professed to the maxim, "Revenge is to be enjoyed cold." He postponed the execution of his plans to a time when circumstances were most favorable for him.

In the course of the psychoanalysis of people of so clearly and lastingly vengeful a type, astonishing discoveries are arrived at. They are in decisive contradiction to the concepts of vengeance and forgiveness, otherwise so willingly and universally adhered to. It is easy to see that these detailed situations of revenge, time and again elaborated in fantasy, could develop only on the basis of inhibitions of action. In most cases, it was possible to reconstruct psychologically a definite phase without being particularly arbitrary. This phase made its effects felt during the time between the offense or hurt and the emergence of plans for revenge. In these people, an especially intense urge for reprisal or revenge

had arisen immediately after the offense had been inflicted upon them. This urge was originally warded off, probably for external reasons, because their own power was not sufficient, or because certain circumstances prohibited an immediate reaction. Only later, internal inhibitions set in, among which the demands of culture have an important place.*

The deepening of the cultural requirements has unquestionably increased the intensity of the unconscious tendencies. Their effect equals that of an accumulation of affects. The transmutation of external punishments and deterrents into feelings of guilt leads to emotional consequences no less cruel than the barbaric measures of ages past. The psychic effect of mourning, which is felt between the ego and the superego, is scarcely less cruel than the mourning rites of ancient peoples and of the primitives of our time, with their cruel self-tortures. Part of us, too, dies with the beloved persons, even though this occurs in other, less conspicuous forms. The psychic effect of the deepening of the moral demands appears also in the realm of vengeance, on both sides. The principle of talion which prevailed in early antiquity does not seem to correspond to our advanced humanitarian demands, nor does it satisfy the instinctual impulses intensified by the processes of repression. To make a comparison, the advantage in saving capital is an increase of interest, while the privations forced by economy seem to justify expectations of a still bigger amount. People's vengeful tendencies, too, grow stronger and more sophisticated.

Suppression of the primary impulse had the effect of psychic frustration, and that in a special sense. The person who inflicted the offense or injury was unconsciously taken into the ego, introjected. This introjection initiated the turn of the instinctual impulse against oneself. To the process of defense and object-introjection corresponds the deep unconscious feeling of guilt in the ensuing time. It comes from two sources. It is borrowed from the

* Freud shows us a similar psychic situation in the psychogenesis of the tendentious joke. (*The Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious. Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. IX.)

introjected object and it relates to one's own suppressed hostile impulses.

In this phase, a peculiar internal tension develops that is sometimes unbearably painful. Its mood ranges from depression to depersonalization and extraordinary disquietude. The retroactive transmutation of this self-tormenting attitude into one of sadism towards the external world is especially significant within the typical emotional sequence. This transmutation occurs under the pressure of the psychic tension which has increased to the extreme, and it has the effect of psychic relief.*

It is difficult to look into the special dynamics of this process. They may best be described as two different processes which combine their effects. The instinctual impulse turns back against the object while a regression to an earlier phase of libidinal development occurs. In turning back, the instinct hitherto directed against the ego, an ego changed by the introjection of the object, drives towards eruption against an external object, hence, towards revenge. The difference between this phase and the earlier one is clear enough and can be dynamically well determined. In the first, the ego is treated like a hated object. In the second, the object is treated like a hated ego. The historical development explains this peculiar change. But it also implies the possibility of regression from the second phase of development to the first.

Both reactions exhibit a distinctly archaic character. A fine example of the first kind has been given by Freud in his analysis of Michelangelo's Moses.† In the scene described by Freud, when Moses expresses his furious anger at the idolatrous Israelites by tearing at his beard, the ego is treated like a hated—and loved—object. An external obstacle, the distance, prohibits action of revenge against the object.

* The moods here described, which follow the defense against motor reactions of revenge and the object-introjection, can be found also in fiction, for instance, in the figure of Hamlet. This particular play is for the analyst an example of the psychic effects of warded-off tendencies for revenge. Seen from this angle, the prince's melancholia and feeling of guilt become better understandable.

† *The Moses of Michelangio (Gesammelte Schriften)* Vol. X.

I give an example from the life of a compulsive neurotic who wished to show a new card game to an elderly relative. While playing, his pupil was extremely awkward and unreasonable. Soon afterwards, my patient behaved in a very unusual way. He began not to understand simple things, stared stupidly in front of himself and behaved altogether like a fool. This, too, could be compared with Hamlet's attitude for instance, in the scene with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.

The course and effectiveness of the psychic process here described can easily be traced in the analysis of certain types. This is undoubtedly an interesting process. The original offense and hurt had the same effect as certain forms of frustrated love. Its psychic consequences were similar to those often observed in those frustrations of love when the object, as such, was consciously given up, but introjected into the ego. Several conspicuous features reveal this origin of vengeful tendencies also to those not familiar with psychoanalysis. The extraordinary gratification through the suffering and torment of the objects that are the targets of revenge, is, in fantasy, enjoyed as if the object's suffering were simultaneously one's own. The frequent sexual excitation combining with the fantasies and the self-tormenting remembrance of the offense or hurt which caused the fantasies, point to homosexual and sadistic impulses as the origin of those scenes, as is the case in fantasies of beating.

The special gratification in fantasies of revenge can best be understood in comparison with another psychic phenomenon. Freud showed, in the analysis of certain masochistic fantasies of children, a phase of development in which the child experiences in fantasy, clearly with sexual satisfaction, the idea of a child being beaten.* In these fantasies, homosexual tendencies and impulses from the unconscious feeling of guilt are simultaneously gratified. Fantasies of various kinds can take the place of indeterminate ideas about some child being beaten or chastised. The fantasies may vary in the detailed circumstances and kinds of

* *A Child Is Being Beaten* (*Gesammelte Schriften*) Vol. V.

chastisement. They may combine with something read or heard and frequently assume features of a novel.*

During his puberty, one of my patients became intensely sexually excited when he imagined the Christian martyrs being subjected to various tortures by the Roman legionnaires. Another was led to masturbatory acts whenever he imagined the horrifying punishments that the revolutionists in his country had had to suffer. When this patient first entered analysis, his person did not figure consciously in these fantasies. He experienced them as an onlooker, as it were, on an imagined stage. Later, however, he put himself in the place of the commanding person, the judge or executioner. Still later, he played in his imagination the parts of the torturer and the tortured together.

The connection of this kind of fantasied beating and plans and fantasies of revenge, which we have described, is obvious. We need only to put real persons in the place of invented—or transformed—ones, to let a hurt appear as the real or rationalized cause of the imagined punishment. We must continue, in a certain direction, that phase of the fantasies of beating in order to arrive at a fantasy of revenge of a pleasurable character, as described before. Often those fantasies of revenge, too, have the character of a novel. Sometimes they are daydreams of the accomplishment of revenge in definite elaborately depicted situations, showing the preparation and the details, and preferably dwelling upon the pain and suffering of the victim. In these features, too, the fantasies of revenge prove to be the counterpart of those typical scenes in which a child is being beaten.

Our derivation has shown that the deep thirst for revenge draws, in these cases, its special intensity from various sources. The original impulse for retaliation, not manifested because of special emotional conditions, has turned against the ego and was strengthened in doing so.†

* Compare Anna Freud, *Phantasy of Beating and Day-Dream (Schlagephantasie und Tagtraum. Imago* VIII. 1922, p. 317 f.).

† There are reasons for me to assume that the special kind of cruel self-irony in the jokes of the Jews about weaknesses and shortcomings of their own peo-

The suppressed aggressiveness, which now can only turn against the ego, gradually adduces an extraordinary tension that could achieve the destruction of the ego. As soon as this aggressiveness attains a certain intensity, not determinable by us, the ego succeeds in warding it off. It is again turned back outward, a new object-cathexis takes place, a fantasy of revenge and sometimes actual revenge action. Clearly the turning back to sadism is an attempt of the endangered ego at self-rescue. The ego would have perished had it not succeeded in throwing the aggressiveness outward. Analytic investigation of those eruptions can show that they owe their vehemence and explosive power also to the pressure

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ple originate in a similar attitude. The impossibility of taking revenge on their enemies was caused by external circumstances and was a decisive cause of that attitude. This is the example of a phenomenon, concerning the psychology of peoples, borne out by the psychic dynamics here described. The offense or hurt from outside, the suppression of revenge caused by the adversary's actual superior power, the introjection of the hated object into the ego and the rage against it. The peculiarity of this interesting phenomenon is the fact that the aggression against the ego creates its expressions in those jokes which mercilessly castigated its own weaknesses and faults. Compared with them, the derision of the Jews by the people among whom they lived appear like clumsy or brutal farces. The suppression of vengeance is one of the causes of the special sharpness and unerring aim of the Jewish joke against the Jews, as this vengeance is secretly contained in it. The Jewish joke against its own people strikes at the heart. The attack, coming from the peoples among whom the Jews live, does not injure any vital organ, however brutal and violent the attack may be. Only seldom is this second phase of aggression followed by the third in which not the changed ego, but, again the external object, the offender, is attacked. The object's continuing superior power is the cause of this inhibition, too. However, it cannot be denied that the aggression of the Jewish joke against its own people hits also the people among whom the Jews live, in a latent way, but recognizable to the unconscious. This particular kind of joke betrays the suppressed rebellion even in the self-humiliation and self-parody. It hits, in its turning against the ego, the object absorbed into the ego, as if to say, "See what has become of us through you and your guilt! See what miserable, weak and terrified creatures you have made of us!" Without an understanding of the psychic mechanisms here described, and revealed only by psychoanalysis, the psychology of the Jewish joke would never go below the surface. (Compare my paper "About the Psychoanalysis of the Jewish Joke" in *Imago*, 1929, issue 1.)

which has been exerted on the warded-off tendencies. This investigation is comparable to a geological examination of erupting, destructive masses of lava which show their power to have been increased by silent struggles in the earth's interior.

3

It may be worthwhile to point out a few more features of this special reaction of vengeance. In cases where real actions of revenge ensue from the described psychic constellation, they rarely cause serious damage to the object. They contrast noticeably with the extremely cruel, sophisticated and variegated tortures invented for their victims by the individuals in their pleasurable fantasies. It is as though one or more definite emotional factors prevented extensive damage to the object. One might surmise that this feature is connected with the one that earlier caused an inhibition of the aggression against the ego. In one case it was the extreme of damage to the object which was avoided, in the other, the extreme of damage to the ego, entirely in accord with the previously mentioned assumption of acts of revenge against formerly beloved persons. It is as if the transitory phase leading from the hostile impulse, via introjection of an object, to the turning again against the object, could offer effective protection against too severe damage of the object. The fantasies have in the meantime taken on, as it were, the function of a buffer. In them, partial gratification is anticipated and does not have to be sought any longer in reality. In several cases, it could be seen that the actions of revenge had a harmless and infantile, sometimes almost clownish character, contrasting conspicuously with the cruel nature of the preceding fantasies. In one of these cases, the patient, who had a serious dissension with his family, came to visit his parents following a sudden impulse. He listened accidentally when his family, assembled in the next room, made some unfavorable remarks about his behavior. He seized a large

cake prepared on the table for the whole family, ran away without saying a word, and ate it up at high speed.

Perhaps I should point out the part apparently played by the *word* in the fantasies of revenge. I do not mean the insults and curses used by these people at the appropriate point in their revenge fantasies towards their objects.* What I mean is the expression of the vengeful tendencies in verbal presentations, or rather, the imagined details of the action of revenge described in special, quite definite words frequently repeated in the fantasies. I was, thus, astonished at the stereotyped phrase which a neurotic used in his fantasies of revenge, "To tear the jewel from his chest." He borrowed this sentence from the description of an ancient Peruvian or Aztec sacrificial feast where the heart is torn out of the human sacrifice.

In another case, a strong, clearly sexually-colored gratification appeared in the person as soon as he imagined, in his fantasies, his use of a certain insulting expression in a particular situation. All this is in complete accord with our experiences concerning the psychology of sadistic and masochistic perversions. In a considerable number of cases of this kind, the word or a certain sequence of words is of definite significance. A masochist became thus sexually excited only when his partner spoke to him in a particular way or said certain words that had emotional value discernible only to him, originating in infantile experiences. In other cases, a whole ceremonial of words developed, enhancing the

* The psychologist can understand why verbal eruptions of this kind constitute a verbal substitute for action. They are, so to speak, actions in words. They approach magic action and they are apt to associate themselves with it. It suffices to point to many old customs of folklore of this kind, which pertain to the realm of "black magic." It is not surprising if occasionally the same phenomenon can be found in persons of a very high cultural level. Thus Disraeli says about himself that he never took revenge on an offender. He would only write that person's name on a slip of paper and bury it in a drawer. It is remarkable, he says, how soon the bearer of that name sinks into oblivion. (According to A. Maurois, *La vie de Disraeli*. Paris, 1928, p. 264.) Psychoanalysis will easily recognize in this practice a symbolic action equivalent to a burial in which the drawer containing the enemy's name is substituted for his coffin.

sexual desire and containing insulting or humiliating expressions. The significance of this verbal masochism has not yet been thoroughly explored and its study seems to hold great promise.

I said earlier that, in the type observed, serious damage to the object through revenge came about rarely. In a few cases, however, such actions were accomplished and revenge fully took its cruel course. But it was noteworthy that these actions turned out to be almost more damaging to the person's own ego, which happened either simultaneously with the action or as its consequence and could have easily been foreseen. This looks like a reaction in two directions, as if the ego would readily pay the full price of its own ruin if only the hated object would perish at the same time. The conditions, emotional and otherwise, conducive to this kind of revenge do not seem to have been clarified completely yet.

A particularly intense unconscious feeling of guilt will have to be considered in the study of these cases. It is the same as that sense of guilt which finds its place and relief in the accomplishment of the forbidden deed. At this point, we approach the psychology of criminal types first pointed out by Freud—of those who became criminals through unconscious feeling of guilt. The perpetrator of the deed is shown to be its second victim, unless one would call him its original, primary victim. The deed has perhaps cast its shadow over him in advance. A number of observations and analytic experiences might be inserted at this point, which could furnish far-reaching and bewildering revelations about the motives and psychogenesis of a special type of criminal. A great number of the cases of those we call juvenile delinquents belong to this group. It has not yet been said that the unconscious feeling of guilt, preceding the crime, behaves like any other repressed material. It can be demonstrated, through its outgrowths admissible into the conscious, that the same processes of condensation, displacement, generalization here take place as in the symptomatology of neuroses. Below the surface, the criminal's associations pursue their way via his deed. His associations of sound do the same.

We do not deny the fact that the part of criminal psychology, revealed by psychoanalysis, derives mostly from analogy with neurotic psychic life where criminal tendencies emerge as veins occur in rock, and that it concerns only certain types of criminals. These are two instances of associations in which the repressed aggressive tendency returns from the center of the repressed: the father of an analysand talks to him about a projected trip to Egypt. The son says, "You must buy a tropical suit. Linen would perhaps be best." This very moment he recalls having once seen the body of a person who had died on board ship, as it was lowered into the sea, shrouded in linen. In another analysand's dream, he tells his mother that he wants chicken, but she brings him beef and he wakes up in anxiety. The interpretation in part was facilitated by the fact that in American slang of this time "chicken" connoted young girl. Beef, taking the place of chicken, connoted the flesh of his father who had been killed.

For the type discussed here, the crime is a shock which can be overcome only through long emotional work. Its effect is that of a trauma and it often produces the same psychic phenomena. The return to the scene of the deed, so frequently an obsession with the criminal, represents perhaps one of those attempts at overcoming the deed psychically, comparable to the phenomena in victims of accident-neurosis. They, too, try to free themselves from the emotional pressure, in reliving the deed so that the latter appears to be a passive experience. Thus we find a surprising connection between the psychology of a certain criminal type and that of the victim of accident-neurosis. The remembrance of the crime is interrupted by attempts at annulment, by conscious flashes of doubt in the nature of an assertion such as, "I can't have done that," that hold against the certainty of the accomplished deed. As in obsessional neurosis, this doubt is often displaced onto a minor detail, for instance, whether or not a lantern was lighted at the scene of the crime, etc.

Considering the ground I have to cover, I am obliged to abandon this interesting topic and to return to the strictly limited subject of this investigation.

4

I started with the unequivocal statement that the unconscious does not know the concept of forgiveness and that this concept belongs entirely to the conscious mind. The preceding presentation has shown how the process, resulting from a psychic hurt and originally concerning the relation between A and B, subject and object, can become a conflict within the ego if certain circumstances cause this development. In that phase, the original offense, directed at the object, will turn against the ego which comes to feel all the aggressiveness and strictness of the superego. The defense against the aggressive tendencies causes reactively their unconscious increase and, thus, an accordingly deepened feeling of guilt. The postponement of revenge has definitely a part in this development as the endopsychically recognized aggressive tendencies are subjected to strict evaluation by the superego. As in analytic investigation of other emotional processes, we recognize the fact that it is often much more cruel to make a person his own judge than to have him judged by another. The Church recognized this intuitively and made use of it in the institution of confession.*

* The deepening of the unconscious feeling of guilt through postponement of revenge can be clearly seen in Hamlet's psychology, as well as the turning of the vengeful tendencies against the ego, the destruction of which is aimed at. "To be or not to be . . ." This heavy feeling of guilt of the prince leads him, indeed, to his ruin simultaneously with the annihilation of the object. The postponement of revenge causes a sense of guilt in him as does the omission of the originally forbidden action in the final phases of obsessional neurosis. The expression "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" used by Hamlet in describing how "enterprises of great pith and moment lose the name of action" clearly points to the death-wishes directed against the ego. Paleness is unconsciously conceived as a sign of death. The inhibition of the action of revenge also means, to Shakespeare, the tragic guilt of Hamlet and is regretted by him. Even at the end, Fortinbras declares that this inhibition prevented him from ascending the throne, saying "For he was likely, had he been put on, To have prov'd most royally."

In consideration of the correlated conscious processes, a conclusion suggests itself from the insight into this psychic process, a conclusion that sounds paradoxical. It is impossible to forgive another unless one forgives oneself first. Even if expressed in another way, it still sounds paradoxical: we can forgive only if we meet our own vengeful tendencies and drives for reprisal with a certain tolerance. From that it would follow that forgiveness is impossible if introjection of the object has taken place because then the aggressiveness turns against the ego.

In other words, we can forgive only after having taken revenge on the object or on the ego changed through introjection of the object. Revenge is, unconsciously, unavoidable. If it does not strike the external object, it strikes the object introjected into the ego.* We recall here how frequently the course of the second vengeful reaction, which I called archaic, can be observed in *statu nascendi* in children when they have no other possibility of reprisal. "You will cry, Mother, when I go out on the terrace and catch cold," said a small girl threateningly when she felt hurt by her mother. The revenge taken on the ego or, rather, on the introjected object can, in its emotional effectiveness, be observed well in the analysis of adult neurotics.

I received my first impression of the intensity of the psychic forces effective here, when I analyzed an elderly lady who had been living with her sister, and for many years quarreling most bitterly with her. She was completely bald from the crown of her head down. She had torn out her hair in terrible rage in scenes of quarrels through many years. When invited in the first session to say what came to her mind, she stayed silent and for many sessions I could not move her to express those thoughts. All urging was futile. She could not decide to say what she had been thinking of. Finally she gave in and against most intense resistance, she disclosed the first thought of the first session. Lying on the sofa in my office, she had seen some dust under the bookcase and, be-

* Compare the hara-kiri of the Japanese, committed in front of the enemy's door.

cause of it, she bitterly criticized the qualities of my wife as a housewife. My wife was, in this case, a sister-image.*

I believe I have shown that, for the unconscious, only reprisal can be an adequate form of reaction to offenses, hurts and damage, and that the concept of forgiveness has no validity for the unconscious emotional life. I have hitherto traced the psychic process only in the hurt or offended person. He will, I said, feel hurt or offended until he has taken reprisal upon the adversary or upon himself. His vengeful tendencies will, in a certain emotional constellation, turn against the ego, the more intensely so, the less he takes revenge on the other person. He will take revenge upon himself for everything that he wanted to inflict upon the other person. Or, more correctly, he will take revenge upon himself for everything the other person has done to him. That would not make sense unless the ego, changed through identification with the object, were concerned. The raging of the ego against the object is continued in the raging of the ego against itself. Thus continues also the rage against the introjected object against which the motor reaction did not take place. The single event is reproduced, as it were, on one's own and re-enacted continuously. Here it can be seen clearly how much more deeply the analytical ego-psychology penetrates than the ego-psychology of Adler who explains these same phenomena much more simply and in a way better adjusted, of course, to popular comprehension.

No less significant and interesting is another part of ego-psychology, not yet investigated by psychoanalysis. That is the emotional process in the offender, the person who inflicts damage, after he has perpetrated his action. I refer here again to a certain type which is neurotic or close to the neurotic character, a type whose special psychic attitude I attempted to describe in *Compulsion to Confess* and *Need for Punishment*. I attempted to show the psychic mechanisms that cause certain persons to turn aggressively

* My analytic technique of urging was entirely wrong in this case. Only loosening of the feeling of guilt would have allowed expression of the thought which was engendered by hatred. This observation sheds significant light on various problems of analytic technique.

against those toward whom they feel guilty. This peculiar phenomenon goes further. Many people show particularly strong hostility and hatred toward those very persons who offer them only good will, friendliness and even love. These, it should be noted, are not the often discussed cases of lack of gratefulness, at least not only these.

To the unconscious, gratefulness is as foreign as is forgiveness. Love takes its place. The paradoxical phenomenon, consists, however, in the fact that a special vengeful tendency is directed against the very persons toward whom one has an especially good reason to feel gratefulness and appreciation. In the theory of the compulsion to confess, I tried to explain that this peculiar attitude originates in the unconscious feeling of guilt and that it means to say, as it were, "I am not worthy of this kindness or friendliness. I am not deserving of so many favors." The observation is noteworthy and psychologically consistent that this peculiar vindictiveness increases the more, as the other, the attacked person, continues to show more love, patience and friendliness.

Under these psychic circumstances, a peculiar emotional cycle evolves. If the offended person does not take revenge but remains composed and friendly, this attitude is felt to be somewhat humiliating. It incites a still more intense desire to hurt or to offend, to be aggressive toward the patient object. It is as though the offender feels the renunciation from revenge to be an especially sophisticated and sublimated form of revenge or scorn. This is entirely in accord with what I said earlier about the impossibility of unconscious forgiveness. It seems as if this odd attitude endeavored to show how impossible it is to renounce the gratification of revenge. It seems as if the offender or the enemy, as we may call him, sensed it to be inhuman not to take revenge, and that the injured person must unequivocally feel strong vengeful tendencies in himself whether he shows them or not.

It is an uncanny feeling for the enemy if his deed—or misdeed, if you will—does not drive the injured person into natural hostile or retaliatory action. He will try to provoke this action through accumulation or increase of the offense, because his unconscious

moral anxiety tells him that revenge cannot fail to appear, that there is no final renunciation of revenge. He is outraged by friendly or forgiving behavior on the part of the offended person because he also senses in it revenge of a special kind. This is the way the Romans may have felt about the attitude of the first persecuted Christians. Their renunciation from revenge drove the Romans to humiliate them still more deeply, in fact, drove them to orgies of hate. They felt unconscious arrogance in that renunciation and they sensed that this was a new, special kind of revenge against which there existed no protection, and they were driven to fury.* The enormous moral anxiety of the Romans is one of the most important motives of the persecutions of the Christians. Their anxiety was justified. Today Rome is Christian, the city of "*senatus populusque Romanus*" exists no more and that slender, despised Rabbi from Galilee has had his frightful and most sublime revenge.

Using a case of neurosis, I shall elsewhere discuss more thoroughly this bewildering part of ego-psychology. It will suffice here to point to the fact that this special unconscious mechanism can be demonstrated by no means only in the emotional life of neurotic patients. Traces of its effectiveness can be found also in persons who would be called psychically healthy. A man who is furious with his tailor to whom he owes money is subjected to its influence no less than the pupil who drops his teacher, to whom he owes much, surprisingly fast and turns against him. This mechanism of sadistic aggression, originating in the unconscious feeling of guilt, dominates the defiant criminal as well as the children who show off a kind of demonstrative naughtiness.† The wife who comes home with a dress that is too expensive is especially apt to reproach her husband for having dropped ashes on the tablecloth. The husband, returning from a little extramarital adventure, unconsciously reproaches his wife because he feels

* The analytical way of thinking can deepen the psychological explanation, given by Nietzsche, for the origin of the feelings of resentment, through the mechanisms of introjection of an object.

† Compare *Compulsion to Confess and Need for Punishment.*

guilty towards her. He is very much exposed to the temptation to provoke a quarrel or a marital scene if his unconscious feeling of guilt exceeds a certain limit.

I repeat, what has been discussed here concerns only a certain psychological type, a group of people whose number, of course, increases steadily under the influence of our cultural conditions. Analytic investigation of these cases reveals that the representatives of this type cannot forgive their fellowman the hurt which they inflicted upon him and hate the object offended or injured by them the more deeply, the less the object is prepared to take revenge. The quintessence of the body of observed psychic facts concerning this type can be expressed in two formulas—revenge on one's self for the hurt not inflicted upon the other person, and revenge on the other person for the hurt inflicted upon him. These persons do not forgive themselves for what they have not done to the other and they do not forgive the other for what they have done to him.*

It is clear from the preceding how little emotional significance there is in forgiveness from outside compared with the criticism and hardness of the superego within these people. Frequently, external forgiveness is accepted only by the conscious mind while the superego drives the ego the more relentlessly and mercilessly towards destruction. The religions have analogies to this psychic phenomenon. The Catholic Church discusses it in the difficult chapter of scruples. The sinner, for instance, does not feel redeemed through the confession, but the more guilty, even unredeemable. Then Catholicism expects *gratia*, grace, to redeem the miserable penitent, to loosen that stubborn feeling of guilt, which turns against the ego and aims to judge and destroy the object with it.

Forgiveness may be considered an attempt at conscious cancel-

* Women frequently behave in this way which only seems illogical. A patient appeared for her analytical session in bad humor declaring that she was furious with me. "It is as if you have given me grounds to feel guilty towards you." That same patient expects other people to be especially nice to her when she treats them badly and brutally. Her demand is psychologically justified as it seems to say, "How unhappy I must be to behave so badly."

lation, a felt disclaimer of a fact whereby the essence of the emotions stimulated by the fact remains in the unconscious. Its character as a reaction-formation does not exclude, but rather includes, this continued existence of the original tendencies. It has been said that it is inhuman and unnatural to turn the other cheek if a person has been struck on one. But the fact has not been taken into consideration that this Christian teaching concerns a reaction to the unconscious tendency to answer by striking both cheeks of the person who struck on one cheek. It hence teaches meekness as a reaction to particularly strong fury and thirst for revenge.*

5

Even though forgiveness can be recognized as reaction-formation of the conscious only, the milder judgment of people, of their tendencies and actions, is quite possible. The most important prerequisite for this attitude is a reduction of the ideal demands. He who makes excessively high demands of this kind on himself is compelled to become cruel and vengeful. The great reformers and moralists became bloodthirsty as soon as they came to power over people because they expected too much of them. Robespierre's faith in human virtue was unshakable. He had, therefore, to have several thousand French heads cut off.

Little confidence in the possibilities of human perfection is one of the most essential pre-conditions for the love of people and for tolerance.** It may sound even stranger that tolerance to-

* Analysis of this reaction-formation shows again that repression of aggressive tendencies brings about their intensification. Two examples of the described contrasting reactions may be given here. A patient refuses to give me her hand declaring that she is angry with me because she had to masturbate the night before. It is as if her hand were taboo. Another patient cannot make himself get up early in the morning, becomes furious with himself and lets himself fall out of bed, injuring himself seriously.

** "I always thought the worst of people, especially of myself, and I have rarely been wrong yet." (Nestroy)

wards the ego is one of the prerequisites of mild and just judgment of one's neighbor. One must be able to forgive oneself in order to forgive others. He who is too strict towards himself will be resentful and vindictive toward others. This may be contrary to accepted ethics, but it has the advantage of being psychologically true.*

At this point I return to the sentence, "To understand all is to forgive all." To suggest that one can understand all implies monstrous arrogance. To consider understanding all to be the same as forgiving all, implies a no less monstrous psychological error. It is not given to us, ephemeral beings on this small planet of ours, to understand everything, and if we could do so, to take revenge would be just as senseless as to forgive, because then every intense emotion and action of this kind would be senseless. The very fact that we love and hate and that, following our ambitions, we are ever making efforts, is the result of an illusion—"*L'illusion c'est tout.*" Even science is only a small, faint light in the deep darkness around us and while we proudly call ourselves explorers, we are comparable to a few daring moles, who for several minutes emerge from their burrows, blink their aching little eyes at the world, and then imagine they can impart to their fellow moles a comprehensive idea of the earth. Under closer scrutiny, the demand implied in the second part, as well as the first, of that remark about understanding and forgiving is presumptive, too. What gives us frail and miserable ephemeral beings the right to forgive each other? Tolerance of galley slaves chained together toward each other is no virtue nor can it be demanded with great moral aplomb.

* This is no contradiction of Freud's remark that he who restricts aggression towards the external world becomes stricter towards the ego (Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI), but rather supplements it. When this strictness has become too great the ego tries to save itself, aggression turning back against the external world. As always, analytical research faces here, too, eventually, a problem of instinctual quantities. I believe I have shown elsewhere that forgiveness towards oneself, tolerance towards the ego, is a prerequisite for our understanding of certain things in ourselves and in others. Compare my book *Wie man Psychologie wird*, Internat. P. A. Vienna, 1927.

Generally it should be remembered that the practical value of maxims like that of Mme. de Staël is as small as that of other moral statements. Similarly, the exhortation for tolerance, for mutual forgiveness, has little prospect of success in the face of the unchangeable human psychophysical constitution. Christ called Himself meek and praised the peaceful. His teachings have offered peace to the world forever. Since then, there has not been the smallest piece of land in Europe that has not been soaked with the blood of murdered people.

V

Success and Social Anxiety

A Contribution to the Analytic Exploration of Fate

1

In its early stages, psychoanalysis had been occupied exclusively with the etiology of neuroses, but soon was compelled to divert its attention from the symptoms of the patients to other topics. Actually, a surprisingly large part of the patients' lives, their whole emotional development, the essence of their biography found its expression in a language not restricted to the inadequate medium of conscious verbal presentation alone. Nervous illness proved to be part of the person's fate, a rather important part, as it absorbed the suffering patient's interest and severely restricted the possibilities of his work and pleasure.

It was not so important, however, as it appeared to the patient in its displacing of everything else, because the disturbance represented the result of complex psychic processes which had for a long time preceded it. All that was emotionally effective and essential occurred before the onset of the illness. The illness, its etiology, its course and prognosis, its basis and aims as far as the drives were concerned, represented that fragment of the patient's fate which had first revealed itself to the analyst in the most conspicuous and obtrusive manner and attracted his close attention. This fragment was not the only one. The really decisive events in the individual's life, as in that of nations, are usually not very conspicuous nor obtrusive. The quietest, not the noisiest, hours determine our fate.

It seems to me that Freud led science closer towards comprehension of this obscure concept of fate, closer than anybody else in many generations. He started from, and then, time and again, returned to the postulate that natural tendency and experience, disposition and accidental causes, all form a mutually complementary whole. The tracing back of individual constellations to the psychosexual constitution and the experiences of submerged years of childhood, the consideration of instinctual disposition and development of the libido, the influences of the family and of education, the observation of the coexistence of inner demands and those of the external world, and of their mutual conflicts show psychoanalysis to be one of the essential paths toward revelations concerning the individual's fate.

It would certainly be wrong to grant too much validity to Friedrich Schiller's emphatic statement that the stars of our fate are in our hearts. At any rate, these stars come out and fade away in some cases, as for example, in that of a cripple or of a child with congenital syphilis. Exploration of constitution and heredity, a consideration of biological, social and economic factors, show how little the purely psychological aspect takes account of the complexity of the entire picture. But analysis has, in its investigation of human instinctual life and of the unconscious processes, revealed the great extent to which psychic processes determine the fate of the individual. Analysis is able to point out and to describe, in its effects, one of the most important and hitherto not appreciated determinants in the play of forces of all the exogenic and endogenic factors resulting in the human fate.

Analysis is destined to make one of the most essential contributions to an investigation which should be called research into fate. Analysis does this at the point where it joins efforts to find the laws of events and to uncover the relations that exist among all individual happenings. While other disciplines reveal facts concerning the manifold, determining exogenic factors like climate, natural surroundings, race, etc., psychoanalysis offers hitherto unseen, hitherto not exhausted, possibilities for the scientific

comprehension and appreciation as to their effects in depth, of psychic determinants of an unconscious kind.

I do not mean to lay claim in what I have said to have opened a new aspect for the psychoanalyst, but to have formulated a hitherto not defined task of research. I should add, at once, that many unsystematic attempts have been made at an analytic exploration of fate. Various analytical publications build bridges to this new field of research, although not aiming in the same direction. They are detailed histories of patients, analytical biographies of great personalities, various attempts at a systematic explanation of character. It is not difficult to point out in what way these contributions differ from those I have in mind and to what extent they follow the same direction.

The essential points of view for analytical research into fate should be able to show the decisive (at least nearly decisive) significance of unconscious factors in the life of the individual, as far as they determine illness and health, success and failure, choice of the love-object and way of life, ascent and decline, etc. The role of coincidence which has, not altogether incorrectly, been called "fate traveling incognito" would be further reduced if individual experiences, their mutual connection and their general course were to be considered from this analytical angle. Its role would be reduced, but not entirely eliminated.

Man of western culture is accustomed to acknowledge only the facts of external reality. Analytical research into fate, however, would suggest with mild but increasing insistence that he recognize and acknowledge the hidden but decisive realities of emotional dynamics. This way of looking at the individual's fate and at the fate of many individuals is no more suited up to this time to furnish an answer to the futile question of the meaning of life than any other way. It can, however, perhaps show much of what happens in life according to a law, possibly a senseless law. If seen from this angle, the pattern of psychosexual life would unequivocally emerge as a determining factor for all the rest of a person's being, and this not only for pathological individuals.

Undoubtedly this analytical research into fate would have its

share in the incompleteness, inadequacy, and discontinuity of all human comprehension. It will mean merely a tiny alteration of our limits towards the recognizable. It will shed faint, often flickering light upon a strip of the darkness around us and within us. It would be wrong to be ashamed of this limitation of scientific work and to tend to conceal it timidly. Research does not acknowledge horror in discovery nor any horror in a vacuum.

2

These are tasks for a generation of psychologists, for "*le grand psychologie de demain.*"

One of the most fascinating topics of analytical research into fate will be the problem of success and failure. Here, too, Freud was the first, the "prodromos" of future research, to point to a part of the problem, but perhaps the essential one. Although he did not later emphasize the psychological significance of this particular phase of that research, Freud has shown that failure following success, typical in the cases he described, can be explained by the underground effectiveness of the powers of unconscious conscience. It can be proven by analysis that this effectiveness originates primarily in the Oedipus complex. It is as if every success later in life were tied by secret threads to the paramount success at which we aimed in our childhood, as if, unconsciously, success in later life, however distant it may be from its origin, was significant in the accomplishment of those early proscribed wishes. From this origin, the reaction of conscience receives its strength and lasting quality. This success, however, is abandoned the moment it has been achieved.

Another type of character formation should be pointed out here, which at first looks like a variation of that analytically described by Freud. While the latter type of individual fails as soon as success has been achieved, the type I shall describe now never permits himself (unless under definite internal conditions) to

achieve success. This concerns a great number of people who, time and again, manage unconsciously to put new obstacles between the determination of a goal and its achievement, and so never, or too late, see their wishes fulfilled. The semblance of fate in a life of this kind appears most clearly in all those cases where the goal is almost reached and suddenly there is a seemingly altogether external obstacle that cannot be overcome. In analysis, the fact is often discovered that these persons, as the invisible managers, arranged for the unexpected obstacle or at least have made use of its existence with extraordinary unconscious skill. They are especially gifted stage managers, as it were, in this play of fate which they seem to attend as spectators only.

Over and over, the impression is gained in the analysis of these people, that a great effort is wasted at the very moment when it should find its justification. One cannot deny that success and failure in these cases do not only depend upon the effect of unconscious factors. Often enough, actual external factors, circumstances of material reality play along in a tragic, more often tragicomic, fate of this kind. But sometimes it is entirely clear that these people who suffer under their fate behave like a mischievous demiurge (he may be called God, as well) who, in an elaborate and carefully planned way, produces these very turns of fate. These people are not conscious of the fact that they are imitating so exalted a model. Every analyst knows of a large number of cases where, whenever success approaches, these unforeseen obstacles pile up.

With another type, the desired success is attained, but satisfaction in it is wanting. I know of the case of a very intelligent man, an artist, in whose life a typical situation keeps reoccurring. He feels a strong urge for the enjoyment of life, often is even obsessed by it, but indulges in it only seldom. Again and again, he postpones the gratification of his wishes until he shall have achieved this or that goal. But when the goal is attained, it does not seem to him to be enough and the gratification of his wishes is again postponed. When he pauses in his work, he has lively daydreams of how he will enjoy life, after first having completed

this or that piece of work. These fantasies are his best consolation in the strong depressions to which he easily falls victim in his aversion against the work and in his struggle with his brittle material. After the work is completed and critically examined by him, it does not seem to him to be a success any longer, compared with the image he had in mind, but he sees it now as full of flaws and mistakes. It does not seem to satisfy his demands now. A new plan emerges and he is forced to postpone the fulfillment of his wishes until after its execution. Time and again, he repeats to himself, "I am going to go to Cairo or the Riviera, associate with beautiful women and finally enjoy life, once I have finished this accursed work." In this cycle he never attains the longed-for enjoyment.

An idea of the significance of this ever increasing, never fulfilled wish may be gained in the analytical consideration of certain features in the biography of Giovanni Segantini. The artist's birthplace where he spent the first five carefree years of his childhood was Arco. His mother died then and the small boy had to leave home. He never saw his birthplace again. The wish to return to Arco arose in him over and over when he was alone in the mountains of the Engadine, where he painted in later years. While he worked, this was one of his most urgent wishes. Always he wanted to see the beloved town again and eventually he set the date for this trip as the time when he would complete his great triptych of the Alpine World. "As a reward," he wrote, he would fulfill his long-cherished wish when he had attained that goal. He died a few weeks before he attained it.*

In a case which was under my observation, the typical postponement of wish-fulfillment was combined with a definite anal factor. A business man kept planning for his retirement from work when he could, *procul negotiis,* enjoy his hard won savings in a pleasant and leisurely manner. But the date of retirement for

* It is peculiar that Dr. Karl Abraham overlooked this significant feature in his beautiful study (*Giovanni Segantini,* 2nd edition, 1925, Leipzig) in which so much emphasis is rightly put on the artist's relationship with his mother who had died early.

which he longed was postponed again and again because the available financial means always seemed to him to be too small to warrant a comfortable, carefree life, although an objective observer would have considered them ample. Whenever he thought he had provided for everything, he found he possessed too little to cover his needs. He was, as it were, a Tantalus in an industrialist's garb.

Analysis of cases of this kind leaves no doubt as to an unconscious secret anxiety that deprives these persons of the fruits of their work, forces postponement of gratification and prevents them from fulfilling their wishes. What seems to be an increased, strict demand, posed by reality, is actually a secret prohibition on the part of the superego for which a rationalization has been found. The analyst does not find it difficult to discover the analogy to this peculiar behavior in the symptomatology of obsessional neurosis. What is shown in obsessional neurosis, by the various compulsive traits in pathological distortion and in exaggerated forms, is generalized, displaced and demonstrable in a form closer to reality in the way the lives of these persons, namely, their fate, develop.

The victims of obsessional neurosis renounce instinctual gratification for mysterious or obscure reasons, or they permit it only upon the fulfillment of definite, very complex and extensive protective or safety measures. In the course of that disturbance, the conditions to be fulfilled will multiply, become more complex and weigh down the ego more heavily and oppressively. Ever more elaborate obstacles will be thrown in the way of the gratification of impulses, which becomes less and less possible and is postponed until all those conditions are fulfilled in the most exact way and in every detail. Obedience to the conditions, often time consuming and pedantic, will gradually fill the whole life of the patient or the best part of it.

Another feature of symptom-formation in obsessional neurosis, as observed in analysis, comes to mind here for comparison. First and foremost, in the psychogenesis of obsessional neurosis there is involved a definite, for example, a sexual, instinctual gratifica-

tion, while the net thrown by the compulsion is then extended farther and farther. Now every enjoyment is postponed as though it were the representative of that prohibited sexual gratification. In almost all cases of obsessional neurosis, we find instinctual gratification postponed until all protective measures are fulfilled, or we find it prevented by an inner prohibition.

One of my patients, who suffered from a washing obsession, had to follow an extraordinarily complicated ceremonial before he could even allow himself to go to the theatre, for instance. Ever new conditions originating in the system of the washing compulsion opposed the lively urge for this pleasure, until the visit to the theatre had eventually to be given up. Long before all compulsive actions prescribed by the precept of protection against dangers of infection were executed, the theater performance was over. In this case, as in an abundance of others, a pleasure harmless in itself had obviously been treated psychically, as if it were a dangerous undertaking that could be ventured upon only after the accomplishment of definite safety measures. The postponement and all the conditions that caused it find their explanation in the defense against an unconscious anxiety connected with the instinctual gratification which is followed originally.

The analysis of the cases described here can be fully understood if they are compared with the emotional dynamics of these compulsive symptoms. A secret anxiety exerts its influence, an anxiety that opposes fulfillment, especially, of the strongest wishes. The analyst need not be particularly ingenious to arrive at a conclusion concerning the motives, which results from the psychic effect. If the postponement has the meaning and the effect of defense, it clearly follows that attainment of the instinctual aim, or fulfillment of those wishes, implies a situation which for obscure reasons the ego opposes. There evolves, therefore, a situation desired and dreaded at the same time, desired on the part of the drives of the individual, dreaded on the part of his ego.

The anxiety originally concerned castration, became fear of death and continued as unconscious moral anxiety. It became less distinct, more stifling, withdrew from the conscious, but was none

the less powerful. Whether, in approaching the desired instinctual goal, it will then express itself as indistinct discomfort, or whether it will be completely silent, or hide behind a reactively increased self-confidence, the anxiety will still be there and be the stronger the less the way into consciousness is open to it. The obscure threatening punishment now originates in uncontrollable powers, and is feared to be approaching from fate or from God.

The closer the goal is, the stronger grow the inner voices delaying or forbidding its attainment; the more strongly powers seem to intrude into sober everyday life, powers which we thought we had overcome long ago. Into the modern world of electric lights, of automobiles, of dynamos, of radio, a power feels its way that comes from primeval days and exerts greater coercion than all the technical upsurge and all the so-called progress of a civilization that believes it has freed itself from God, while it merely has been abandoned by Him. On that wall there appears, ghostlike, next to the electric advertising signs, the newest dispatches about the formation of trusts, stock value, entertainment advertisements, a *mene tekel* written by an invisible and strong hand.

In tracing back the psychic processes of the described type, psychoanalysis, again and again, arrives, via some intermediary stations, at the same situation in childhood, a situation that is like a germ cell of this later, peculiar phenomenon. An instinctual impulse emerged, imperiously ordered gratification and came into conflict with the demands of the external world. It could be gratified only if that obstacle in the external world were eliminated. This was for certain reasons the first condition against which the ego struggled. The simplest and certainly primary instance of an emotional situation of this kind is shown in the conflict of the child's sexual drive and the prohibitions from outside.

The boy who wishes to follow his sexual impulse, must, in his fantasies, come across the image of the forbidding and admired father. This inhibiting authority must be removed if the sexual gratification is to be permitted. From the original fear of castration as punishment for a violation of the prohibition, fear of death developed on the part of the ego as a reaction-formation to

repressed death-wishes against the father. The fear of death, in its more subdued, less outspoken form, appears as moral anxiety. If the father's death is the condition *sine qua non* for uninhibited instinctual gratification, the ego will endeavor to fend off those strong wishes. The conflict between those urges and the forces of defense has been declared permanent. After that, there is no peace, only shorter or longer truces in the ego.

Later on, the pattern which originally concerned only the sexual conflicts is displaced onto all pleasures unconsciously connected with the grossly sexual ones. For instance, in obsessional neurosis, everything that promises enjoyment for the ego can enter into unconscious connection, through thought, with the father's death or that of a substituted person, and, in this connection, can become the unconscious motive to inhibit the enjoyment. This can best be expressed by defining the enjoyment as the representation of the forbidden, every success as the representative of the longed-for and dreaded overcoming of the father. From here a path opens to the first comprehension of that peculiar attitude towards enjoyment and success which interests us here.

Fear of death is now unconsciously put before the instinctual gratification which it followed earlier.* Now it throws its shadow

* This unconscious connection was especially clear in two cases. In both, there existed the wish to see a certain town, and the two people were full of an uncertain fear that something would happen if they were to fulfill that wish. In one case it was the fear of dying. In that case an old prophecy played a role which had been interpreted in this way by my patient. In the other case the patient referred to the saying, "To see Naples and die," which itself may perhaps owe its existence to a superstition of this kind. The psychological affinity of these premonitions and apprehensions to compulsive phenomena comes to the fore if we recall a thought, which started a patient of Freud's on many a brooding thought. Several years after his father's death, this idea forced itself upon the son's mind when, for the first time, he experienced the pleasurable sensation of sexual intercourse, "this is magnificent; for that one could murder one's father." (Freud, "Remarks about a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," Coll. Writ, Vol. VIII. p. 311.) Analysis was able to supply similar explanations in several cases of a stifling fear of the attainment of a certain age. An obsessional patient was tormented by the fear that he would die in his fortieth year. This was the age that his father had reached.

over the bright image of fulfillment. If, for instance, in puberty, severe measures of penance and expiatory practices followed masturbatory activity, the psychic sequence is reversed later. The execution of ever more extensive and complex protective measures is expected to ward off anxiety. Depending upon this execution is the decision of whether or not gratification is to be permitted. During one patient's puberty, each relapse into masturbation was followed by a vow of abstinence for ten days. If that did not succeed, if, for example, an emission occurred during the night, he had to double the vow and postpone the time to permitted masturbation for twice as long, later for three times as long and so on. Afterwards, gradually every pleasure was drawn into the realm of this type of postponement. He forbade himself to visit a theater, to read interesting books, to enjoy stimulating company and conversation, even to read the newspaper until he had remained sexually abstinent for a definite time. Later, this whole procedure became more complicated by the addition of certain protective measures enforcing abstinence. Many little activities had to be accomplished, certain demands of a special kind had to be complied with before he would permit himself even the smallest pleasure. As the intrusion of those satisfactions he fought off disturbed the execution of his compulsive actions more and more, the defensive measures multiplied and the gratification of his wishes had to be postponed more and more.

The reversal of the sequence of gratification to protective measure, into the sequence of protective measure to gratification, is the psychological spot from which a primary insight can be gained into the described portentous constellation. Work or performance frequently takes the place of the protective measure the closer the neurotic situation comes to a socially better adjusted one. Work or performance itself takes on the character of penance, as if in fulfillment of that primeval curse of the tale from Genesis. Analytic observation, however, will not overlook the fact that the longer this process of transformation lasts, the more comprehensively and energetically the work has taken the place of the forbidden gratification. The instinctual component overpowers the

reactive character of the symptom in the final phases of obsessional neurosis. The very expiation slowly becomes sin, one might say in the theological vernacular.*

In the type here discussed the broadened, socially better adjusted effect in a later phase of this described dynamic course can be demonstrated in the whole formation of the life, in the development of the fate of the persons concerned. That which had been there early, reappears late; that which once happened in the narrowest limits is reflected in far reaching relations. We find here again the condition which had to be fulfilled before the wish is

* In this direction, too, the Church has demonstrated her sure psychological instinct by repudiating exaggerated self-castigation, calling it a sin. She knows from experience that in repentance there is still a delayed enjoyment of the repented deed, and that the desperate attempt to wipe out something that has happened, often signifies its happening again. The psychology of the flagellant and of the penitent, in which expiation of carnal lust becomes itself lust of the flesh, was known to her. An analogous phenomenon is to be found in the final phases of obsessional neurosis where eventually the illness itself and the reaction-formations against the fought-off impulses are felt as guilt. There occur all phenomena which I summed up in the expression, "Expiation becomes sin." This whole process is explained not only through the instinctual tension, the damming-up of libido, but also through the definite simultaneous influence of the over great feeling of guilt. Too intensive repentance produces depression that can be relieved only through perpetration of a new proscribed deed. The reactive hatred against the person who burdened us with such strong feelings of repentance is certainly also active in this situation.

Something should be said here about the differentiation between the feeling of guilt concerning the ego and that which is borrowed. This differentiation made by Freud is very significant, theoretically and practically, but it does not erase the fact that primarily there exists only a borrowed feeling of guilt or that every feeling of guilt is a borrowed one. This can be understood genetically, as well as from the point of view of emotional dynamics. In the very feeling of guilt somebody else is accused, the one who was responsible for the rise of that feeling of guilt. Even in the unconscious feeling of guilt, the object in the ego is the target. That which thus accuses itself accuses others, the parents or their substitutes. Goethe reproaches the gods: "You push us into life, you let the miserable become guilty." In other words, the feeling of guilt concerning the ego is a differentiation which derives from the primary, borrowed feeling of guilt. Let us assume a billiard ball, capable of human feelings, pushes another hard, on the same table. Isn't its feeling of guilt, because of the damage caused to the other ball, a delusion? Hadn't it been pushed itself?

permitted gratification, and postponement of gratification, which eventually tapers off into its renunciation or, rather, into its substitution.

But in the background, the analyst still recognizes the secret anxiety that unconsciously intrudes between wishful impulse and its gratification. Between the emergence of these wishes and their renunciation, that painful approach and retreat continue which make up the content of a human life, of every human life. "In between, there is left just enough space for the dream of happiness and love to burst and vanish." (Hieronymus Lorm)

3

Analytic consideration of these cases sheds new light upon the psychogenesis of the concept of duty. Duty is originally the fulfillment of the conditions which must be met before one may allow oneself instinctual gratification, hence, it is primarily an effect of social anxiety.* The defensive or protective character of duty cannot remain hidden from deeper psychological insight, even if it aims later to acquire a positive purpose under the influence of the increasing share of gratification. Little does it matter that this concept of duty seemed to detach itself, gradually but completely, from its origin and that, subsequently, the functional relation to the following satisfaction of a drive was dropped. This later phenomenon is psychologically connected with the fact that the

* Freud characterized the feeling of guilt as social anxiety. This determines the origin of the feeling of guilt. The instinctual factor within this still obscure reaction perhaps gains significance, if Freud's explanations are supplemented by the addition of the statement that the feeling of guilt can be traced back to two remembrances, namely, that of the satisfaction of a drive and that of the expectation of punishment. The feeling of guilt may, therefore, be determined as social anxiety in the face of the emergence of a forbidden instinctual impulse. This characterization helps also to understand how there is, in the feeling of guilt, the influence of the memory of the forbidden instinctual gratification, and how the process of repentance still includes its unconscious renewed enjoyment in fantasy.

performance of duty has, itself, annexed some instinctual gratification, has, itself, unconsciously become a partial gratification, in complete analogy to the character of the compromise of neurotic symptoms.

It is difficult to deny that some psychological features here described are also part of the concept of ethics. The greatest emphasis in morality is still on its imperative and prohibitory factor. Instinctual renunciation is still its essential trait, so much so, that a tragicomic *quid pro quo* is possible, namely, that sometimes what is psychically felt as unpleasure is, for that very reason, felt to be ethical. Shaw once wrote the seemingly paradoxical sentence: "An Englishman considers himself moral as soon as he feels uncomfortable." The factor of time in the concept of morals can be traced clearly back to its origin as a reaction and as penitence. From this point of view, morality may be defined as the waiting time which has to be observed until that which was formerly immoral is permitted.

The fateful, unconscious connection of success and a feeling of guilt, as described here, could easily be confused with the relations between success and the overcoming of all the external difficulties of hard and pitiless reality. Certain special factors in the fate of these people, however, cause to disappear any doubt of the fact that emotional powers of an unconscious kind are here at work. Often all external obstacles seem to vanish as by the stroke of a magic wand when success is no longer cherished or when it has been dearly paid for in another field, when, indeed, there no longer remains a motive for the development of anxiety. It is as though success were being bought only by suffering or by the performance of a severe penance. To the psychologist, the inner relation of this phenomenon with the nature of a vow is clear. What is a vow? A promise given to the higher powers to renounce an instinctual gratification in order to see another one, a more highly valued one, fulfilled.

The experience, originating in reality, that success can be achieved only through toil or suffering, that the gods have demanded sweat before granting it, is brought to its extreme in the

cases under discussion.* Inversely, success often appears no longer to be valued because not enough sacrifices have been made for it. The pleasure often appears incomplete or empty because it has not been paid for dearly enough. In several cases that I observed, the attainment of success was, unconsciously, so intimately connected with the condition of the father's (or the older brother's) death, that a little anticipated, unconscious mourning had to be recognized in the deep depression preceding the success. The skeleton in the closet seems really a part of the necessary furnishings of every successful and esteemed citizen.

In other cases, psychoanalysis finds that intense effects of anxiety are the emotional payments for success. This was the case with an actress who suffered from extreme stage fright which often grew into attacks of anxiety. The anxiety supplied, as it were, a guarantee for success on stage. Whenever she appeared on stage full of self-confidence, or assurance without anxiety, artistic success was denied to her.

The unconscious moral anxiety before success, or more generally speaking, before happiness, is definitely not limited to neurotics. The religions and the customs of all people testify to the universally human existence and effectiveness of these unconscious feelings. The belief in the evil eye suggests itself in this connection as do the libations which the Romans offered to the gods of the netherworld, to the *diis inferis*, before their banquets. The great significance of the deep-reaching conception of hubris, in Greek faith and tragedy, may be ascribed to the psychic effect of that unconscious moral anxiety.

It often seems as if people were seized by a feeling of uneasiness when they see happiness or success that has not been counterbalanced by pain. "I have paid my debt to happiness," says the wise king in Schiller's poem. He who has observed the always happy man shudders at the envy of the gods, namely, at the feelings of guilt at work underground. These feelings of guilt demand their

* A masochistic patient frequently expressed apprehension that his analysis did not proceed satisfactorily when he felt relatively comfortable, was not tormented by his symptoms or did not feel very depressed.

sacrifices before they allow man to attain the miserable bit of gratification he calls happiness. "Not one have I yet seen to end in happiness." It is as if the gods, the deified fathers, first lull their victim into deceptive safety by spreading their gifts with "never-tiring hands," only to remind him the more frighteningly of their monstrous, cruel power. Psychoanalytically speaking, the warded-off feeling of guilt will prevail the more triumphantly, the greater the energy that has first been expended to ward it off.

In analysis are occasionally found special fateful features which may appear like a confirmation of the old belief in fate, and which give an indication of the secret emotional powers at work. The fate of a certain man, whom I observed, will not easily vanish from my memory. Time and again, the father had risked a substantial fortune by gambling in stocks. Finally, in the firm hope of regaining what he had lost, he wagered everything, buying a large number of certain securities. He lost almost his whole fortune. The son had reproached him again and again most severely because of his gambling. A serious conflict developed; their relations were completely severed and the father died while he was traveling abroad, unreconciled. The son had earned considerable standing for himself by his strenuous work, and slowly he also acquired a fortune. Under the most difficult circumstances, renouncing many comforts of life, he overcame all obstacles with extraordinary circumspection and energy. Apparently, he was able to overcome adverse and hostile circumstances which would have stopped anyone else, and to remove difficulties which seemed insurmountable. Several years later, as a mature person, he once felt tempted to gamble in stocks. He kept winning until he bought certain securities which were almost out of circulation and then suffered severe losses by this purchase. At the same time that his interest in this gambling increased, his neurotic symptoms set in and increased in severity. I could find in analysis repressed facts that showed the very same securities in the picture, the purchase of which had ruined his father financially. A similar situation had developed as that which had caused the breach with his father.

In several other cases, it seemed like an ingenious coincidence

of fate when success was spoiled by the very means that had served in its pursuit. Here, too, the accident had been arranged unconsciously or, at least, made use of unconsciously. In these cases more than in others, the impression is clear that success depends not only upon the external conditions and the drives of the ego, but also upon the relations between ego and superego.* At the same time, we come to see the dimension in depth at which the attainment of success is determined by the formation of the individual Oedipus complex which finally crystallizes in the establishment of the superego. The analyst daily has the opportunity to convince himself of the fact that the fight with the external world is not always the most difficult, but that its continuation, the fight between ego and superego, sometimes is the hardest. While man may face a thousand enemies outside himself, in the time of maturation the ego will know none more dangerous than the superego. Not so, when life nears its end. Then death appears as the only real enemy until it, too, becomes the "mildest form of life" to the now tired eyes.

4

If, in this section, a similar type of character is taken into analytical consideration, the limits of this discussion will be exceeded only to a small extent. This concerns only a special case, a particularly obvious variation of the one described earlier. In its fate, appears a peculiar constellation with a tragic note. Coinciding external and internal circumstances, the combined effect of several factors, make the long aimed-at or ardently wished for success take place just when it has become senseless. They permit an intensely desired satisfaction to come near enough to be grasped when it can no longer be enjoyed. This tragic trait is apparent in the fate of some of the great people whom we admire. It is the

* Compare Napoleon's remark, "Happiness, too, is a quality." (*Bonheur est aussi une qualité.*)

more tragic when those people feel deeply how much they would have been helped by their success, how much this satisfaction would have meant to them had it been achieved earlier or under other circumstances. When Hebbel lay dying, he said, "First the cup is missing, then the wine." He said this in a concise and eloquent way of his own tragic fate. Lord Beaconsfield, the omnipotent English premier, who had once been a pale, derided and deeply intimated Jewish boy, the son of Isaac d'Israelis, said to his friends who congratulated him when he reached the peak of his career, "For me, it is twenty years too late. Give me your health and your youth." He clearly recognized that success which comes too late scarcely longer deserves the name and said, "that means to reach death and immortality at the same time." One can hear him, at the age of seventy-six, venerated like a god, murmur again and again, a little poem sent him once by a friend who had early become wise.

"What is life? A little strife
Where victories are vain
Where those who conquer
Do not win
Nor those receive who gain."

We find often enough the prototypes of such tragic fate in a distorted, pathological form in the analyses of some neurotic patients. There, as well as in many a fate which does not owe its development to neurosis, it is clear how the superego managed to prevent success long enough, until it meant enjoyment no longer, or until it did not offer the dreamed-of satisfaction. The tragicomic character of these fates, which seem to be determined only by external circumstances, becomes apparent when these people recognize how much suffering they have inflicted upon themselves. How futile were many sacrifices, privations and renunciations, how senseless (making sense psychologically only) were so many struggles and such pain, and how much more easily these people could have obtained that overvalued success, that gratification which had been exaggerated in fantasy! Everyone who has studied

the fate of many neurotic or of many healthy persons from analytical points of view knows how many "unheard of human sacrifices" have been made to the over severe superego. In retrospective contemplation of these fates, there arise complaints and accusations that eventually sink into silence, complaints and accusations that clearly testify to the grotesquely comical talents of that demiurge called Jahve.*

While the unconscious feeling of guilt was not powerful enough in many of these cases to prevent success entirely, it still made its effect felt by postponing success until it no longer meant what it once did to the individual. In some cases, the fulfillment of wishes of long ago, which now have lost their meaning, is like tragic irony, as it takes place just in time for the hearts not yet to be too tired to recognize this fact. The deep reaching, pre-forming significance of the development of the Oedipus complex is noticeable also in this connection, and the influence of the individual psychosexual life upon the other realms of human existence can still be recognized here, too. The remark, *"Si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait,"* reflects some of that melancholy knowledge.

The reports of explorers and missionaries about some savage tribes of central Australia seem almost to imply a psychological correlation in ethnology to this development of an individual's fate in which all of us have a greater or lesser share. In some tribes in Australia, the young men are, commencing with puberty, subjected to extensive restrictions concerning the time of marriage and the consumption of certain foods highly valued by primitive people. During their best years, the men of the tribe are not permitted to marry nor to eat of these prized foods. The older they grow, the less strictly are the prohibitions respected. When enough white hairs appear on the chin, the man is allowed to marry. When their teeth threaten to fall out, consumption of these delicacies is permitted the men.

* It was he, who in ancient times, first gave an example of that peculiar fate, when he caused Moses to lead the Israelites to Canaan, and then ordered him to climb Mount Nebo so that he could see the promised land. "Because," said he, "you shall see the land before you, but you shall not set foot on the land that I shall award the Israelites."

For those poor cousins of ours who still are spared culture's blessings, and for us who are endowed with them, there remains, in our common misery, after all, the illusion of a just world order and of this comforting certainty: up there, above the stars a benevolent father must dwell.

VI

Faith in a Higher Justice

Is there something akin to a principle of talion in nature? That was the question a renowned naturalist recently attempted to answer in a brochure. He believed he could replace Darwin's theory of selection, the hypothesis of survival of better adjusted species, by the application of this point of view. A species, which, with its superior physical strength, oppressed a weaker one for a long period had to yield gradually to the latter which developed in the struggle a special means of defense. The victors eventually succumbed to the vanquished. The verification of the scholar's postulates must be left to experts of natural science. The first impression of this combination of teleological and moralistic contemplation of the process of coming into existence and passing away is not favorable to this theory. But perhaps the third, fourth or nth impression may be decisive. Still, this explorer energetically advances the view that happenings in nature are dominated by the principle of a higher justice.* As I said, the first impression

* While reading the scientific paper of this scholar, an ancient tune sounded in my memory, a tune I had often heard from my grandfather when I was a child. It is the song "*Chad gadjo,*" sung to a melancholy Jewish folk-tune:

"A little kid, a little kid,
God judges the world and all that's His,
All that is good, all that bad is.
To give the killer death He willed
As he the son of man has killed,
For he has guided to the slaughter
The ox that swallowed all the water
Which had put out the fire quick
That took revenge upon the stick

is not decisive. One should not even yield to the much stronger impression that happenings in nature are arranged by a higher injustice.

Perhaps human fate seems better suited to bring problems of this kind nearer their solution. But it is not better suited, since it is, itself, part of that unrecognizable process which, through the influence of psychic factors, grows still more complex and more difficult to penetrate. Because we are not privileged to solve the old questions, it is perhaps better to turn our attention to the newer psychological question, as to how faith in a higher justice could arise, a faith that is so deeply rooted in the human soul. Do we not still secretly believe that after a time of suffering there come better days, that he who always tries hard can be redeemed? And do we not still struggle against the fact that this redemption takes place only at that special time, when, according to the word of the Greek sage, man is to be praised as being happy, namely, when he is dead? We still unconsciously share the illusion that success awaits the good, failure the bad, even though from an elevated view are seen neither good nor bad people and even though both success and failure are tiny waves in the sea of universal transitoriness.

Psychoanalysis can make an important contribution to the psychological problem of the genesis of this kind of belief in fate. About this problem, Freud has already said what is essential, starting from the psychology of compulsive thoughts. What I shall say here, as a supplement, likewise originates in analytic practice, starting, however, from the analysis of moods that sometimes get

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For rushing without any right
To slay the dog quite dead on sight
Which limb from limb the cat had rent
That bit the kid so innocent.
The little kid, belonged to Dad.
Two farthings for it paid he had.
A little kid, a little kid!"

To me it seemed that the unknown author wished to symbolize in this fateful chain of events the Talmudic comment (Sabbath 32 a), that no one escapes his fate and his merited punishment.

hold of the ego. There are, therefore, captured and analytically interpreted impressions of pensive moments in which a belief of the described kind arises in people and in which they feel as if touched by the fatefulness of certain turns of events which they feel to be, in a way, predestined.

I had best start from isolated features that look like arabesques of a type described in an earlier essay. An impression of this kind was produced by a certain situation in the life of a man in whose youth the wish to own and to read many interesting books was predominant. At that time, he was without means and had few possibilities of satisfying his increasing interests. Now a mature man, he was recently sitting at his desk and looking pensively at his large library containing many unread books that covered all the walls of his study up to the very ceiling. In these moments, in a pause of life, as it were, the memory of many hours of his boyhood came back in almost painful clearness, of the time when his deepest longing concerned the possession and the reading of books. The old wish was still strong in him, but with many duties, overburdened with great and responsible tasks, he could now scarcely find the time and occasion to indulge in the pleasure of reading any longer. A similar aspect results from the constellation in the life of a patient, a constellation which seems to represent the artful incongruity of human existence. As a child, the patient especially liked a certain dish of meat. His parents were poor and this expensive dish appeared very rarely on the family table. Now he could easily afford to eat this favorite food every day, but a serious organic stomach disease forbade him to have it.

In some, not in all cases, analysis can give psychological insight into the genesis and structure of individual features of this kind, which seem to reflect turns of fate of a tragicomic nature. It shows how the combination of actual, external factors with unconscious determinants can frequently lead to a result exhibiting features of fate. As an example, I am thinking of the analysis of the following little scene described by a patient. One evening he sat at his desk finishing a task he was obliged to complete and which had caused him much effort. In the next room his small son was play-

ing, jumping about rather noisily. First, the man found himself slightly distracted and disturbed, but he endeavored to return to his calculations. The longer the noisy play went on, the more impossible it became and the more impatient and irritable he became. He wanted to hurry into the next room and scold the "naughty" child roughly and to reproach him severely for his lack of consideration. Restraining himself in a moment from yielding to that strong impulse, he was surprised at the vehemence of his impatience which almost took on the character of blind fury. At the same time, he felt a curiously stifling pressure near the heart, combined with breathlessness. Suddenly, apparently without any connection, he felt forced to think of his own father as he had seen him in his last years. He saw clearly before him the aging man's image opening the door to the nursery and looking at him, then a little boy, with a severe expression.

In the analysis of those feelings which impressed my analysand strongly, the significance of the emergence of the effective and stressed thoughts became clear. When the patient was still a small boy, as old as his son, he had often played just as noisily and thoughtlessly and was often vehemently scolded by his father. Often he wondered about and was hurt by the intense and incomprehensible wrath displayed by his father on these occasions and, in thought, had reproached him for unjust treatment. Only later did it become clear to him how strongly his father's seizures of excitement had been influenced by his rapidly progressing heart disease. During the scene when he heard his son jumping about in the next room, feelings similar to those of his father had arisen in him and all those painful memories of his hostility, of early death-wishes against his father must have unconsciously awakened in him. That moment was, therefore, dominated by his recognition of how emotionally similar to his father he had grown, and it was filled with unconscious anxiety and fear of death. The astonishment at himself and at his unusual vehemence and fury looked like the beginning of human understanding of his father's attitude, the importance of which exceeds by far that of intellectual comprehension, because he had experienced it. The pain near the

heart and the breathlessness were actually sensations of which his father had complained. Later medical examination indicated the probability that these sensations of the patient were early signs of the same affliction.

Speaking retrospectively of the feelings in this scene, the patient was somewhat horrified, as if he had heard the roaring of the wings of fate over his head. His impression was that somehow in that scene something mysterious had taken its course, something which he called "higher justice." The same vehement effects, the very emotions for which he had once reproached his father so severely, had suddenly appeared in him, who otherwise thought so much of his self-control and gentleness. Suddenly he had felt the urge to behave in the same rash and unjust way as his father, to behave in a way that had once appeared so incomprehensible, even unforgivable to him. His shock was, in a way, an apology to the long dead father.

Parents may thus become educators from beyond the grave, parents who never were distinguished pedagogues here on earth. The influence of a fear of reprisal and of the unconscious feeling of guilt shows unmistakably in the affective stress and in the character of the described sensations. For the belief in a "higher justice" to which the patient professed, it may also have been decisively significant.

A mood reported by another patient may have resulted from a similar psychological constellation. The previous day, she recounted in her analytic session, she had suddenly experienced a lively feeling of *déjà vecu* which was accompanied by mildly melancholy sensations. She had reposed on her sofa half-reclining and looking, "thoughtlessly," as she said, at her four children at play. She realized she was looking rather inattentively at the children. Suddenly she became conscious, in a peculiar way, of her position on the sofa, of the light falling into the room, of the playing children and the whole situation. She described her feelings as though she had had a thought absence for seconds, while at the same time embracing with her eyes the whole room with all that was happening in it. It was as if she had been, somehow, observing herself in

doing so. It was not, however, a state of depersonalization because she felt an odd sadness, like a mood of farewell, while she was looking at her children at play. She now admits she might have had some thoughts during that time but she could not say anything about their kind and content. She could only say that she must have once before experienced a quite similar situation with similar feelings.

Afterwards, analytic investigation showed that the special mood, this constellation of feelings she pointed out, lost its mysteriousness, once it was assumed that an unconscious remembrance emerged in her. All the thoughts coming up in later associations suggested the reconstruction of a remembrance of the patient's mother. Eventually she was, indeed, able to remember a scene in which she had once observed her mother. This scene had, for reasons not known to her, impressed her deeply. Her mother had been lying on a sofa, as she had been now, and had been looking at her children playing in her room, with a special, peculiar expression in her eyes. The patient's age was at that time approximately the same as that of one of her children. From certain circumstances determinable in time, the fact could be reconstructed that her mother had by that time been suffering from cancer of the uterus. In that scene, the patient must have identified herself intensively with her mother. Furthermore, a faint understanding must have arisen in her of what her mother felt at the time, while she was perhaps thinking of an early death and looked sadly at her children's play.

The whole recollection, however, was unconscious during the situation proper. This is indicated through the feeling of *déjà vecu* as well as in the feeling of looking at herself, which is a reverberation of her attentive observation of her own mother in that forgotten scene. Certain traits will, to the analyst, point the way into long forgotten childhood, as, for instance, the situation of the mother and the children at play, the melancholy glance which observes and at the same time looks inward. Also the knowledge, that has become unconscious, has made possible an intuitive comprehension of the little scene. During the preceding few days,

the patient happened to have suffered from abdominal pains and it was easy to guess that she was unconsciously afraid of an imminent affliction of the uterus, even though her physicians had made another, less serious diagnosis.

In both cases, an unconscious identification, based on a remembrance, had developed in the two scenes. The process of identification enabled these people to understand better the particular mood of the object with whom they identified themselves, in a similar situation, and to appreciate it psychologically. This beginning human comprehension, this intuitive understanding of emotional processes in the old objects toward whom there was an ambivalent attitude, cannot be something entirely new. Even though the approach to the same situation and increasing age enhance identification and the deepening of understanding, there must also be other unconscious factors exerting influence in the psychic genesis of those special moods, those evanescing and still impressive moments.

The empathic understanding cannot originate primarily in the similarity of the situation. Rather, there must be involved a kind of regression to childlike understanding which at the time comprehended, perhaps still without adequate verbal presentations, the emotional situation of the parents. The observing child had already possessed at that time something that adult intellect might fail to grasp. Besides all their affective wondering, there must have been in the children, even then, a certain budding psychological understanding of the meaning of the father's inexplicable vehemence, and of the reason why the mother's glance rested so full of graveness and melancholy upon her children.

It is difficult to determine this pre-knowledge and understanding of children at its best. One may compare it to an instinctive insight. Also, the special psychological interest on the part of many children must be acknowledged. It often makes them sense with remarkable accuracy connections that are not comprehensible to their intellect. Sometimes their beginning interest enables them to recognize intuitively the innermost motives of human action, the understanding of which so often eludes adult compre-

hension. We find, therefore, not new knowledge, but a renewed recognition of psychic processes. This recognition is made possible by several factors, of which unconscious anxiety is of special significance. From the unusual kind of feelings in those scenes and from the whole situation, we can conclude that this understanding originated in the memory of the parents' illness and death, and that one of its sources is one's own fear of death. Here Thanatos becomes a teacher. The reaction to fear of death opens secret, hitherto closed passages. By unconscious powers of conscience, this understanding has been prepared and helped to break through. Now it dawns on us that in the establishment of the principle of a "higher justice," a psychological, rather than a metaphysical, fact was concerned.

This impression is strengthened by examples like the following, from the life story of a neurotically disturbed woman. As a girl, Mary was often invited to the house of an older married friend with whom she had been at school. This friend's husband was increasingly attractive to Mary, and the more she struggled against it, the more deeply she felt her interest in him. He reciprocated with the same intensity. Mutual interests and tasks enhanced this affection. After a long emotional conflict, Mary agreed to enter into secret love relations with her friend's husband. The divorce of the married couple ensued and the old friendship was severed. Happy and full of glad hopes, the girl entered into marriage after her long time of suffering. In the beginning, the harmony of this marriage seemed unruffled. After a certain time, Mary met a young girl whose peculiarly confident and gay nature exerted a special attraction upon her. She drew her into their circle, was able to win her over to her and her husband's special interests and became close friends with the girl. The fact, that for many months she was unaware that her husband was falling under this girl's spell and was unaware of the girl's being in an inner conflict exactly like the one she had experienced, appeared definitely to be caused by an emotional blindness. So Mary was destined to experience all the painful feelings that the first wife of her husband, her conquered rival, had once experienced, to suffer the same effects of

jealousy, defiance and repudiated love that she had caused her friend. Even to a superficial observer, it was only too clear that the old game repeated itself, but with roles exchanged. The victor of yesterday was the vanquished of today. Having first conquered, she now succumbed. She who suffered now, had earlier caused suffering to others. She broke with her friend, and her husband left her to follow the younger and more attractive woman, as he had done before. Consequently, Mary had a nervous breakdown that finally brought her into analysis. The analysis had to be interrupted prematurely but apparently it helped her to find new happiness or at least a new illusion that she called happiness, after such severe vicissitudes.

In following that whole course of fate, the first impression is, that with all its ups and downs, its glamor and misery shown here only in very much abbreviated form, this course has somehow been contrived. Here, a believer could really find a confirmation of the figment of a law of higher justice. He would be satisfied that anything arbitrary, unpredictable, irrational has receded and that an element of symmetry or equalization in fate has seemed to come forward. The line followed by this and many another fate seems no more to be an indecipherable zig-zag, disorganized and confused. Yet this impression would be wrong.

In analysis, anything recognizable as being in accord with a causal law definitely leads to the discovery of certain childhood impressions reverberating in the depths, to peculiarities of the libidinal and ego-development, to influences of education and of the external world. Was it, for instance, by accident that Mary drew the girl ever more closely to herself and that she introduced her to her own husband, and was there not a bit of hidden homosexual inclination effective here? Was it fate coming from outside, a lot imposed by dark powers that, in turn, she had to experience all the suffering she had caused to the other woman? Was it not rather the identification, gradually asserting itself, with her older friend whom she had loved so dearly, that was operating in the unconscious depths? Didn't the frequently recurring memory that Mary's father had left her mother to follow "the other

woman," a memory of a short stay of the child with the latter, of her vacillation between mother and father have some influence upon the way in which Mary's fate developed? Didn't a similar situation in the home of the parents of her husband perhaps have some emotional significance which could have determined his fate?

We can then see how the semblance of a transcendental, higher justice scatters and vanishes. Whatever remains of that semblance can be reduced, in analytic consideration, to the effects of psychic dynamics. That which seems to indicate metaphysical effects in the fleeting events we call human fate, appears in analysis as simultaneous external circumstances, and unconscious factors. The drama of destiny of a playwright would, of course, be well justified in trying to see rise, fall and catastrophe in Mary's fate or in that of other people. The playwright would look for a transcendent meaning or significance in it—with somewhat less justification. What meaning can be seen there is, however, not a metaphysical connection, but a psychological one. In the place of the metaphysical thinking that, after the manner of the old philosophers, clouds the water to make it appear deep, metapsychological thinking, according to Freud, must set in. The vicissitudes of the drives and the formation of the superego, the effects of the instinctual powers and of the powers of conscience that can be traced to them, assume greater importance here than the works of supernatural, incomprehensible powers. The veil is not so much to be removed from the transcendental, as from the minds of men. It is not guilt or innocence that expresses itself, for instance, in the development of the fate described above and of so many that could be described, but the effects of an unconscious feeling of guilt, once acquired by the still weak and undeveloped ego in childhood, a feeling of which it could not rid itself.

We should best refrain from any final statement about the events of the world. Even the impression of a pre-established disharmony, of a contrived disorder, of predestined utter chaos, may be inadequate. In any case, nothing can be noticed of a higher justice except for that childhood belief present in our uncon-

scious psychic life. The time has come to give that up, too. "Away with the holy parables, the pious hypotheses!," to speak with Heinrich Heine. What we are left with, after an attempt to solve forthwith the "cursed questions," is an inkling of how deep the unconscious forces of our emotional life are, which contribute to the determining of our fate, and how much we still depend upon the ideas of forgotten forefathers who have been dust and ashes for a long time. The believers, the majority of whom can be found today outside the Church, recognize, in special whims of fate, the influence of a higher justice. They can tell guilt from innocence. Those with more insight know of the simultaneous effects of exogenic factors and of inner impulses and of the fact that, in the process, often an old figment, an illusion never completely overcome, has gained the upper hand in the psychic life of the individual. Pure joy in faith is left only to the saints and to some professors of the exact sciences.

VII

About the Genesis of the Superego

THE genesis of the superego has been clearly described by Freud. The significance of the concept of this factor in psychic life, and its psychological effects, has by no means been appreciated fully as yet. I believe that such appreciation requires the discussion of certain essential points that need clarification. This discussion cannot, however, be expected to afford a complete explanation. Its character will be, rather, that of a psychological consideration. He who knows that complete darkness prevailed until recently in these passages of the emotional underworld will not expect the first light that penetrates to illuminate everything. Certainly, there will result many erroneous or inexact observations, but that does not absolve us of the duty to explore. Jakob Grimm once said, "We must have the courage to make mistakes, too."

The formation of the superego, the taking of the father into the ego, can occur only when the conflict between the anxiety and the impulses originating in the Oedipus complex has attained a certain intensity and a certain form. There is some truth in the statement that the formation of the superego is a psychic consequence of castration-anxiety, but it does not seem to be sufficiently exact. The original identification of the small boy with his father is continued in the emotional incorporation of the father into the ego in the form of the superego. Formation of the superego is an attempt to overcome the fear of the father, an attempt which was preceded by others. It has been too little noted, as yet, that the establishment of the superego shows, in itself, that it is a phenomenon of reaction to a fantasied overcoming of, and doing away with, the father. While it establishes the father's power for-

ever, it also replaces it to some extent, making the effects of his presence superfluous to a certain degree by taking over his sphere of influence. He who has erected those prohibitions in himself is no longer so much in need of the external veto that still remains in existence in the background.

The comparison of this development with the formation of the reality function preceding it is revealing. The ego, facing the perceptual world, experiences external stimuli that leave traces of memory and that enable the ego later to recognize gradually which of these stimuli may be expected to give pleasure and which unpleasure. This remembrance then functions upon the approach to the stimulus as a signal, as an indication of something familiar. Little by little, the ego spares itself the trouble of having the same unpleasurable experience over and over again, of being warned by remembrance. Its emergence is, as it were, an abbreviated, probational reliving of the previously felt sensation of unpleasure. The external experience comes to be a possession of the ego through memory, and thus, its repetition becomes superfluous.

There exist also intermediary links between this acquisition of the sense of reality and the formation of the superego. I shall select the most important one, the parents' warnings of the possible dangers of reality, their pointing to injuries, their exhortations to postpone an immediate instinctual gratification, etc. Later, these warnings and exhortations are pushed into the background and eventually made superfluous by two factors, the growing experience of the ego and the introjection of the parents as warners. In the analysis of pampered children, or children educated with special care, we can often see that the external warning has been transposed into an internal one, its origin frequently staying unconscious. The parental warning or reminder has now changed into an inner reminder of the ego. Now the independence of the growing child will often turn angrily or indignantly against the mother's or father's warning of possible dangers and say, "I know that myself."

As in this building up of the reality function, the parental share in it gradually becomes an internal, unconscious possession

that makes the warnings of the parents themselves superfluous. The parental authority is done away with to a certain extent in the building up of the superego and of morality. The same phenomenon that testifies to the internal gain of power on the part of parental authority, shows the decline of its external power. That which achieves internal victory, had first to be thoroughly conquered. The reactive character of the superego reveals itself in this enthroning of the father after the revolution.

In analytical circles, too little notice has been taken as yet of the psychological fact that in establishing the superego, the ego seizes power over the father. What has been emphasized is the fact, more important, of course, that the father takes possession of the ego in this process. Now it is no longer the father himself who is feared and loved. It is part of the ego that arouses fear. The superego, a part of the ego, now says, "You shall not"—no longer the father in reality. The actual father may appear much less significant than this inner factor, and the small boy can even criticize him sharply on occasion. It is the super-father in the ego who gives orders and who forbids.*

I must say once again that the psychogenesis of the superego represents an attempt to overcome the fear of the father. Also, it should be noted that in the same period the father, transformed in the superego, is assigned a much greater power and importance than the father in reality. The formation of the superego might best be likened to an act of preservation. The prerequisite is that the object be dead. Then it may last in its changed form for thousands of years and arouse shudders and anxiety. The formation of the superego signifies, therefore, simultaneously, the dispatch and the exaltation of the father, indicating the point at which his fall became the transition to his greatest triumph.

* The super-father, projected outward, is now called God. This psychogenesis of the belief in God from the idealization of the father is possible only when the figure of the father joins the ranks of the idealized forbears:

> "I, as an idol, joined him, the idol.
> I waste away, becoming my idol, myself."
> (Goethe, Faust II)

It is because of the difficulties encountered in the psychological explanation of individual development that we seem to be justified in taking into consideration the analogy in collective psychic life. This is the more so because, according to Freud's explanation, the superego reflects all that the evolution and the fate of man have created and left behind in the id. The primal father of the primitive horde had been a powerful, violent and dreaded tyrant. His fall became, hundreds of thousands of years later, the condition for his rise. The first legends about him were certainly created while he still lived but their development reached its peak long after his death. In memory he grew again into the primal image of an omnipotent authority. Never was his superior force so unrestricted and magnificent before his sons until long after they had convinced themselves of his powerlessness. As the time since his disappearance increased, the brighter became his image.

The more profound the certainty, the security of his being dead, the more alive he grew in them. What, little by little, detached itself from the earth and moved towards heaven, had first to be sunk deep down in the earth. Out of the process of his decay, a new world arose and out of the dark into which he sank ever more deeply, a brightness grew which illumined the world.

Here again is a repetition of the development in which fall and rise constitute an event complete in itself. I have made an attempt to comprehend the projection of the totem animal upon the sky, as the typical case of its psychic "dispatch," in a paper concerning the psychology of religion, "Oedipus and the Sphinx."* There I show that, at the time when that projection occurred, religious development had already progressed via the totemistic phase to other concepts of the deity. "Now it could throw the totems that had become obsolete into the celestial lumber room." I mentioned in my paper that the rise of the deity meant not only

* "Image," VI (1920), p. 95 f. On page 110 of this issue, this statement can be found, "The Egyptian gods were mortal, but while their bandaged and well-wrapped bodies lay in their earthly graves, their souls shone as bright stars in the firmament."

an advancement, but, unconsciously, also a removal and, as seen from earth, a kind of secret dispossession.

In this new concept of religion, the old psychic dynamics still prevail which are generally effective in the formation of religion. The respect, love and esteem for the deity have reached their highest point. Simultaneously, however, the revolutionary unconscious wishes that aim at its removal break through. This process represents a second or third edition of a similar one that preceded it long before. Totemism was one attempt to overcome the fear of the father, accomplished through the mechanism of displacement. Likewise, the displacement of anxiety in the infantile phobias concerning animals can be understood as an attempt to master anxiety.

The formation of the superego is only the last link joining this chain. It continues the killing of the father in the form of incorporation into the ego. It commemorates his victory, but also his ruin. It is a token of the immortality, but also of the transitoriness of his power. It eternalizes him, repressing him in reality. It is the representation of an emotional "*le roi est mort, vive le roi*," where the new king is the ego enriched by the superego.

There must be a connection between the features described here and the fact that the superego usually attenuates its strictness as the individual grows older, though there are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. The emotional attitude towards the father is changed by the partial achievement of the goals desired in childhood. The drives of the id have become less urgent and the ego has become more similar to the father. The absolutistic reign changes gradually to a democratic one that exhibits the tolerance and weakness peculiar to all democracies. The pressure of the id and the tyranny of the superego give way to more temperate trends. The technique of non-violence has achieved victory in emotional life.

This process of gradual assimilation with the father and of declining strictness of the superego can sometimes be observed in the analysis of neuroses. In the fates of many neurotic persons there appears with advancing age something akin to a late peace,

a peace in which all emotional crises and struggles lose in intensity. This peace signifies psychic attrition rather than a victory over the power of those much resisted instinctual impulses. It signifies an asylum for the emotionally homeless rather than a home. Still, the decisive fact cannot be overlooked: this self-adjustment and subordination, often after the superego along with the cruel id-impulses had led the ego to the brink of disaster, is due also to the decline of the strictness of the moral, self-destroying factors of the ego.

One of those pensive sayings, melancholy even in their gaiety, which live on in my people, comes to mind here: "How fortunate that not only the hunted tire, but the hunters, too!" That may offer comfort to those who are still being chased. The dead are left cold by this and any other wisdom of the world.