Karl Popper’s Falsification and the Demarcation of Scientific Knowledge: A Digest

In the pursuit of understanding what makes a science a science, we are faced with the challenge of demarcation. This challenge requires us to differentiate between genuine sciences and pseudo sciences in a motivated and nonarbitrary way. While it is important to acknowledge other epistemically special endeavors like mathematics, engineering, and art, our main focus is on distinguishing between true sciences and those that falsely claim the special epistemic status that science holds.

 

 

Understanding the Demarcation of Science

One project of science is involved in asking ‘how do we know what we think we know ?’; what means do we use to test what we believe, and how do these tests contribute to – or take away from – how reliable our beliefs are ?  Take for example a belief that fire is an illusion and will not damage the flesh; it could be argued that each person goes through some rudimentary process which engages the basic fundamentals of scientific method in order to formulate a belief about fire and how to appropriately interact with it as a phenomenon.

 

In such a context people generally adopt the belief that fire is hot and damages things, as over time experience of fire has a constancy of characteristic sufficient to measure and predict the fact that if someone puts something into a fire, it will burn.  A pseudo scientific perspective might argue that it is not hot, that it does not burn and that there are obscure principles which demonstrate that it does not have this physical effect.

 

 

Pseudoscience and Faulty Reasoning

Pseudo scientific claims are sometimes a result of faulty reasoning and sometimes a result of people claiming to have special knowledge which others do not or cannot comprehend; the second of these can be a part of an attempt of some individual as a part of a culture to hold influence over other people, and is unconnected to science.  This kind of behaviour can be considered a part of ‘eristics‘; a word in philosophy and rhetoric (derived from ‘Eris’, the ancient Greek goddess of chaos, strife, and discord) used to refer to an argument which aims to successfully dispute another’s argument, rather than searching for truth.

 

Astrology serves as a classic example of a pseudo science, as it claims the same epistemic status as science but does not merit such recognition. Although pseudo sciences may sometimes make true and important claims, they are not supported in the same rigorous manner as scientific claims. Similarly, scientific theories are not immune to being false, but they deserve recognition as worthy competitors in the field of scientific inquiry.

 

 

Astrology as a Case Study of Pseudoscience

Astrology and horoscopes as we commonly encounter them give us examples of what is known as the ‘Barnum Effect’ – also known as the Forer effect.  The psychology of perception is necessarily an important inclusion in the philosophy of science as it holds helpful descriptive power on how humans decieve themselves and others for a range of motivations as well as offering accounts on where perception falls short of apprehension and where illusionary imagination is used to fill in the blanks. The same kind of confirmation bias occurs in a range of psychometric tests of personality.

 

 

The Barnum Effect and Psychological Insights

The psychologist Paul Meehl coined the term ‘Barnum Effect’ based on his colleagues work in order to stigmatise certain psychometric tests as the pseudoscience which they have turned out to be on scrutiny.  Meehl wrote in his 1956 paper:

 

“Many psychometric reports bear a disconcerting resemblance to what my colleague Donald G. Paterson calls ‘personality description after the manner of P. T. Barnum’ (see Blum & Balinsky, 1951, p. 47; Dunnette, 1957, p. 223). I suggest—and I am quite serious—that we adopt the phrase Barnum effect to stigmatize those pseudo-successful clinical procedures in which personality descriptions from tests are made to fit the patient largely or wholly by virtue of their triviality; and in which any nontrivial, but perhaps erroneous, inferences are hidden in a context of assertions or denials which carry high confidence simply because of the population base rates, regardless of the test’s validity. I think this fallacy is at least as important and frequent as others for which we have familiar labels (halo effect, leniency error, contamination, etc.). One of the best ways to increase the general sensitivity to such fallacies is to give them a name. We ought to make our clinical students as acutely aware of the Barnum effect as they are of the dangers of countertransference or the standard error of r.”

Meehl, P.E. (2005). Wanted – A Good Cookbook, American Psychologist, 1956, 11, 263-272.

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Blum, M. L., & Balinsky, B. (1951). Pseudo-Scientific Guidance in Counseling and psychology: vocational psychology and its relation to educational and personal counseling. Prentice-Hall. p. 47

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In the above text book (Blum & Balinsky, 1951) that we find mention to Forer’s classic experiment and paper “The Fallacy of Personal Validation: A classroom Demonstration of Gullibility” which starts: “This paper is concerned with some of the methodological errors which can affect estimations of the validity of personality interpretations and measuring instruments. Of prime significance is the nature of the interpretations themselves. Personality evaluations can be, and often are, couched in such general terms that they are meaningless in terms of denotability in behavior of denotability in behavior. Or they may have ‘‘universal validity” and apply to everyone. Bobertag (2) refers to the universally valid personality trait as Universalscharaffteristik.”

 

Forer created a test for his classroom which involved students responding to a list of character traits which he had predesigned in such a way that everyone could see themselves in them to some extent.  Forer demonstrated the cognitive biases in contexts lik the analysis of personality and behaviour.  Given the correct criteria of circumstance and wording, a psychological/psychiatric assertion may say more about the person doing the categorization than about the person who is being categorized.  Currently there are many disagreements over use of psychiatric terms and the lack of falsifiable evidence bases associated with them.

 

 

Forer, Bertram R., “The Fallacy of Personal Validation: A Classroom Demonstration of Gullibility,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44: 118-123 (1949).

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The Influence of Psychological and Sociological Perspectives

Moving on; Thomas Seyfried an American professor of biology, genetics, and biochemistry at Boston College brings some useful quotes together to illustrate how psychological, sociological and political foibles can affect people in their quest for truer understandings more representative of ‘what is’ in the universe (as opposed to ‘what we think ought to be).  These I will draw on as they are helpful in identifying how paradigms can produce sedimentary cultures around which industries, personalities and reputations come to be built and ossify.  Below I attempt to source the original references:

 

 

The first quote is from Carl Sagan, famous commentator on science and public personality who inspired many generations to learn more about the universe and the way it works:

 

“We live In a society exquisitely dependent on science and technology, in which hardly anyone knows anything about science and technology. This is a clear prescription for disaster. It’s dangerous and stupid for us to remain ignorant about global warming, say, or ozone depletion, toxic and radioactive wastes, acid rain. Jobs and wages depend on science and technology.”

 

From the article in Parade Magazine ‘Why We Need To Understand Science: Ignorance of science threatens our economic well-being, national security, and the democratic process. We must do better’ by Carl Sagan, September 10, 1989: Click here to download

 

Seyfried’s second quote is from Leo Tolstoy’s book ‘The Kingdom of God Is Within You’: “Even the strongest current of water cannot add a drop to a cup which is already full. The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him. The Christian doctrine is presented to the men of our world to-day as a doctrine which everyone has known so long and accepted so unhesitatingly in all its minutest details that it cannot be understood in any other way than it is understood now.” (Page 36)

 

 

Leo, T., & Constance, G. (2024). The Kingdom of God Is Within You.

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The Relationship Between Faith and Science

It is an interesting quote which Seyfried chose to draw on raising what is often popularly thought of as a polar opposite of how science is notionalised; that is, thinking from a faith context.  The perspective I take faith operates as a necessary part of reason without it being sufficient in itself.  It feels problematic to pitch science and faith as polar dichotomies, a habit of thought which fails to exercise perception in terms of non-binary perception.

 

If we see in faith the functions of ‘trust, belief and confidence’, the etymological roots, it seems sensible enough that these modes of thinking are necessary to engage in order to get at ‘knowledge’ for without being able to operate through these modes we would become so behaviourally limited that we would not be able to test anything.

 

I offer these thoughts up as personal ponderings to enrich discussion rather than as proofs, partly because of a question put to me by Izobel Brown ‘why would you believe in something which you have no evidence for ?’.  Good question, important question. This formulation puts forward ‘faith leads to knowledge through reason’ which can be reworked as trust and confidence leads to knowing-ness/knowledge through thought.  To analyse these amateur notions of philosophy, in part I must imagine that they are true in order to examine how they hold up in the light of day.

 

In some ways I feel this scheme speaks to aspects of Thomas Henry Huxley’s operational Agnosticism in remaining open to ideas as a fundamental position as a starting point for knowledge is not having been in a position to have the necessary experience in order to assess something as a truth claim.  This also brings to mind the expression attributed to Hippocrates “Life is short and Art is long; opportunity fleeting, experiment treacherous, judgment difficult.”, so in my own context faith often functions as a sort of theoretical particle needed in order to get beyond the fatalities which can accompany some cynicisms.

 

The Role of Paradigms in Scientific Understanding

Returning to Seyfried’s choice of quotations, he draws on Francis Bacon arguing him as ‘the originator of the scientific method’: “Once a man’s understanding has settled on something (either because it is an accepted belief or because it pleases him), it draws everything else also to support find agree with it. And if it encounters a larger number of more powerful countervailing examples it either fails to notice them, or disregards them, or makes fine distinctions to dismiss and reject them, and all this with much dangerous prejudice; to preserve the authority of its first conceptions” (page 43)

 

 

Bacon, F., Jardine, L., Silverthorne, M., Ameriks, K., & Clarke, D. M. (2000). Francis Bacon : the New Organon. Cambridge University Press, page 43

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The Impact of Social Constructs on Understanding Science

The fourth quote he draws on is from Upton Sinclair: “The newspapers said it would be that way with our fifty dollars a month pension. They would challenge me to say where I was going to get that money, and when I answered they did not publish what I said. Impossible for any editor of a commercial newspaper to understand the difference between a profit system in a state of collapse, driving the State and everybody in it to bankruptcy, and a system of production for use in process of growth, providing security and plenty for all. used to say to our audiences: ‘It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!’”

 

 

Sinclair, U. (1935). How I got licked and why. T.W. Laurie. Page 109

 

The Importance of Defining Science

Jeffrey L. Kassers online lectures are good taking the reader through a range of key vistas in the development of the philosophy of science. He points out that the distinction between science and pseudo science is not merely a theoretical concern but has practical implications as well. The classification of a discipline as a science can impact its role in school curriculums, the amount of funding it receives, and its overall credibility in society.

 

For example, the controversy surrounding creationism in school curriculums highlights the importance of defining what constitutes a science. Additionally, practices such as IQ testing have been called into question as potentially pseudoscientific, raising concerns about their role in society. A clear definition of science can help resolve such controversies and ensure that important practices are grounded in scientific principles.

 

 

Dr. Rina Bliss is Associate Professor of Sociology at Rutgers University

 

Philosophical Definitions of Science

A definition of science, in the philosophical sense, consists of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that determine the essence of a concept. Legal definitions, such as the criteria for bourbon whiskey, exemplify this concept of definition by outlining the specific requirements that must be met for something to be classified as bourbon. While definitions provide clarity and criteria for distinguishing between concepts, they can be challenging to establish, especially in complex or controversial cases. However, having a clear definition of what constitutes science can help us confidently differentiate between genuine sciences and pseudo sciences.

 

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Although a philosophical definition of science would be ideal, it is not always necessary to draw a confident distinction between science and pseudo science. Necessary conditions can be used to rule out certain disciplines as not meeting the criteria for science, while sufficient conditions can definitively classify others as scientific. While achieving sufficient conditions may seem more challenging than necessary conditions, it is possible to know a sufficient condition without necessarily knowing all the necessary conditions. In the absence of a philosophical definition, we can still make progress in identifying and classifying sciences based on established criteria.

 

What is Meant by Necessary and Sufficient Conditions:  These terms are used in logic to describe conditional and implicational relationships of truth statements:

 

Necessary Conditions

To say that A is a necessary condition for B, is to say the following:

  • Without A, we won’t have B
  • A is required to have B
  • The lack of A guarantees the lack of B
  • B exists only if A exists

 

Sufficient conditions

To say that A is a sufficient condition for B, is to say the following:

If we have A, we will also have B

The presence of A guarantees the presence of B

The existence of A guarantees the existence of B

If A exists, then B exists

 

The Demarcation Problem

One influential solution to the problem of demarcation was proposed by Karl Popper. Popper emphasized falsifiability as a key criterion for distinguishing between science and pseudo science. According to Popper, a scientific theory must be capable of being falsified through empirical evidence. Pseudo sciences, on the other hand, rely on unfalsifiable claims (not capable of being proved false) and lack the rigor and testability that are characteristic of true scientific theories. While Popper’s criterion of falsifiability has been widely debated and critiqued, it remains a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion of what defines a science.

 

This gets discussed as ‘the demarcation problem’ and it highlights the importance of distinguishing between true sciences and pseudo sciences. A clear definition of science aids in resolving controversies, informing educational practices, and guiding use of resources. While achieving a philosophical definition may be challenging, necessary and sufficient conditions can be used to make progress in identifying and classifying sciences. Karl Popper’s criterion of falsifiability offers one perspective on how to differentiate between science and pseudo science, but the debate continues as philosophers and scientists seek to understand what truly makes a science a science.

 

Popper’s Critique of Non-Falsifiable Theories

Karl Popper, the influential philosopher of science, has gained recognition among scientists for his unique perspective on what sets science apart. Popper’s admiration for scientists and his solution to the demarcation problem, a key component of his philosophy of science, have left a lasting impact. Born in Vienna after World War I, Popper was surrounded by a rich cultural atmosphere that fostered intellectual discussions in science and the arts. He was particularly intrigued by Einstein’s theory of relativity, Marx’s theory of history, and the psychological theories of Freud and Adler. Despite the promising nature of these theories during that time, Popper began to question their scientific validity due to their susceptibility to confirmation bias and lack of genuine falsifiability.

 

Popper’s interest in Einstein’s theory of relativity stemmed from its openness to criticism, a quality he found lacking in theories like Marxism, Freudian psychology, and Adlerian psychology. While Einstein’s theory made bold and testable predictions, other theories relied heavily on observational evidence that could be interpreted in various ways to support their claims. Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability as a key criterion for scientific theories was a response to the loose standards of evidential support in pseudo-sciences. He believed that genuine scientific theories should make bold conjectures and be susceptible to being proven wrong by observation.

 

Extension of Criticism to Political Philosophy

In his work “The Open Society and Its Enemies,” published in 1945, Popper extended his emphasis on criticism from the realm of science to political philosophy. He argued that an open society is characterized by the freedom of individuals to voice criticisms of government policies and the willingness of those in power to respond to such criticisms. Despite his advocacy for openness to criticism in both science and politics, Popper himself struggled to accept criticism, highlighting a disconnect between his ideals and his personal behavior.

 

Implications of Falsifiability

Popper’s theory of falsifiability as a criterion for demarcating scientific theories from pseudo-sciences had far-reaching implications. He believed that genuine scientific theories should be risky, making predictions that could potentially be proven false by observation. This contrasted with pseudo-sciences, which were often confirmed by various interpretations of observational evidence. Popper’s formulation of falsifiability as a hallmark of scientific theories challenged traditional views on what constituted scientific validity and emphasized the importance of making bold and testable predictions.

 

Challenges to Popper’s Falsifiability Criterion

Despite the elegance of Popper’s theory of falsifiability, it also faced challenges in practice. The degree to which a theory could be falsified and its scientific status were not always clear-cut, especially in the case of theories like Marxism, which underwent modifications to protect them from apparent falsifying data. This gray area between science and pseudo-science complicated the demarcation project and raised questions about the nature of scientific inquiry.

 

Truzzi’s Notionalising of Pseudoskepticism

It may be helpful to distinguish science from what takes place in the rhetoric of debate separating out the idea that an hypothesis becomes scientific or not via assent of a crowd.  Often it is not so easy to test complex phenomena and the means of testing may not yet be invented or available; there is also the issue of imperfect information in drawing on the benefits of collegial science – i.e. the building of knowledge through the cross referencing and comparison of different people’s/pieces of work.

 

Skepticism here is used to describe the agnostic position and process of health doubt toward knowledge claims in order to distinguish testable claims from mere belief or dogma. Sociologically issues can arise in pseudoskepticism, the characteristics of which were laid out in a commentary by Prof Marcello Truzzi to describe ‘critics who take the negative rather than an agnostic position but still call themselves “skeptics”‘.  The characteristics of pseudoskepticism Marcello wrote about were helpfully distilled into the following:

 

  • Denying, when only doubt has been established
  • Double standards in the application of criticism
  • The tendency to discredit rather than investigate
  • Presenting insufficient evidence or proof
  • Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof
  • Making unsubstantiated counter-claims
  • Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence
  • Suggesting that unconvincing evidence provides grounds for completely dismissing a claim

 

 

Lasting Impact of Popper’s Philosophy

Karl Popper’s philosophy of science, rooted in the principle of falsifiability, has left a lasting impact on the field of scientific inquiry. By emphasizing the importance of making bold conjectures and being open to criticism, Popper challenged traditional notions of scientific validity and championed a more rigorous approach to theory evaluation. Despite facing challenges and limitations, Popper’s work continues to influence how we define and differentiate between genuine scientific theories and pseudo-sciences.

 

Controversies Surrounding Scientific Method

In the debate over the scientific method and the nature of scientific theories, Karl Popper’s ideas have been both influential and controversial. One of the key points of contention is whether scientists seek confirming evidence for their theories. Popper argues that this is not the case; instead, scientists should be focusing on developing theories that can be falsified and attempting to falsify them – in the ideal, the person involved in science would assess if their hypothesis could be tested and attempt to test it until the point of failure.

 

This approach, known as falsifiability, is seen by Popper as a necessary condition for a statement to be considered scientific. However, Kasser suggests it is important to note that falsifiability alone does not guarantee scientific status, as not all falsifiable statements are scientific. Despite this, Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability has been a significant contribution to the philosophy of science.

 

Popper’s Implications for Scientific Evaluation

Popper’s theory is not merely a prescription for how scientists should conduct their research; it also has implications for the evaluation of theories in scientific practice. While Popper does not offer a definitive definition of scientific status, he suggests that scientific statements must be falsifiable.

 

Simply put, if something cannot be tested, then it cannot be scientific.  Adding complexity into this, something may only become testable diachronically (over time), such as happens with orbiting comets with large time signatures.  Science is not simple.

 

This criterion serves as a way to distinguish between scientific theories and other types of claims, such as metaphysical assertions. Popper acknowledges that certain metaphysical frameworks, like those proposed by Freud, Adler, and Marx, may contain valuable insights despite being untestable in a scientific sense. He also recognizes that non-scientific theories, such as atomism, can still contribute to scientific progress indirectly.

 

Challenges with Probability Statements

One of the challenges that Popper’s falsifiability criterion faces is the issue of probability statements. Popper acknowledges the importance of probability in scientific inquiry but struggles to provide a clear criteria for how scientists should handle improbable events. He suggests that scientists can reach a consensus on what constitutes a falsification based on probability, but this approach raises questions about the basis for such agreement. Additionally, Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability as a logical property of statements may oversimplify the complex relationship between scientific theories and their empirical support.

 

Empirical support may change over time for a range of reasons.  This gets hotly debated especially since the hailing of double blind crossover placebo controlled trials (for example) as a gold standard of evidence.  The cost of these studies is so considerable that relatively few get done and relatively few people get to do them.  It raises philosophical questions about how rigidly discounting methods of observation outside of these culturally situated norms which can be tested none-the-less can hinder progress through science.

 

The Pragmatic Approach to Theory Modification

Another criticism of Popper’s theory is its treatment of scientific theories as disposable entities that should be discarded when faced with contradictory evidence. While Popper advocates for a rigorous approach to theory testing and modification, he fails to address the practical considerations that scientists must balance when evaluating theories.

 

Scientific theories often undergo modifications in response to new evidence rather than being outright discarded, as seen in the case of Newtonian physics and the discovery of Neptune. This pragmatic approach highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of how scientific theories evolve in response to empirical challenges.

 

The Dynamic Nature of Scientific Inquiry

Ultimately, Popper’s theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the nature of scientific inquiry and the criteria for evaluating scientific theories. While his emphasis on falsifiability as a necessary condition for scientific status has shaped modern philosophy of science, it also raises important questions about the complexities of scientific practice. By examining the limitations and implications of Popper’s ideas, we can gain a deeper insight into the dynamic relationship between theory and evidence in the scientific process.

 

This article is a supplemented digest of the work of Prof Jeffrey L. Kasser, Ph.D. who did a Philosophy of Science course as a part of The Teaching Company audio productions. It is recommended for the reader to listen to Kasser’s presentation embedded in the article above; it is also recommended for the active learner to hand write their own notes from working through this as this practice helps extend the memory and develop deeper understandings.